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CANADIAN POLITICS IN THE SIXTIES

I

CANADIAN elections have in recent years been a puzzle to analysts trying to detect swings to the Left or to the Right in the voting habits of the Western democracies considered as a single political community. When in the late nineteen-fifties the Conservative party won two national elections from the Liberals, who had been in office since 1935, some observers saw it as a Canadian reflection of a general swing to the Left in the Western world, while others interpreted it to be a belated manifestation of the turn to the Right in the early fifties that had elected Eisenhower in the United States, Adenauer in West Germany and dethroned the postwar Labor government in Britain. Canadian commentators generally favored the first interpretation, if only because it was more flattering to see Canada as the leader of a larger trend instead of a laggard ingloriously catching up with the older nations of the West.

Both views had some plausibility. The Conservatives were led by John Diefenbaker, a prairie radical who had always been to the Left of his party, and the Liberals, especially under the French-Canadian corporation lawyer, Louis St. Laurent, had begun to resemble a comfortable and arrogant Establishment after more than twenty years in power. On the other hand, the Conservatives claimed, after all, to be conservatives with a small "c" and had always been the party most closely linked to the business interests of Montreal and Toronto.

The alleged swing to the Left in the late fifties turned out

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to be a bit premature, if not a total illusion, although it is once again being predicted, at least in Britain and Western Europe. But the Canadian election of last June has produced so inconclusive a verdict that it should thoroughly confound anyone determined to fit it to a clear-cut trend, whether in the Western world at large or in Canada itself. The Conservatives were returned to office as a minority government, showing a decline in parliamentary seats and in the popular vote which was the second greatest ever suffered in Canadian history by a government in power. The Liberals made substantial gains in seats and a more modest advance in the popular vote, while the Social Credit party, which had lost its entire parliamentary representation in 1958 and had been confidently written off as a force in federal politics, picked up thirty seats, twenty-six of them in the province of Quebec where the party had never before had a following. The other minor party, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), reconstituted under a new name as the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961, made less spectacular gains, although its popular vote continued to surpass that of Social Credit.

If one classifies the parties as Left or Right, the Conservatives may be described as a party of the moderate Right to Center, the Liberals represent a moderate Left to Center tendency, the NDP, successor to the socialist CCF, is clearly a party of the Left, and Social Credit represents the extreme Right. But such a classification is intolerably crude, ignoring the traditions of each party, their origins—especially important in the case of the two minor parties—and the voting groups in the population from which they draw their greatest electoral support. The simple Left-Right dichotomy, so beloved to trend-spotters seeking broad tendencies cutting across the diversities of national electorates, often confuses more than it clarifies the politics of a particular country in a particular historical period. Canadian political commentators, unfortunately, are peculiarly addicted to it, partly because they still tend to take British politics as their model for understanding Canada and partly because many of them, particularly the university intellectuals, have long been supporters of the CCF, now the NDP, whose goal for over thirty

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years has been to become the Canadian counterpart of the British Labor party, realigning the Canadian party system along a clear Left-Right axis.

II

The results of the 1962 election closely resemble at first glance the outcome of the 1957 election. In that year the long-reigning Liberals were barely toppled by the Conservatives, who failed to win a parliamentary majority when the two minor parties also gained at the expense of the Liberals. The Conservatives won 113 seats, the Liberals 106 and the minor parties a combined total of 44. Last June's election produced an almost identical line-up in the House of Commons: 115 Conservatives, who have once again formed a minority government, 101 Liberals and 49 members from the minor parties. If one bears in mind that in the "Tory landslide" of 1958 the Conservatives won 208 seats, reducing the Liberals to 49 and the minor parties to a mere 8, the appearance of a return to the 1957 pattern is striking. And the division of the popular vote tells roughly the same story: in 1957 the Conservatives and Liberals each polled about forty per cent of the total, the CCF eleven per cent and Social Credit six per cent, while in 1962 the two major parties were again tied, each with thirty-seven per cent (the Conservatives declining from fifty-five per cent in 1958), the New Democrats had fourteen per cent and Social Credit twelve per cent.

It is easy to conclude from this that the Conservative sweep of 1958 resulted from a transitory situation and in no way signified, though it was widely so interpreted at the time, the coming to power of a new national coalition that could be expected to dominate Canada for as long a period as the Liberals had succeeded in doing. The rise of a new political leader in the person of John Diefenbaker, whose visionary oratory stirred the recently-born national pride of Canadians, was one element in the situation that could not recur once the oratory had to be matched against performance in office. Perhaps a more important factor, however, was the fear of weak, unstable government evoked by the evenly-divided Parliament elected in 1957. Diefenbaker's plea for a majority to give him a real mandate to govern was supported by

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much non-partisan hand-wringing over the dangerous paralysis alleged to follow from minority government.

The reaction of the Canadian electorate in the last three elections suggests a wildly swinging gyroscope that repeatedly overreaches its target. In 1957 the desire to provide an effective opposition in Ottawa to the Liberals, who had won top-heavy parliamentary majorities in two previous elections, was probably even more widespread than the "time for a change" feeling that inevitably erodes the following of a party long in power. But the two minor parties as well as the Conservatives were the beneficiaries of these sentiments with the result that a government which had been regarded as too strong was replaced by one which was viewed as too weak. So in 1958 the electorate, showing an altogether unprecedented voting consistency from one end of Canada to the other, returned the Conservatives with a majority so large that it exceeded even the Liberals' most impressive triumphs in their salad days. In 1961 Prime Minister Diefenbaker and his Cabinet became involved in a bitter dispute with the Governor of the Bank of Canada and, cushioned by their huge majority, behaved arrogantly towards Parliament in a manner reminiscent of that of the last St. Laurent Liberal administration. The electorate now appears to have similarly chastised them, once again overreaching itself by restoring the stalemate of 1957. And again one hears expressions of alarm on all sides about the evils of minority government in this period of crisis. These forebodings have been echoed in the American press, which has paid more attention than usual to last year's Canadian election. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were among the "prestige" newspapers which published editorials expressing concern over the risks of a Canadian minority government at a time when the international climate was chilly and Canada faced a balance-of-payments crisis with the United States.

In all likelihood, therefore, there will be another general election in a year or so. If the electorate continues to react like a gyroscope that is out of kilter, one of the old parties should be returned with another big majority in Commons. At the moment, Lester Pearson and the Liberals are the most likely beneficiaries of such a swing. After the 1957 election the Conservatives were surprise victors on their way up, but

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today following the erosion of their 1958 majority they are going down. And the losses they have suffered amount to a personal defeat for John Diefenbaker, just as 1958 was widely seen as his personal triumph. Significantly, many Conservative candidates scarcely mentioned him in their 1962 campaigns, preferring to stress local issues and their own records and qualifications. The results of the election will certainly strengthen such a disposition should another election follow shortly.

Diefenbaker himself is obviously aware of this and has been reminding the public that forty years ago Mackenzie King managed to stay in office for a full term at the head of a Liberal minority government. However, the Conservatives' most "natural" allies in Parliament, the Social Credit party, are unlikely to want to wait four or five years before trying to cash in on their Quebec showing elsewhere in Canada. The Liberals, of course, are anxious for a quick election. Only the New Democrats, short of funds and disappointed by their failure to do as well as expected, are reluctant to face another election immediately, and they are unlikely to want to assume full responsibility for keeping Diefenbaker in office for much longer than a year.

III

Yet if the unbalanced gyroscope theory explains something about Canadian political behavior, it is hardly the whole story. The electorate, as in other countries, does not simply respond uniformly to what is happening in Ottawa, but is divided to an even greater extent than the American electorate into ethnic, economic and regional interest groups which are unequally affected by government policies and have their own traditional party allegiances. The fact that the pattern of voting by population groups in 1962 differed sharply in several respects from the 1957 pattern is as striking as the close correspondence between the overall outcomes of the two elections.

Thus in 1957 the strength of Social Credit and the CCF lay largely in the prairie provinces of the West, the region where both parties were born during the Depression, where each had long controlled at least one provincial government,

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and where their federal voting strength had always been concentrated. In 1958, however, the Conservatives carried nearly every seat in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The Tories are back in office chiefly because they managed to hold on to these gains on the prairies in 1962, with the exception of two seats won by Social Credit in Alberta and two Manitoba seats in the city of Winnipeg carried by the NDP. Yet although they lost almost entirely their prairie bastions, the two minor parties ran slightly better both in seats and in the popular vote than in 1957.

Social Credit's much-publicized victories in Quebec represent the most spectacular shift in voting habits that the election revealed, although not necessarily the most significant in the long run. The NDP also succeeded in compensating for its loss of support from prairie wheat farmers by winning new urban seats in Toronto and Vancouver and by recapturing old CCF seats in Winnipeg, the coal mining region of Nova Scotia and the lumbering districts of British Columbia. Both Social Credit and the CCF were originally parties of agrarian protest with their strength concentrated among prairie wheat farmers. Social Credit, which had long since embraced an ideology similar to that of the so-called "radical right" in the United States, has at least temporarily survived its loss of farm belt support by becoming a new vehicle for the long-standing disenchantment of rural and small town French Canadians with the two old parties. The New Democratic party came into existence in 1961 for the purpose of establishing a closer tie with organized labor than the CCF had ever managed to achieve. Although it improved upon the CCF's past showing in mining and industrial areas across the country, the price appears to have been loss of the CCF's agrarian base in the West.

But no less surprising than the shift in the minor parties' base of support is the Conservative showing on the prairies. Before 1958 Western wheat farmers rarely supported Conservative candidates. Indeed they frequently saw the Tories as their natural enemy: the party of the processing monopolies and the big financial interests in the East which, like the Populists and Western Progressives south of the border, they blamed for their economic plight. For a long time John Diefenbaker was the sole Conservative MP from the

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rural West. As Prime Minister since 1957, Diefenbaker has made a special effort to aid the Western farmers in a number of ways, including the government purchase of wheat surpluses for relief shipments to Communist China. Farmers are notoriously the most hard-headed and self-interested voting group in modern democratic societies and Diefenbaker's agricultural policies have clearly paid off in votes. The wheat growers of Western Canada may very well have finally rejected independent political action through minor parties, choosing instead to trade votes for favors with the major parties which alone are able to win office. In the United States the farmers of the Midwest experienced a similar change of political outlook nearly a half-century ago, as Richard Hofstadter has documented in his history of Populism and Progressivism, *The Age of Reform*. The very decline in the agricultural population makes it easier for the government to buy off the farmers at the expense of the urban taxpayer, while rural over-representation, as much a fact of political life in Canada as in the United States, permits them to retain considerable electoral power.

But if the Conservatives have found a new bastion in the rural West, they suffered unprecedented losses in the cities and the new suburban areas surrounding them. Of the fifty-seven seats in or adjoining Canada's four largest cities—Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Winnipeg—the Conservatives carried only seven, while the Liberals took thirty-seven and the New Democrats ten. Montreal has long been a Liberal stronghold, but the proportions of the Conservative rout in Toronto were unanticipated by the Liberals themselves, who were over-optimistic about Quebec—where they underestimated Social Credit—and over-pessimistic about Ontario. Even the seats won by the Conservatives in what used to be called "Tory Toronto" were carried by small margins, including several held by Cabinet Ministers. Several districts outside the city into which Toronto's rapidly growing suburbs are expanding fell to the Liberals for the first time since Canada became a nation in 1867. That the Tory party should find itself so weak in the cities is truly a surprising development, suggesting that it may be acquiring a pattern of voting support resembling that of the American Republican party with the Liberals and the New Democrats to-

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gether dominating the urban areas as does the northern Democratic party in the United States.

Since it is possible, if not probable, that Lester Pearson may yet become Prime Minister of Canada, it would be premature, not to say unjust, to draw too close a parallel between his career as leader of the Liberal party and that of Adlai Stevenson. Pearson may yet combine the roles of Stevenson and Kennedy, rebuilding his party during the lean years out of office and eventually himself leading it back to the heights of power. But whatever may happen in the future, the recent election reveals the degree to which Pearson has succeeded, especially in Ontario, in giving a "new look" to the Liberals by attracting into their ranks a whole group of young, well-educated and intellectually sophisticated new candidates. University professors, youthful lawyers, and former federal civil servants ran as Liberals, and their appeal to residents of the new suburbs in the Toronto area was comparable to Kennedy's appeal to similar districts in the United States. Pearson himself has tended to rely on "egghead" advisers from the universities and the civil service, often ignoring the counsel of the Liberal party's older professional politicians. While this may have hurt him somewhat in Quebec, it undoubtedly helped him in Ontario.

During the summer of 1961 I spent several weeks in Don Mills, a planned middle-income residential development north of Toronto. It is not unlike Park Forest, Illinois, which William H. Whyte described so fully in *The Organization Man,* although it contains a rather more diversified group of professional men than the young corporation executives who, according to Whyte, were responsible for the oppressive uniformity of Park Forest. I was surprised to discover that Don Mills residents had revitalized the Liberal organization in the constituency and were busy consulting pollsters and university political scientists on voting trends in the area before nominating a candidate for the forthcoming federal election. Successful Liberal candidates in the Toronto area used to be for the most part Jews and Irish Catholics representing the lower-income and immigrant wards in the center of the city. Many of them had a certain aura of the machine politician, although less markedly so than their counterparts in American cities. The Conserv-

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ative candidates, on the other hand, were usually impeccably respectable upper middle class business and professional men of English or Protestant Irish origin. The expansion of the suburbs and the influx of postwar European immigrants into the center of the city has altered the composition and political style of the voting population. In last June's election at least, the Liberals and the New Democrats appear to have adapted themselves more successfully to these changes than the Conservatives.

After the Conservative sweep of 1958, the Liberals were left with only four Cabinet Ministers, including Pearson himself, who had served in the St. Laurent governments. The passage of only two years had brought defeat or retirement to the party's most talented and experienced politicians, leaving the survivors with the almost impossibly heavy burden of leading an effective opposition to the Diefenbaker government on Parliament Hill and finding issues capable of winning popular support in the country. The government's errors rather than the effectiveness of the opposition contributed most to the Conservative losses of 1962, but the new crop of Liberal MP's contains more than enough material for an able and attractive "shadow cabinet."

The concentration of Liberal gains in Ontario rather than Quebec saves the Liberals from becoming, or seeming to become, a predominantly French-Canadian party. In 1957 this appeared to be a real possibility when over half of the Liberals in Commons were elected from Quebec or from French-speaking constituencies elsewhere in Canada and when it was uncertain whether Louis St. Laurent intended to step down from the leadership. Until the 1958 election, Quebec had, with a single exception, voted solidly Liberal since the 1890's. The standard formula for ruling Canada, mastered only by the Liberals in the present century, was to unite French and English Canadians in a single party, alternate the leadership between each ethnic group, and, with Quebec functioning as a "solid South," pick up sufficient seats in English-speaking Canada to win elections and form governments. The three Diefenbaker victories, two of them without much help from Quebec, have finally refuted, or at least outdated, this theory.

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Quebec has now failed to return its traditional Liberal majorities for two straight elections, giving the Conservatives fifty of its seventy-five seats and a slight popular majority over the Liberals in 1958, and splitting its seats three ways in 1962, thirty-five going to the Liberals, twenty-six to Social Credit and fourteen to the Conservatives. The startling Social Credit successes were won from both Conservatives and Liberals but were concentrated in the poorer agricultural regions of the northern and eastern parts of the province, the working-class districts of Quebec City and several small industrial towns. Social Credit made no impact at all in the Montreal area and trailed the Conservatives in the province's popular vote in spite of winning more seats. The regional and economic character of the Social Credit following, the evangelical oratory of Réal Caouette, the provincial leader, and their soft-money, anti-banker program leavened with traditional French-Canadian nationalist sentiment, gives Social Credit some resemblance to the late Poujadist movement in France. The most widely-accepted explanation of the Social Credit upsurge is that the remnants of the political machine of the *Union Nationale,* a provincial Quebec party which has never run candidates in federal elections, helped Social Credit in a large number of rural constituencies. In 1958, before the death of Maurice Duplessis, Premier of Quebec and founder of the *Union Nationale,* and before the later defeat of the *Union* by the provincial Liberals, it was no secret that Duplessis placed his massive political machine at the service of the federal Conservatives. Disillusioned by Diefenbaker's failure to reward Quebec with a large number of Cabinet and sub-Cabinet positions, many *Union* organizers undoubtedly swung to Social Credit in 1962. But reporters who visited the constituencies carried by Social Credit and witnessed Caouette's spell-binding hold over rural audiences are not at all convinced that Social Credit will prove to be a one-election wonder in the province.

IV

Thus the picture across Canada shows the Conservatives strong on the prairies and in the eastern Maritime provinces (although their vote there was down from 1958), the Liberals resurgent in Ontario and retaining considerable Quebec

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strength, Social Credit suddenly emergent as a force in rural Quebec, and the New Democrats beginning to resemble a labor party with scattered strength in urban-industrial areas across Canada outside of Quebec. In British Columbia all four parties won seats with the New Democrats out-polling the others. One hesitates to seek emerging new alignments on a country-wide basis after contemplating this apparently crazy-quilt pattern. Moreover, ever since the 1930's Canadian political analysts have been prematurely killing off the minor parties, which have stubbornly refused to die, or, particularly if they were partisans of the CCF or Social Credit, forecasting the imminent absorption of one of the old parties by its more ideologically programmatic challenger from the Left or the Right. And indeed such things happened in the provincial politics of several Western provinces during the 1940's and 1950's. But they have not spread to federal politics where the electorate has persisted in finding real differences between Conservatives and Liberals and in witholding mass support from the minor parties.

Still, when one notes the fracturing of the French-Canadian vote in Quebec, and groups the Liberal-NDP and Conservative-Social Credit totals across Canada together, it is possible to discern a more pronounced Left-Right division of the national electorate than has been apparent in previous elections. Such a division resembles rather strikingly the Republican-Democratic division in the United States (excluding, of course, the Deep South). In the past, the Liberals under King and St. Laurent seemed able to absorb all ideological currents into their hospitable ranks. Since 1957, the gyroscopic behavior of the electorate as a whole has blurred both old regional and ethnic and new nation-wide rural-urban and economic lines of political cleavage. The jockeying of the four parties in a Parliament that lacks a majority has made strange bedfellows, with a Conservative-NDP *de-facto* coalition by no means an impossibility. And another election may produce yet another gyroscopic swing, probably favoring the Liberals.

Yet Lester Pearson's efforts to transform the Liberals into a party that is unmistakably of the moderate Left, combined with gains in urban Ontario and the loss of former strongholds in rural Quebec, is a significant development. The

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replacement of John Diefenbaker by a more "traditional," business-minded Tory leader would accentuate the trend in Canada towards what political scientists have called the "nationalization of politics." The New Democrats, by solidifying their hold on the trade unions, and Social Credit, by subordinating its "funny money" radicalism to the rural conservatism of its Quebec supporters and the militant "free enterprise" ideology of its Western and national spokesmen, might survive as organizations playing roles similar to those, on the one hand, of the unions and the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) in the Democratic party and, on the other, the right-wing groups from Barry Goldwater fan clubs to the John Birchers in the Republican party. But it is impossible to predict safely with an electorate which has suddenly become as volatile as the Canadian electorate in the past few years.

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NOTE: This article was written before the dissolution of Parliament and the announcement of the election to be held on April 8.

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THE LIMITING PROCESS IN THE KOREAN WAR *

THE problems of limiting local war in the nuclear-missile age have been analyzed by a number of military strategists; [1] particular local wars have been examined by historians and political scientists. This essay represents an attempt to fuse the two approaches and to test the logically derived hypotheses of the strategist against a historical event. Korea was the catalyst which forced policy-makers and strategists to take limited war seriously. An understanding of why and how the war remained limited, in addition to contributing to an evaluation of an important event in the cold war, should be of value in analyzing other local wars, past and future.

THE LIMITS OBSERVED

Before exploring the pressures for restraint, I will briefly outline the limits which were observed by both sides in terms of geography, kinds of weapons, targets and the participation of particular countries.

Geography

Both sides limited ground fighting during the war to the Korean peninsula. The war began with the North Korean invasion of South Korea, and Communist ground troops fought both north and south of the thirty-eighth parallel.

The United Nations forces also restricted their ground and air attacks to the Korean peninsula.[2] One of the major ex-

* This is part of a study of the theory of limited war. For a general theoretical discussion of the limiting process, see Morton H. Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (in press). Among the many people who commented on my discussion of the Korean War in the context of my larger study, I would like to thank Allen S. Whiting and Ellen Moot whose comments on this essay were especially valuable. Mrs. Moot also did research for the paper and made extensive editorial improvements.

1 This literature is listed in the bibliography of Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*.

2 There is some evidence that on at least one occasion United Nations planes strayed over the Yalu and bombed and strafed Chinese villages. See Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York, 1960), 97–100.

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pansions of the war (in terms of the geographical limit) was the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by United Nations ground forces and the march up to the Yalu River, the northern border of North Korea. Nevertheless, the war remained restricted to the Korean peninsula.

Kinds of Weapons

Perhaps the most dramatic and the most frequently discussed limit in the Korean War was the abstention by both sides from the use of atomic capabilities. It should be recalled that these capabilities were substantially smaller than they are now. Both sides had only fission weapons (and no fusion bombs), and both (but particularly the Soviets) had very small stockpiles. Nevertheless, these weapons were potentially decisive, particularly if they had been used in a geographical area more extensive than the Korean peninsula. They would also have had significant impact on the battle had they been used just in Korea. The failure to use nuclear weapons was the only major weapons limit observed by the United Nations forces.[3] On the other hand, the Communist troops not only failed to use nuclear weapons, but also did not employ submarines.[4]

Participation of States

Only the North Koreans and South Koreans participated in the war with all their available forces. The Communist Chinese sent in a large number of troops, but, as Peiping continually stressed, all of them entered the war as "volunteers," for Peiping never declared war. Although there is some evidence that some Russian pilots flew planes for the Chinese Communists,[5] Russia did not overtly intervene with military forces, either air, sea, or ground. Nor did any other Communist state send troops to fight in the war. The Russians supplied large quantities of materiel to both Chinese

[3] Except for biological and chemical weapons.

[4] U. S. Congress. Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, *Military Strategy in the Far East*, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1951, p. 1719. Hereafter cited as "MacArthur Hearings."

[5] Robert Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953* (New York, 1961), 370.

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and North Korean troops and gave them extensive diplomatic support.[6]

On the other side, while a large number of states participated in the defense of South Korea, none of them officially declared war, not even the United States. All contributed troops to a United Nations Command in what was termed by the United States a "police action." But the United Nations did exercise one important restraint on the states involved in the war. It refused the offer of Chiang Kai-shek to send Chinese Nationalist troops into battle.[7] Even after the Chinese Communists came in, the renewed offer of Chinese National troops was rejected.

Targets

Even within the confines of North and South Korea, both sides refrained from attacking important military targets within the area of combat. The Communists did not attack any targets in South Korea.[8] As a result, Pusan and Inchon, the two major ports through which the United Nations supplied its forces, and therefore highly important military targets, remained free from air harassment, although attacks on them probably would have seriously hampered the United Nations military effort. Pusan, which frequently operated at night, was well-lit and a virtually perfect military target. Yet neither port was attacked either from the air or with mines. Nor were there air attacks on convoys of trucks or trains carrying supplies or on troops in the field in South Korean territory.[9]

Thus, except for North Korean guerrilla operations behind the lines, there was no interdiction of American logistical lines in United Nations territory or international waters. The United Nations confined its interference with Communist supply movements to North Korea except for bombing the Yalu bridges at the middle.

6 Whiting, 68–99.

7 Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), 343.

8 "MacArthur Hearings," 751.

9 "MacArthur Hearings," 5.

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Moreover, the Communists never challenged America's air supremacy or sought to use air operations for anything but dog fights at a low level against the United Nations planes. In addition, the Communists refrained from attacking American planes on the ground or American airfields in South Korea, Japan and Okinawa. Finally, American naval vessels off the Korean coast, including the carriers basing aircraft that were operating in the combat zone, were not attacked either by Communist submarines or aircraft, but were fired on from the shore when in range.

In limiting its operations, it is important to note that the United Nations command did not impose comparable restraints on its forces. For example, attacks were made on armies in the field. Convoys were bombed, and the bridges across the Yalu, the key supply points of the Chinese Communists, were attacked. Nevertheless, the United Nations did impose restrictions on targets within the zone of battle. These will be discussed below.

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States believed that a major objective of the Soviet Union was to expand the area under the control of international Communism as far as possible. Thus, in responding to the North Korean attack—which had not been anticipated—American objectives were developed in the framework of the belief that the attack was part of a general plan for expansion and perhaps a prelude to general war.[10] The United States sought to prevent the success of this Communist attempt to expand by the use of force in the belief that allowing the Soviets to succeed in Korea would encourage aggression elsewhere. General Bradley expressed this purpose at the MacArthur hearings in describing Korea as "a preventive limited war aimed at avoiding World War III." [11] President Truman later described his objectives in intervening in the Korean War in similar terms:

> Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years

[10] "MacArthur Hearings," 942, 954, 971, 2585, 2630.

[11] "MacArthur Hearings," 154.

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> earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.[12]

The defense of Korea was partly motivated by the feeling that the action was necessary to convince the West Europeans that the United States would come to their aid. The Administration was wary of exposing itself to Soviet aggression in Europe by committing its military power in Korea. During the Korean War, in fact, the major American build-up occurred in Europe and not in the Far East. The Administration was also aware of the danger of splitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance in a dispute over Far Eastern policy. A major objective throughout the war was to prevent adverse repercussions in Europe while using the episode to strengthen NATO and build up its military capability.[13] America's NATO allies, particularly the British, applied constant pressure on the United States to prevent expansion of the war and to bring it to a swift conclusion. Following an almost inadvertent reference by President Truman at a press conference to the possibility of using atomic weapons, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee flew to the United States to confer with Truman and to propose the seeking of a cease-fire in Korea to be followed by the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.[14] Partly because the defense effort in Korea was carried on under UN auspices, the United States felt obliged to consult constantly with its allies on policy and was influenced by their continuous efforts to halt the expansion of the war and to bring about its conclusion.

Soviet objectives were more closely related to the situation in the Far East. The Soviets were interested in the capture of South Korea for its own sake and probably expected a rela-

[12] Truman, 333.

[13] Truman, 387.

[14] Truman, 396–413.

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tively quick and easy North Korean victory.[15] In addition, the Soviets probably hoped to prevent Japan's alignment with the Western powers. Whiting has suggested the nature of the Soviet Far Eastern objective:

> In view of the multiple pressures directed at Japanese foreign policy, the Communist leaders may have conceived the Korean War as serving ends beyond the immediate control of the peninsula. Military victories in Taiwan and Korea could be heralded as ushering in the Communist era in Asia, that is demonstrating the impotence of America's 'puppets,' Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee. The resultant effect upon Japan might swing opportunistic groups behind existing neutralist opposition to Yoshida and prevent his supporting American policy.[16]

The Chinese objectives in entering the Korean War were also based on general political considerations, but of a defensive nature. According to Whiting, the Chinese also hoped to influence the course of United States–Japanese relations.[17] Moreover, they were worried about the loss of prestige they would suffer if they allowed the Western "imperialists" to march unhindered to their borders. And they were perhaps most concerned with the beneficial effects of United Nations success in Korea on the many opponents of the Communist regime still active in China and on Taiwan. Whiting concluded:

> In sum, it was not the particular problems of safeguarding electric power supplies in North Korea or the industrial base in Manchuria that aroused Peking to military action. Instead, the final step seems to have been prompted in part by general concern over the range of opportunities within Korea that might be exploited by a determined, powerful enemy on

[15] Whiting, 40.

[16] Whiting, 37. This interpretation of Soviet strategy in the Korean War was offered by John Foster Dulles right after the North Korean attack. Dulles, who was at the time the State Department planner for the Japanese Peace Treaty, suggested that the Korean attack may have been motivated in part by a desire to block American efforts to make Japan a full member of the free world. He conjectured also that the attack may have been ordered because the Communists could not tolerate the "hopeful, attractive Asiatic experiment in democracy" that was under way in South Korea (*The New York Times*, July 2, 1950).

[17] Whiting, 156–62.

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> China's doorstep. At the least, a military response might deter the enemy from further adventures. At the most, it might succeed in inflicting sufficient damage to force the enemy to compromise his objectives and to accede to some of Peking's demands. Contrary to some belief, the Chinese Communist leadership did not enter the Korean War either full of self-assertive confidence or for primarily expansionist goals.[18]

The Chinese apparently entered the war with the aim of saving at least some of North Korea. Their minimal objective was to preserve the identity of Communist North Korea rather than its total territorial integrity.[19]

In an effort to secure the political effects discussed above, American battlefield objectives and war termination conditions underwent considerable fluctuation during the course of the war. When the United States first intervened, its objective was simply to restore peace and the South Korean border.[20] Very early in the war and after the Chinese intervention, the United States considered a total withdrawal from Korea.[21] Later its battlefield objective expanded to include the unification of Korea. But in the end, the United States accepted a truce line which closely approximated the *status quo ante*. As Neustadt has pointed out, Truman's original decision to seek the unification of Korea failed to take into account the political objectives that the United States was pursuing, and in the end, according to Neustadt, the recognition of this forced the abandonment of the unification effort:

> Had the unification of Korea been Truman's dearest objective, its announcement as a war aim would have been another matter. But it was among the least of the objectives on his mind. In July and August 1950, in December after Chinese intervention, in his struggles with MacArthur, and thereafter through his last two years of office, his behavior leaves no doubt about the many things he wanted more than that. He wanted to affirm that the UN was not a League of Nations, that aggression would be met with counter-force,

18 Whiting, 159.

19 Whiting, 155.

20 Truman, 341.

21 Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York, 1956), 429–31, 438.

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> that 'police actions' were well worth their cost, that the 'lesson of the 1930's' had been learned. He wanted to avoid 'the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time' as General Bradley put it—and any 'war,' if possible. He wanted NATO strengthened fast, both militarily and psychologically. He wanted the United States rearmed without inflation, and prepared, thereafter, to sustain a level of expenditure for military forces and for foreign aid far higher than had seemed achievable before Korea.[22]

Once the Soviets recognized that they could not easily secure their objective of demonstrating American weakness and unwillingness to use force, they seemed to have abandoned the battlefield objective of capturing all of Korea. They may have been willing to accept an end to the war with part or perhaps even all of North Korea in Western hands, and ultimately settled for a virtual restoration of the *status quo ante*.

DOCTRINE

The North Korean attack on South Korea suggested the willingness of the Communists to seek a limited objective by a limited use of force. The Soviets probably intended to seize South Korea with the use of North Korean forces and then to halt their military operations. When the United States intervened, they recognized their miscalculation of American intentions, while proceeding on the assumption that American intervention need not lead to world war. The attack upon South Korea, moreover, seems to have been motivated by the Soviet compulsion to fill power vacuums. In view of the specific United States declaration that South Korea was outside its defense perimeter, the Soviets could have reasonably counted on a quick and easy victory by the North Koreans.[23] But, while Communist conduct during the war reflected a doctrine that included the limited use of military force, and limited objectives, neither the Chinese nor the Russians seemed to have any idea of the optimum methods of communicating intentions and capabilities to the other side in the course of such a war.

22 Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York, 1960), 126.

23 Whiting, 40.

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American doctrine, on the other hand, seems to have been much less hospitable to the limitation of warfare. It would appear that the United States had not foreseen the possibility of Soviet military action in South Korea or any other local area unconnected with a general Soviet military offensive. The result was the American decision not to prepare for the defense of South Korea in view of the low estimate of its value in a general war. Thus, the decision of June of 1950 to defend South Korea was not based on a re-estimate of South Korea's military importance, but on a recognition that something had occurred for which American military doctrine had not been prepared.[24] It is important to note that, in its policy decisions throughout the war, the United States was operating without any general theoretical notions of the nature of limited war in the atomic age, and its decisions were probably affected by the lack of such theory.[25]

Each side's image of the other's doctrines and intentions influenced its decisions. The Soviets clearly underestimated the likelihood of American intervention. In the Soviet view, the American declaration that it would defend South Korea only as part of its United Nations obligations had meant that the United States would not in fact defend South Korea. The Soviets failed to anticipate the partly moral and partly political American reaction to aggression. They were insensitive to the importance that the United States would attach to repelling "illegal" aggression, as opposed to less clear-cut violations of international law.

The American decision to intervene in Korea and the subsequent decisions were also based on and influenced by estimates of Soviet doctrine and intentions.[26] In assessing the motives and operating doctrine of the North Korean attack, American policy-makers gave consideration and, to some extent, credence to five different interpretations, as follows:

24 "MacArthur Hearings," 1110.

25 For a discussion of the development of the theory of limited war, see Halperin, *Limited War: An Essay on the Development of the Theory and an Annotated Bibliography*. Harvard Center for International Affairs (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), Occasional Paper No. 3, 1–14.

26 This discussion of the American image of Soviet doctrine is based on Alexander L. George, "American Policymaking and the North Korean Aggression," *World Politics*, VII (January 1955), 209–32.

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(1) The "diversionary move" interpretation. In view of the number of other areas, particularly Western Europe, that appeared more militarily significant than South Korea, the South Korean attack was seen as a diversionary move, aimed to draw American resources away from the areas where they were most important. Truman reports that he shared this view in part and was determined not to leave Europe vulnerable to Soviet aggression.[27]

(2) The "soft-spot probing" interpretation. By this image of Soviet doctrine, the Soviet compulsion to fill power vacuums had led to the attack on South Korea which had been abandoned by the United States and which was clearly incapable of defending itself.

(3) The "testing" interpretation. This was the view that seemed most to influence Truman's image of the North Korean attack.[28] It recalled the progress of Hitler's aggressive moves and asserted that the North Korean attack should be seen as a prelude to attacks in other areas if that aggression were allowed to succeed. This view differed from the "soft-spot probing" interpretation in its assumption that the Communists' success in Korea would encourage them to attempt aggression in the other areas where Western defense capabilities were far stronger. In short, the purpose of the Korean attack was to probe the firmness of Western intentions, and not simply to fill a power vacuum.

(4) The "demonstration" interpretation. By this interpretation, the Soviets were mainly concerned with demonstrating their own strength and American weakness in order to promote, on a long term basis, important shifts in political allegiance throughout the world.

(5) The "Soviet-Far-East-strategy" interpretation. This interpretation put emphasis on the idea, discussed above, that the Soviets hoped to prevent the entrance of Japan into the Western camp and to pave the way for further Communist expansion in the Far East.

As George has pointed out, the inclination of American policy-makers toward the "testing" interpretation of Soviet doctrine—in which the Korean attack was equated with Hit-

[27] Truman, 437.

[28] Truman, 333.

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ler's early expansionist moves—may have reinforced the likelihood that the United States would intervene in Korea.[29] If the "soft-spot probing" interpretation of Soviet conduct had been accepted instead, the United States might have been more prone to cede South Korea while taking steps to prevent the existence of power vacuums elsewhere. It was the belief that successful aggression would embolden the Soviets that made the defense of South Korea seem so crucial.

THE FEAR OF GENERAL WAR

In an analysis of the limiting process, it is important to say again that the Korean War was fought before the era of intercontinental ballistic missiles and fusion weapons. Thus, while both sides could have expanded the war quickly and decisively, there was not the danger that now exists of a sudden unleashing of nuclear missiles which within an hour could destroy a large part of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Even without this threat of a mutually devastating strategic exchange, the danger of a world war was nevertheless present, and it is significant that both sides seem to have been determined to avoid its occurrence. Truman has reported that the major American aim in Korea was to prevent a third world war; the United States was determined not to give the Soviets any "excuse" to initiate global war.[30] The Russian decision to remain out of the war seemed to be partly motivated by a fear of igniting a global war. In this situation where neither side could gain a decisive advantage by going first, both sides seemed to recognize that, no matter who started the global war, both would suffer major losses. While the United States could have attacked the Soviet Union with its relatively limited stockpile of atomic weapons, it could probably not have prevented a Soviet ground attack in Western Europe which might result in Communist domination of the European continent. The Soviets had no capacity to attack the United States and could not have prevented an American attack on the Soviet Union. While both sides avoided forcing the other into starting a global

[29] George, 220.

[30] Truman, 345.

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war, neither was preoccupied with the possibility of "preemption" by its adversary.

The United States was, however, concerned that the Korean War should not lead it to expend those military capabilities which were considered an important deterrent to general war. Whereas today there is a somewhat clearer distinction between the main forces to deter and fight a general war and forces primarily designed for local war, in Korea the United States was, in fact, using the troops and the material which it felt were necessary to deter general war. At the MacArthur hearings, Air Force General Vandenberg rejected a Senator's suggestion that the United States should commit a major part of the American Air Force to the Korean War effort. He argued instead that the United States must get a cease-fire

> without endangering that one potential that we have which has kept the peace so far, which is the United States Air Force; which, if utilized in a manner to do what you are suggesting, would [sic.], because of attrition and because the size of the Air Force is such and the size of the air force industry is such that we could not still be that deterrent to [general] war which we are today.[31]

DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES

During the Korean War, the Truman Administration continued to pursue its domestic political goals. Despite the war, it was "politics as usual" on both sides of the political fence. The President was busily engaged in promoting his Fair Deal program, consolidating the position of the Democratic Party, strengthening his Northern and Western liberal support in Congress, and calming the political crises raised by such men as Senator McCarthy. Nor was the Administration immune to criticism from the Republican Party which felt it possible, necessary, and desirable to attack the Administration's conduct, as well as to question the basic concept of limited war.

After the MacArthur hearings, a Republican minority report declared: "We believe that a policy of victory must be announced to the American people in order to restore unity and confidence. It is too much to expect that our people

[31] "MacArthur Hearings," 1385.

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will accept a limited war. Our policy must be to win. Our strategy must be devised to bring about decisive victory." [32]

These few sentences suggest a number of important assumptions about the nature of wartime politics. The first is the notion that the unity of the American people can be achieved only with a declaration that victory is the goal. A further implication is that, after such a declaration, the method of achieving a battlefield victory becomes a "military" problem, that is, beyond the realm of partisan domestic politics. On the other hand, once the government admits that there are other political considerations that affect and moderate the goal of a strictly military victory, then, according to this Republican statement, it is legitimate to criticize the particular policy adopted. Unity will come only when the country is asked to back an absolute goal. If there is no such goal, then it is the duty of the opposition to examine and critically appraise the war effort.

Congress, as a whole, also felt itself free to criticize. The inquiries into the firing of General MacArthur were striking in that they required the Administration, *during the war,* to justify its conduct and to explain publicly what it hoped to accomplish in the war and how it was conducting the war, as well as to explicate a host of particulars which must have been of as much interest to the Communists as they were to the Senators across the table.[33]

The quotation from the Republican Senators also reflects the then still strong American opposition to limited war.[34]

32 "MacArthur Hearings," 3590. The Senators signing the report were Styles Bridges, Alexander Wiley, H. Alexander Smith, Bourke B. Hickenlooper, William F. Knowland, Harry P. Cain, Owen Brewster and Ralph E. Flanders.

33 This is not to say that hearings did not provide a unique and invaluable opportunity for the Administration to communicate what it wanted to communicate to the Chinese and the Russians. But it does not seem likely that the Senators' questions at this hearing had that motivation. The point made here is that Congress forced the Administration to give this testimony during the war without any apparent consideration of the effect it would have on the American war effort. While the hearings were reviewed on security grounds before their release, the pressure to approve publication was great and leaks were inevitable.

34 This view in an extreme form was expressed by one of MacArthur's biographers as follows:

> MacArthur understood what Truman did not, that the admixture of military strategy with political expediency can produce national disaster

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The Senators stated flatly that the American people would not accept the strategy of limited war, and indicated their rejection of the strategy as well. The implication is that during a limited war the American government will be subjected to attacks from the political opposition, from Congress, and from public citizens on two grounds: on the legitimacy of fighting a limited war, and on the particular tactics employed in the war.

The general public seems to have shared the Republican Senators' dissatisfaction with the course of the Korean War, at least in its later stages. On the other hand, the public apparently approved the decision of the Eisenhower Administration to end the war short of victory. The public's disapproval of the Korean campaign probably added to the margin of Eisenhower's victory in 1952; his ending the war enhanced the Republican image as the party of peace and increased the Eisenhower plurality in 1956. On the other hand, at least according to the results of the Michigan Survey Research Center voting studies, the Korean War did not have a major or lasting impact on popular political attitudes.[35]

American political leaders seem to have over-estimated the effect of the war on the voting public. Korea is taken as demonstrating—as to some extent it did—that local wars are not popular with the American public. Leading the United States into one or expanding it is likely to be perceived as a political liability; ending one on almost any terms may be a political asset.

All these domestic pressures undoubtedly influenced the manner in which the Truman Administration conducted its Korean operations, both by hampering its freedom of action and by increasing the costs of various actions.

THE GREAT DECISIONS

The remainder of this essay will explore several of the major decisions to limit or expand the Korean War and the general nature of the Korean War limiting process.

. . . . He felt, as experience has long taught, that once the diplomats have failed to preserve the peace, it becomes a responsibility of military leadership to devise the strategy which will win the war. (Whitney, 509.)

35 Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), 49, 50, 527, 546, 555.

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Atomic Weapons

As was noted above, the most dramatic limit on the Korean War was the failure of either side to use its atomic weapons. According to Brodie,[36] there were four reasons why nuclear weapons were not used by the United States:

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and civilian policy-makers continued to feel that the war in Korea was basically a Soviet feint. There was, therefore, a strong case for conserving the then relatively limited stockpile of atomic weapons for the principal war which, they thought, would come in Europe. Their fear was not that the employment of nuclear weapons would lead to an expansion of the war and a Soviet attack on Europe, but rather that Korea was deliberately designed as a decoy to get us to exhaust our nuclear stockpile and our conventional military resources, so that the Soviets could later attack with impunity in Europe. It was the desire, then, to save resources and not the fear of provoking the enemy that was one of the main causes of the American decision not to use nuclear weapons in Korea.

(2) American policy was also affected by the reports of local commanders that there were no suitable targets for nuclear weapons in Korea. While the impact of this view was considerable, it apparently reflected an uninformed attitude about the possible uses of nuclear weapons. Commanders in the field came to think, for example, that atomic bombs were of little use against bridges, a belief which Brodie explained as follows:

> This odd idea probably resulted from a misreading of the results at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some bridges were indeed badly damaged at those places and some were not, but for the latter it was generally forgotten that a bridge only 270 feet from ground zero at Hiroshima was actually 2,100 feet from the point of explosion, and also that it received its blast effect from above rather than from the side.[37]

Nuclear weapons were still relatively new and had not been extensively tested, and it is probable that commanders in the field were too busy to search out potential targets for nuclear weapons.

[36] Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, 1959), 319–21.

[37] Brodie, 319n.

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(3) Our allies, particularly the British, were strongly and emotionally opposed to the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War.[38] This pressure from our allies strengthened our own anxieties and moral doubts about again using these terrible new weapons.

(4) A subsidiary reason for the failure to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War was the fear of the retaliatory employment by the Soviets of the few atomic weapons in their possession against Pusan or Japan, despite the American near-monopoly over these weapons. Brodie doubts, however, if this fear played a conscious part in the relevant decisions.[39]

The United States, then, was concerned with the vulnerability of Europe and with co-ordinating policy with her allies. It was also determined not to be drawn in by a Soviet feint in Korea. But it is important to note that the first and second factors will not obtain in the future. The American stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons is now so great that military commanders may urge their use precisely because they are a non-scarce military resource, and certainly no argument can be made that they should not be used because they are scarce. Military officers now have a much better understanding of the capabilities of nuclear weapons, which, moreover, now come in much smaller sizes. Thus, it will be clear to military commanders that there would be suitable targets for their use in any conceivable future major limited war. While we can expect continued pressure from our allies against the use of nuclear weapons, it is possible that certain allies might advocate their use in some situations. There will, however, be other international political pressures—for example from the uncommitted or neutral states—against nuclear weapons, and the possibility of a Soviet nuclear response will be a much more important determinant of the decision.[40]

We know much less about the details of the Russian decision not to use atomic weapons in Korea. The Russians

[38] See, for example, Truman's report of his conversation with Attlee about the use of atomic weapons. (Truman, 410–11.)

[39] Brodie, 320.

[40] For a discussion of the factors which should influence American policy on the use of nuclear weapons, see Halperin, "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* V (June 1961), 146–66.

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seemed determined not to supply any materiel to the forces fighting in Korea which could clearly be labeled as having been supplied by them after the war began. This would certainly be the case with atomic weapons.[41] In addition, the Soviet stockpile of such weapons was so small that its use in a localized military encounter might have seemed wasteful.

Here again, the limit observed by both sides seems not to have resulted from an attempt—or even an awareness of the need—to bargain with the enemy. However, the Soviets were probably more restrained than the United States by the fear that the initiation of nuclear attacks would be met by a response in kind.[42]

The Chinese Communists seem genuinely to have feared the possibility of the American use of nuclear weapons when they intervened in the Korean War. According to Whiting, the Chinese felt that a nuclear response was a real possibility; intervention was considered risky; and every effort was made to delay it and to minimize its consequences.[43] The extent of this Chinese concern was reflected both in its shelter-building program and in domestic Chinese Communist propaganda. But Peiping was reassured by the three-week testing period of relatively small Chinese intervention which revealed that United States aircraft, although authorized to bomb the Korean ends of the Yalu bridges, were forbidden to venture into Chinese territory.

The background of the limit on the use of atomic weapons in the Korean War, then, suggests a failure of both sides to understand what the other side was likely to do and what the other side's fears and goals were. It also suggests that, to a large extent, the determination of limits is based on considerations other than those that result from the battlefield interaction. Some of the other limiting points established in the war reveal the same pattern.

41 It was also true of the MIGs along with which the Soviets probably supplied Russian pilots.

42 However, if the use of atomic weapons had been confined to the Korean theatre—that is, if the decision to use the weapons was not coupled with a decision to expand the war in some other way—it is not clear who would have gained from an atomic exchange.

43 Whiting, *passim*.

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Chinese Intervention

One of the major expansions of the Korean War was the decision of the United Nations Command to cross the thirty-eighth parallel. This decision was based partly on the military consideration that one could not stand by and allow the enemy forces to regroup for renewed attack just beyond the border. It was also made on political grounds. When the battlefield conditions changed in its favor, the United States decided to pursue the unification of Korea by military means. In crossing the parallel the United Nations Command was aware of the risk that it might trigger Chinese Communist intervention, and tried by reassuring statements to prevent it. But, it apparently underestimated the Chinese reaction, and, at the same time, it failed to develop a concurrent strategy which, by retaliatory threats or other sanctions, could succeed in preventing Chinese intervention. As Whiting has suggested,[44] the threat to use atomic weapons on the Chinese mainland, if the Chinese intervened, might have been a much more effective deterrent than the attempt to reassure them that a march to the border did not presage an attack on mainland China.[45] The threat to use atomic weapons would have involved major political costs for the United States, and it is not clear that the American government would have warned of a possible atomic attack, even if it recognized its likely effect. Had it been aware that the fear of greater expansion might have deterred Chinese intervention, an alternative course might have been to threaten to expand the war to China with conventional weapons. But even this was not done. In fact a decision was made that Chinese intervention would not lead to conventional bombing beyond the Yalu. MacArthur reportedly believed that this decision had been leaked to the Chinese.[46]

In choosing, instead, to inform the Chinese of its limited objectives, the United States also considered it important to reassure the Chinese that their hydroelectric plants would

44 Whiting, 162.

45 Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, reported that the Chinese expected an atomic attack, but were nonetheless prepared to intervene. See K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas* (London, 1955), 108.

46 Whitney, 455–56.

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not be jeopardized by a march up to the Yalu. But, as Whiting has pointed out:

> It was widely believed in Western circles that a determining factor in Chinese Communist concern over North Korea was the reliance of Manchurian industry upon power supplies across the border as well as along the Yalu River. This belief prompted explicit reassurances from Western spokesmen, both in Washington and at Lake Success, concerning 'China's legitimate interests' near the frontier. Yet we have seen that Peking ignored this issue completely in its domestic as well as its foreign communications. The absence of propaganda about the protection of the hydroelectric installations, despite the need to maximize popular response to mobilization of 'volunteers,' suggests that this consideration played little if any role in motivating Chinese Communist intervention.[47]

In its advance through North Korea, then, the United Nations Command was attempting to communicate two points to the Chinese Communists: first, that it was prepared to go up to but not beyond the Yalu, and second, that it was prepared to respect China's legitimate interests in the northern regions of North Korea. It sought, therefore, to establish its limited objectives: that United Nations forces would take all North Korea, that the North Korean government would cease to exist, but that China's legitimate industrial interests would be protected. And it sought to assure the Chinese that the capture of North Korea would not be used as a springboard for an attack into China. It assumed that these were the limits in which the Chinese were interested, and that these would serve to keep the Chinese out of the war. But Chinese interests were different and could only be satisfied by different boundary conditions to the war.

Neustadt argues that the Chinese were not in any way affected by the announcement of the United Nations aim to destroy the North Korean government:

> To judge from what the Chinese said, and later did, Peking's concern was with MacArthur's military progress, never mind its foreign policy objective. Chinese concern was not confined to anything so simple as a buffer zone along the border; an entity called North Korea, not the border, was

[47] Whiting, 151–52.

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> at stake (perhaps in roughly the same sense that South Korea, under reverse circumstances, was for Washington). Even had the United Nations promised restoration of an independent North once all resistance ceased—which, naturally, no one proposed—I know of nothing to suggest that Peking would have withheld intervention. The Communist world does not take kindly, it appears, to the dismantling of the member state's facilities for government: the party and the army. MacArthur's military progress threatened both, no matter what came after. In short, the military risks and the diplomatic dangers usually associated with MacArthur's march across the parallel existed independent of the words used in the UN resolution. MacArthur's march was authorized before the words were seen, much less approved, at Lake Success.[48]

Even if we assume that Neustadt was attempting to justify the policy of an Administration with which he was connected, it seems clear that Washington was convinced in retrospect that its declarations did not influence the Chinese decision to enter the war and that no other declaratory policy could have altered the Chinese decision. American policymakers have concluded that once the decision was made to cross the thirty-eighth parallel, nothing could be done to affect the Chinese decision. In fact, the State Department reportedly argued in December of 1950 that the Chinese decision to intervene was made prior to the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel. In one sense, at least, this conclusion may be wrong: the Chinese position might have been altered by threats to expand the war with the use of atomic weapons against China. Moreover, it is by no means certain that the Chinese were interested in preserving the total territorial integrity of North Korea. It is possible, as Whiting suggests, that an American commitment to advance only part way up the peninsula—that is, to permit the maintenance of the North Korean government in some part of its territory—might have been sufficient to deter the Chinese entrance into the war:

> Neither before [n]or during the first three months of war [Whiting wrote] did the degree of interest in Pyongyang

[48] Neustadt, 125; see also 123–24.

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evinced by Peking warrant acceptance at face value of its concern for a 'just' peace, based upon the status quo ante.

This is not to say that the Chinese Communist leadership was prepared to accept with equanimity the total defeat of North Korea. As a minimal goal, intervention must have been attempted to preserve an entity identifiable as the DPRK, and to prevent unification of all Korea under U.N. supervision. The late date of Chinese Communist entry into the war suggests that it was the political importance of the North Korean government, rather than its territorial integrity, that was at stake. Although intervention was officially predicated upon U.N. crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel, no Chinese People's Volunteers and Democratic People's Republic of Korea defense lines were established during the August–October period, not even to protect Pyongyang. To Peking, a 'just' Korean peace was not an end in itself but rather a means towards fulfilling other related goals of policy.[49]

Thus, even after the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel, Chinese intervention might have been prevented, had the United States acted differently. Although it tried to impose limits on expansion, the United States failed to grasp adequately either the reasons that the Chinese felt intervention was necessary or the threats that might have deterred their intervention. Both sides expanded the war, the United Nations by crossing the thirty-eighth parallel and the Chinese by entering the war. Both sides failed to convey to each other the kind of counteraction to be expected which might have deterred expansion. China attempted to prevent the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by declaring her intention to intervene, but this intention, relayed by the Indian Ambassador,[50] was not taken seriously by the United Nations Command. The United Nations sought to prevent the Chinese entrance, not by threatening a further expansion, but by attempting to satisfy the Chinese security interests that, it was assumed, might lead her to enter the war.

Despite these two major acts of expansion which followed closely on each other, the war remained limited, and this fact suggests the fallacy of the proposition that the limitation of

[49] Whiting, 155–56.

[50] Panikkar, 111.

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a war depends on neither side drastically expanding the war at any point. These were major expansions, but neither seems to have brought the sides close to decisions to initiate global war or to expand very substantially the area or intensity of the local war.

Ports and Troops

Despite the fact that United States planes taking off from airfields in South Korea and Japan, and from aircraft carriers, consistently bombed targets in North Korea, the Communists engaged in almost no bombing south of the thirty-eighth parallel. This was one of the major asymmetries of the war both from a legalistic point of view and in terms of interfering with the military operations of the enemy. Both sides apparently devoted considerable attention to the question of what targets to attack, and a variety of motives affected the relevant decisions.

The American decision to bomb targets in North Korea was made prior to the commitment of American ground troops in June 1950. A month later permission was given to bomb industrial targets in North Korea, but the use of incendiary bombs was not permitted because of the civil damage that would have resulted. The Air Force was not allowed to bomb the areas close to the Soviet and Chinese borders. Rashin was the single industrial center within the forbidden area and it was the only industrial target in North Korea which was not destroyed by mid-September when an end to industrial bombing was ordered by the Joint Chiefs.[51] With this task completed, the bombing of the North Korean halves of the Yalu bridges was authorized. Because of the restrictions imposed, the operation was only partly successful and came to a halt with the freezing of the Yalu in late November. It was not until June 1952 that attacks on the hydroelectric plants in North Korea were authorized; within two weeks almost ninety per cent of the North Korean power capacity was destroyed.[52]

American attacks on targets in North Korea steadily expanded. The attacks were aimed at affecting the immediate military situation. The restraints observed had several mo-

[51] Futrell, 174–86.

[52] Futrell, 449–52.

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tives: (1) to avoid extensive civilian destruction considered undesirable on both humanitarian and propaganda grounds; (2) to avoid a spill-over of the war into China or the Soviet Union—the spill-over into China prior to her entry into the war probably did not have a major impact on Chinese policy, but it did create propaganda and political difficulties; (3) to avoid damaging, in the case of the hydroelectric plants, targets considered vital to the Chinese, so as to avoid their entrance into the war, presumably in retaliation.

The Communists exercised far greater restraint on their air forces. Except for a few night "heckling" attacks from small biplanes in the spring of 1951, no air attacks were made on any targets in South Korea. The Communist restraint was not the result of the absence of inviting military targets. The port of Pusan was an extremely inviting target for bombardment and mining. It was the key to the American logistic effort and frequently was lighted up all night. American logistic convoys and troops in the field also could have been hampered by air attacks. A number of factors seem to have influenced the Communist decision not to respond in kind to United Nations air attacks on North Korea:

(1) The Communists may have believed that it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for the United Nations to continue its operations in Korea if Pusan came under heavy attack. It might also have been obvious that, once the United Nations committed itself to the defense of South Korea, it was no longer in a position where it could afford to accept complete withdrawal. Therefore, if attacks on its logistic lines made impossible its continued conduct of an effective ground war in Korea, the United States might have been forced to engage in strategic strikes against the Chinese, if not the Russian, homeland.[53] If the Communists found this supposition credible, they may have concluded that, once their initial grab for South Korea failed, they could not afford to do anything that would lead to their complete con-

[53] The United States had secured British concurrence to bomb bases in China in the event of heavy air attacks from Chinese bases on United Nations troops (*House of Commons Debates*, 5th Series, CDXCVI, 970, Feb. 26, 1952) and this was probably communicated to the Chinese. However, Truman reported that he was convinced that Russia would intervene if Manchurian bases were bombed. (Truman, 382–83.) It is not clear that the American threat was considered credible by the Chinese.

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trol over South Korea.[54] They may have recognized that American confinement of the war to the Korean peninsula was dependent on her ability to fight there effectively.

(2) In order to avoid attacks on Chinese air bases just north of the Yalu, Red airmen were not allowed to attack United Nations positions from these bases. Although the Communists were permitting the United States the sanctuary of bases in Japan and on aircraft carriers, they apparently were afraid that they would not be granted a similar sanctuary for bombing operations. United States planes managed to keep the North Korean airfields out of commission throughout the war. Thus, given that the Chinese limited the use of their fields to staging operations and to fighter planes, they were incapable of bombing operations.[55]

(3) There is some evidence to suggest that Soviet pilots constituted a significant part of the "Chinese" air force during the Korean War.[56] If this is true, the explanation for target restraint may have been the desire to avoid the capture of Soviet airmen. This proof of direct Soviet involvement in the war would at the least have been politically damaging and, from a Soviet point of view, might have created an intolerable risk of American retaliation.

By the end of the war the United States was exercising almost no target restraint in North Korea and the Communists were doing no bombing in South Korea. Each side was guided by a complex series of motives and incentives. However, despite the asymmetry of the actions there is nothing to suggest that either side treated its decisions on targets as being closely related to, affected by, or likely to affect, the opponent's decisions on these questions.

CONCLUSIONS

The development of the limiting process in the Korean War seems to have been the work, on the whole, of the civilian decision-makers, at least on the American side, in rejecting or approving requests by the military to engage in mili-

54 This thesis implies that the Chinese would not have driven the United Nations forces off the Korean peninsula by ground action even if they had the capability. There is no evidence to substantiate or invalidate this point.

55 Futrell, 266, 637–38.

56 Futrell, 370, 651–52.

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tary operation which would have the effect of expanding the war. In some cases, particularly on the question of using atomic weapons, the military never made the request, and so, in some sense, no decision was made. On three occasions, General MacArthur was refused his requests: to employ Chinese Nationalist troops, to impose a naval blockade on China and to bomb bases and supply lines in China.[57] But a number of MacArthur's requests for permission to expand the war were approved. These included the commitment of American ground forces, the Inchon offensive, and the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel.

In deciding whether to go on the offensive in the war, Truman reports that the National Security Council recommended the consideration of three factors: action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, the views of friendly members of the United Nations and the risk of general war. It is clear that this and other decisions were also influenced by American objectives and doctrine, as well as by domestic political pressures.[58] The balancing of the factors varied from decision to decision, but all played a role in the major decisions to limit or expand the war.

Much less is known about the Communist decision-making process or the factors which influenced their decisions to limit or expand the war. The initial decision to keep the Chinese out of the war seems to have been based largely on domestic conditions in China, particularly the desire of the Chinese to implement their program of economic growth and development, and their desire to avoid military entanglements at a time when they had not yet consolidated their hold over their own country.[59] The reasons for the Russians' abstention from open intervention in the war are less clear. It is apparent that Russia was determined not to do anything that directly labeled her as a participant. She did not publicize the participation of any Russian "volunteers" in the war, nor provide any atomic capability, although she did supply

57 "MacArthur Hearings," 13.

58 Truman, 359

59 It was probably based also on the belief that the United States would not intervene and that the North Korean army would capture all of South Korea. (See Whiting, 40, 45–46.) The reasons for their entrance into the war were discussed above.

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large amounts of conventional military equipment. One likely explanation is the Russian fear that her intervention would lead to total war, and, it should be remembered, the strategic balance at this stage was one that drastically favored the West. The United States had the capability of inflicting great destruction on the Soviet homeland with its stock of atomic weapons, while the Soviets had no capability of directly attacking the United States, although they might have been able to take a large part of Western Europe with ground forces. Thus, the Soviets, aware of their inferior strategic position, were probably determined to keep out of the war and to provide no excuse for a direct American attack on the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that both sides apparently arrived at their decisions to limit the war for different reasons and with minimal attention to the battlefield interaction. In addition, they observed very different limits: that is, both did not abstain from the same actions. What we did in North Korea was quite different from what the Communists did in South Korea, but the Chinese used a much greater percentage of their gross national product than we did. Nevertheless, while we used naval vessels and airplanes to bomb troops and airfields beyond Korea, they did not. The United States engaged in logistical interdiction, the Communists did not. Each side, then, observed its own series of limits and restraints only in some general way related to, and dependent on, the limits of the other side.

At least a few of the limits were symmetrical. Both sides restricted their military operations almost entirely to Korea, and neither used nuclear weapons. There was lack of symmetry in that all the military targets in North Korea were attacked but some in South Korea were not. The United States attacked the Chinese points of entry—the Yalu bridges —but the Chinese did not attack ours—the ports. Both sides observed a number of what Schelling has called "legalistic" limitations.[60] The United Nations carefully observed both the Chinese and Russian borders and tried to avoid crossing them inadvertently. There was symmetry in the absence of

[60] Thomas Schelling, "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War," *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 257–66.

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official declarations of war. The United Nations troops participated in the war in a "police action" capacity, and none of the countries involved, including the United States, declared war. The Chinese used "volunteers," and the Russians supplied equipment and, presumably, technicians but little manpower for the battle.

In some cases, the limits represented a recognition of the battlefield interaction—if one side did something the other was likely to reciprocate—which would result in expansions of the war benefiting neither side. But the origin of many of the limits observed, and part of the explanation for others, lay not within the dynamics of the war itself, but within the domestic and international context in which the war was fought.

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THE NEW YORK MUGWUMPS OF 1884: A PROFILE

IN AN era when party regularity was regarded with more than ordinary reverence, the Mugwumps displayed remarkable political independence. Between 1870 and 1896, the Mugwumps, most of whom were members of the Republican party's reform faction, frequently engaged in protests against "unsuitable" party candidates. Their only attempt to organize a reform party was the abortive Liberal Republican party of 1872, and after its failure they resorted to temporary associations for particular campaigns such as the anti-Grant movements of 1876 and 1880 and the anti-Blaine bolt of 1884. Believing it their duty to educate the public to its civic responsibilities, they filled such Mugwump journals as the *Nation* and *Harper's Weekly* with scathing denunciations of the laxity in public morals which permitted the Boss Tweeds, Jay Goulds and Roscoe Conklings to flourish in post-Civil War America.

Aside from their efforts as bolters and critics, the Mugwumps seem most improbable reformers. Well-educated men of comfortable circumstances, their intellectual protest against the spoils politics of the Gilded Age had little appeal for the majority of their contemporaries. Gentlemen reformers, they denied that labor unions should serve as vehicles for social reform, and they resisted every effort to expand the government's economic and social functions on behalf of farmers. The Mugwumps' program was limited to economy in government, civil service reform, tariff reduction, the gold standard and honesty in politics. Their political hero was Grover Cleveland, an honest man although somewhat less than an ardent reformer, and the high point of their reform crusade came in 1884 when they bolted the Republican party and its nominee, James G. Blaine, to support Cleveland's successful campaign for the presidency. In 1896, even those Mugwumps who were nominally Democrats shrank from the "free silver mania" and voted for the thoroughly conservative Republican candidate, William McKinley.

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I

The phenomenon of Mugwump reform has been explained as a status revolution, as a moral crusade and as patrician reform. While each of these interpretations contains some elements of the others, they have distinctly different perspectives, each describing one characteristic of Mugwump reform particularly well.

The status revolution thesis appears to have broad significance for middle class reform movements from 1820 to 1920. It was first applied to Progressivism and Abolitionism, and was recently employed by Ari Hoogenboom in his treatment of the early agitation for civil service reform, a movement related to, but not identical with, Mugwump reform.[1] The status revolution thesis describes reform as the response of an established leadership group to the deterioration of its position of influence in the community. In the nineteenth century the "old élite" was composed of lawyers, clergymen, merchants and bankers whose careers were associated with the commercial-mercantile economy of pre-industrial America. In the post-Civil War period community leadership was assumed more and more frequently by men whose rise to prominence was based on the emergence of an industrial economy. The old élite's status did not decline in absolute terms. They held respected positions and were moderately wealthy, but they were no longer the most influential men in the community. Sensing this fact, they turned to political reform as a means of reasserting their leadership.

A feature of the old élite's decline was their estrangement from majoritarian politics. Believing that the crudely acquisitive "new men" joined with the "politicians" to undermine high standards of civic morality, the old élite found any connection with regular party politics distasteful. They became convinced that principled men such as themselves were a beleaguered minority exiled from political power because of their independent spirit. The classical expression

[1] David Donald's essay, "Toward a Reconsideration of the Abolitionists," is found in his *Lincoln Reconsidered* (New York, 1956), 19–36. Richard Hofstadter treats the progressives in *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York, 1955). See also Ari Hoogenboom, *Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement 1865–1883* (Urbana, Illinois, 1961).

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of this feeling among the Mugwumps was Henry Adams' protest that there was no place for young men of talent in the political life of the Gilded Age. Richard Watson Gilder, editor of *Century Magazine,* echoed this sentiment: "There seems to be a feeling that an honest man is an impertinent intruder if he expresses any dissent from the management of politics by murderers, liquor dealers, and selfish and vulgar politicians generally." [2]

Gilder's statement contains a suggestion of the "moral crusade" thesis, an interpretation which treats reform as the effort of "honest men" to wrest power from the "selfish and vulgar politicians" who possess it. Reform aligns the forces of good against the forces of evil, or, as Professor Nevins observes in his biography of Cleveland, "the health of the nation requires, from time to time, a far-reaching moral movement to awaken men from old lethargies." [3] The quality of a moral crusade was unmistakably present in the Mugwump bolt of 1884. The leaders of the bolt stressed the moral aspect above all others. According to George William Curtis, editor of *Harper's Weekly,* "The paramount issue of the Presidential election this year is moral rather than political. It concerns the national honor and character and honesty of administration rather than general policies of government, upon which the platforms of the two parties do not essentially differ." [4] While this thesis provides a good account of the Mugwumps' moral intensity, it does not explain why some men were reformers and others were not.

Noting the Mugwumps' tendency to look upon themselves as the "best men," several scholars have treated Mugwumpery as "patrician reform." [5] Their thesis is that the Mug-

[2] Rosamond Gilder (ed.), *Letters of Richard Watson Gilder* (Boston, 1916), 222.

[3] Allan Nevins, *Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage* (New York, 1932), 156. This interpretation of Mugwumpery is typical of narrative accounts of the campaign such as Carleton Putnam's *Theodore Roosevelt, the Formative Years, 1858–1886* (New York, 1958), I, 494–496, and David S. Muzzey, *James G. Blaine, A Political Idol of Other Days* (New York, 1934), 269–71, 287–325.

[4] Address published by the National Committee of Independents and Republicans, Pamphlet 1, July 30, 1884.

[5] Eric Goldman's chapter, "Thrust from the Top," in *Rendezvous with Destiny* (New York, 1952), 10–28, is a suggestive essay on the "patrician dissidents." Harrison C. Thomas also notes the élitist quality of Mugwumpery

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wumps' reform urge stemmed mainly from a belief that the "best men" must accept civic responsibility. George William Curtis spoke of this obligation in a commencement address entitled "The Public Duty of Educated Men": "By the words 'public duty' . . . I mean simply that constant and active participation in the details of politics without which, on the part of the most intelligent citizens, the conduct of public affairs falls under the control of selfish and ignorant or crafty and venal men." [6] No doubt the Mugwumps' class attachments contributed to their conviction that they were an élite, and to their belief that reform must originate from men such as themselves; nevertheless, their class status also seems to have circumscribed severely their reform program. More work needs to be done on the relationship between the Mugwumps' reform drive and their élitist assumptions about the proper origins of reform.

II

An examination of the socio-economic characteristics of the Mugwumps has led me to an interpretation somewhat different from those mentioned above. Unlike the status revolution theorists, I do not believe that "displacement" was the primary stimulus for the Mugwumps' reform efforts. As I will attempt to show in my conclusions, the Mugwumps' moral intensity and élitist feelings were in large part the outgrowth of their family tradition, educational background and professional status. Their familial, educational and professional experiences led them to feel a personal responsibility for the preservation of civic morality. When the standards to which they adhered were threatened by the spoilsmen in the post-Civil War period, the Mugwumps' reactions were natural, even habitual responses: demands for moral reform.

The basis for my analysis of the Mugwumps' socio-economic characteristics will be a close study of the membership of the New York Mugwump bolt of 1884. Some of the traits

in *The Return of the Democratic Party to Power in 1884* (New York, 1919), 27–28, as does Geoffrey T. Blodgett in a perceptive analysis of Massachusetts Mugwumpery, "The Mind of the Boston Mugwump," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, March, 1962.

[6] Charles Eliot Norton (ed.), *Orations and Addresses of George William Curtis* (New York, 1894), I, 266.

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which I will discuss here (such as club membership, religion and great wealth) were clearly less important in shaping the Mugwumps' reform drive than were their education, occupation and family tradition. I have included these traits in my findings because they indicate the remarkable consistency of what I will call the Mugwumps' socio-economic profile.

Although based on a large sample of the New York Mugwumps, the statistics which I will present should not be taken too literally. For example, the fact that one-fourth of my sample were lawyers does not necessarily mean that one-fourth of all Mugwumps were lawyers. Nor am I advancing the thesis that all men of a certain socio-economic group were Mugwumps. The Mugwumps were a minority within a minority; most of the members of their class did not support the Mugwump movement. The validity of a social interpretation, however, is demonstrated by reversing the case. The point is not that all men of a certain class were Mugwumps—such class solidarity not being characteristic of American political life—but that nearly all the Mugwumps were members of one class.

My chief source of Mugwump names was the *New York Times* for 1884. The *Times* published lists of Republican bolters from all over the state. Mention of a man in its columns meant that he had actively supported the bolt by signing protests, walking in anti-Blaine demonstrations, or attending Mugwump gatherings. Supplementing the *Times* lists with the *New York Tribune, Harper's Weekly,* the *Nation* and historical monographs, I collected the names of 410 Mugwumps of whom I identified 396 (96.6%). The amount of information I was able to gather about these men varied greatly from category to category. For instance, I ascertained the occupational background of 379 Mugwumps (92.4% of the total sample), but discovered the religious identification of only eighty-two of them (20% of the total sample).[7]

[7] For identifying these names I utilized biographical directories of all types, from the *Dictionary of American Biography, Who Was Who,* and other sources stressing biographies of prominent men, to city directories for Brooklyn, Buffalo, Ithaca, and New York City which included all heads of families living or employed in the city and listed men with occupations such as "laborer," "driver" and "shoeshine."

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III

The fact that the Mugwump leaders—Carl Schurz, E. L. Godkin, George William Curtis and Henry Ward Beecher—were all more than fifty years old in 1884 may give a false impression of the age of the majority of the Mugwumps. Table I indicates that approximately half of the Mugwumps were in their twenties or thirties at the time of the bolt; by far the largest ten-year age group is the category for men in their thirties.

Table I

THE MUGWUMPS' AGE IN 1884

Age group	*Individuals in group*
21–29	24
30–39	49
40–49	35
50–59	28
60–69	13
70–	6

The Mugwumps in their twenties and thirties were members of a political generation which came of age after the Civil War. The young Mugwumps found it hard to identify with the same issues of union and disunion which had excited their fathers and which continued to be of great importance to the Republican party. Henry L. Stoddard, a reporter, voted for Blaine but expressed a Mugwump-like despair with the Republican party: "For me the Republican party had overplayed the war. I had no desire to vote as others had shot." [8] Another journalist, Richard R. Bowker, asserted, "Parties have lost their significance, . . . our young men who have come into political life since the Civil War find nothing to fight for." [9] To these young men, Blaine, who had a reputation as a spoilsman and rebel-baiter, did not offer any hope for a change in the politics of the day. Cleveland, on the other hand, had demonstrated his incorruptibility as Governor of New York, and seemed to promise

[8] Henry L. Stoddard, *As I Knew Them* (New York, 1927), 52.

[9] E. McClung Fleming, *R. R. Bowker, Militant Liberal* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1952), 95. Bowker was known as the "original Mugwump" because he organized a "Young Scratcher" movement to oppose Alonzo Cornell's campaign for Governor of New York in 1879. He was aided by Horace E. Deming and George H. Putnam, both later Mugwumps.

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something better in the attitude of politicians towards their duties. One contemporary wrote, "There was nothing in the ideals, practices, or leaders of either party which commanded my admiration . . . till the nomination of Grover Cleveland." [10]

The experience which distinguished the men over forty from the young Mugwumps was their service to the party. Not only could they remember the party of Lincoln, but they could recall their efforts in its behalf. Francis Barlow had been a Lincoln elector in 1860. Edward Salomon, a refugee from the German revolution of 1848, had been wartime governor of Wisconsin. Daniel Chamberlain had been Governor of South Carolina during reconstruction. Benjamin Bristow had served as one of Grant's secretaries of the Treasury. Carl Schurz was another ex-cabinet member.[11] These men felt that the Republican party had "sprung from a moral sentiment. It was the party of political morality and of personal liberty." [12] This idealism was no longer present in the Republican organization of 1884. The nomination of Blaine, whose public record was marred by his involvement in a questionable railroad bond deal, seemed intolerable to the Mugwumps. Their efforts had been betrayed, and, they felt, "We have not left the party; it is fairer to say that the party has left us." [13]

While the Mugwump spokesmen were older Republicans, much of the organizational drive behind the bolt was supplied by younger men. Frederic Bancroft, later a noted historian, was a Columbia graduate student when he volunteered for the Independent Committee's office staff. Six men under thirty-five were members of this executive committee

10 David F. Houston, *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet* (New York, 1926), I, 1, 2.

11 Because of their efforts to maintain high standards of official responsibility, the Mugwump politicians were ostracized by regular party politicians. Barlow was twice elected New York's Secretary of State, but in reporting the 1876 Florida election returns he was the only investigator to report against his party's candidate. This ended his political career. Grant dismissed Bristow because the Secretary's vigorous prosecution of the Whiskey Ring case pointed clearly to duplicity on the part of the President's crony, Orville E. Babcock.

12 George William Curtis, *Address* (National Committee of Republicans and Independents), Pamphlet 1, July 30, 1884, 2.

13 *The New York Times*, October 26, 1884.

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and handled many of the organization's projects: Richard R. Bowker; three lawyers, Frederick Whitridge, Horace Deming, George W. Green; the publishers, Charles Scribner and J. Henry Harper. Some of the foremost Mugwump journalists were in their forties: Richard Watson Gilder; George Haven Putnam, son of George Palmer Putnam; Henry Holt, author and publisher; Thomas Nast, cartoonist for *Harper's Weekly;* and Edward Cary, editorial writer for the *New York Times.*

Occupationally, the vast majority of the bolters were professionals or entrepreneurs. From the figures summarized in Table II, it appears that approximately one-fourth of the New York Mugwumps were lawyers, that another fourth were businessmen, that one-eighth were financiers and that most of the rest were professionals: journalists, physicians, teachers or clergymen.

Table II

OCCUPATIONS OF MUGWUMPS

Occupation *	*Individuals*
Lawyer	101
Businessman	97
Financier	57
Journalist	27
Physician	25
Teacher	25
White collar	22
Clergyman	13
Miscellaneous	12

* For my purposes these general categories were specific enough. A more detailed break-down of four of the categories is as follows: Businessman: merchant 66, manufacturer 24, miscellaneous 7. Financier: banker 15, broker 25, insurance agent 9, investor 8. White collar: clerk 4, secretary 6, agent 10, manager 2. Journalist: editor 15, publisher 10, author 2.

Exceptions to this upper middle class economic pattern were few and not especially striking. Only one labor leader and one farmer were found in the sample. Of the white collar category, ten were clerks or secretaries associated with law firms and stock brokerages. Others were agents for various types of firms. One man was listed as a "cashier." Of the miscellaneous category, only William Webster a "railroad engineer," Owen Torrington a "painter" and Andrew W. White a "polisher," do not seem to be professionals or entrepreneurs.

As well as being drawn from a relatively narrow segment

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of the occupational spectrum, the Mugwumps were men in comfortable circumstances. Many of them were owners of mercantile or manufacturing establishments; others were partners in the larger law firms of their cities. Those who worked in Brooklyn or Manhattan lived in the better residential districts of those cities or commuted from homes in Flushing, Yonkers, Tarrytown and New Jersey. Many were men of considerable affluence such as Pascal P. Beals, the Buffalo steel and hardware manufacturer, William H. Childs, chairman of the board of Bon Ami Corporation and Alfred T. White, fur importer and housing reformer, whose estate exceeded $300,000.[14] Undoubtedly many of the ninety-six businessmen were not as wealthy as Beals or Childs, but they were owners of their business establishments, and, as such, largely independent, if not completely self-employed.

Along with the moderately well-to-do majority of the Mugwumps were a few men of great wealth. Twenty-six of the sample were millionaires.[15] Three of them—James Stokes, a real estate investor, George Jones, owner of the *New York Times* and Thomas C. Sloane, a prominent Manhattan merchant—served on the Independent Executive Committee.[16] Three others—the leather goods manufacturer, Jackson S. Schultz, and two publishers, Joseph W. Harper, Jr. and J. Henry Harper—attended Mugwump meetings from the start of the bolt. Eleven of the Mugwump millionaires inherited their fortunes. Twelve of the other fifteen appear to have reached the millionaire level well before the 1880's. Ten were in merchandizing, three in publishing, five each in im-

[14] A little known fact about the Mugwumps is the leading role some of them took in tenement house reform. White was exceptionally active in this field. He built model tenements and advocated government enforcement of better housing standards as early as 1877. No effective legislation was passed until the Tenement House Commission Investigations of 1894–95 under the chairmanship of another Mugwump, Richard Watson Gilder. R. R. Bowker, A. P. W. Seaman, Richard W. G. Welling and R. F. Cutting also participated in "model tenement" ventures.

[15] Sidney Ratner (ed.), *New Light on the History of Great American Fortunes* (New York, 1953).

[16] The Mugwumps who engaged in importing were angered by the extortionist policies of the Republican-controlled New York Customs House, a notorious center of spoils politics. Sloane protested this graft (*New York Tribune,* January 3, 1872) in a petition signed by several other importers including two other Mugwumps.

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porting and real estate and one each in contracting, banking and manufacturing. Their attitude toward wealth was expressed by the ever-trenchant Godkin, "Who knows how to be rich in America? Plenty of people know how to get money; but . . . to be rich properly is, indeed, a fine art. It requires culture, imagination, and character." [17]

Two further indexes of the Mugwumps' social status are their representation in the *Social Register* and in the exclusive clubs of New York City. The *Social Register* listed the foremost families of New York City. One hundred Mugwumps achieved this pinnacle of social prominence.[18] This was in part a reflection of their membership in the city's most exclusive social clubs. Four of the more prestigious organizations in which they participated were the Union Club, the Union League Club, the Century Association and the University Club.

The Union Club and the Union League were social clubs with quasi-political functions. Writing in the twentieth century one author said, "So far as the aristocratic clubs enter into politics they are defense-units against reform criticism." [19] Although in the 1880's some members of these groups rebelled against these anti-reform tendencies, Peel's description was almost as applicable in 1884 as in 1935. The Union Club was the oldest organization of this type. For many years after its founding in 1836, it was "the wealthiest and most exclusive" [20] social club in New York. In the post-Civil War period it remained the "representative organization of the 'old families'." [21] Sixteen Mugwumps were among its members.

The Union League was a patriotic organization founded in 1863 to "strengthen love and respect for the Union." [22] In the post-Civil War period "this wealthy club tended . . . toward extreme conservatism." [23] In 1884, however, a "large

17 Edwin L. Godkin, "Waste," *The Nation* (March 8, 1866), II, 302.

18 *Social Register, New York, 1890* (New York, 1935), IV, No. 1.

19 Roy V. Peel, *The Political Clubs of New York* (New York, 1935), 316.

20 Francis G. Fairfield, *The Clubs of New York* (New York, 1873), 154.

21 *Ibid.*, 155.

22 Union League Club of New York, *Report* (New York, 1887), 9.

23 Will Irwin, *A History of the Union League Club of New York City* (New York, 1952), 125.

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element in the club opposed Blaine's nomination." [24] The *Nation* reported that at an October meeting about thirty per cent of the members present voted against endorsing the Blaine ticket.[25] The thirty-eight Mugwumps who belonged to the club were undoubtedly the core of this number. Some of them, such as Jackson S. Schultz, who was an ex-president of the League, must have used their prestige to gather the large vote against Blaine.

Although the Mugwumps were members of and even leaders in these conservative organizations, their presence was felt more fully in the Century Association and the University Club of New York City. These two organizations were literary and intellectual rather than political in their aims. Both were select, but neither was the bellicose Republican club which the Union League epitomized. The tenor of the Century Association and University Club was humorously portrayed by Samuel Clemens:

> By permission, I visited the Century Club last night—the most unspeakably respectable club in the United States, perhaps. . . . The reading and supper rooms were crowded with the distinguished artists, authors, and amateurs of New York. I averaged the heads, and they went three sizes larger than the style of heads I have been accustomed to. In one of the smaller rooms they averaged best—thirteen heads out of the twenty-seven present were what I choose to call prodigious. I never felt so subjugated in my life. And I was never so ashamed of wearing an 8¼ before.[26]

The Century Association limited its membership to seven hundred. Fifty-five Mugwumps were members. The University Club had somewhat over a thousand members of whom sixty-seven participated in the Mugwump movement. The Mugwumps were often prominent in the governing councils of these bodies. In 1884 the University Club had four Mugwumps on its Executive Committee.[27] This included Henry Holt who was one of the club's founders.

The Mugwumps' remarkable record of college, profes-

[24] *Ibid.*, 155.

[25] *The Nation*, October 16, 1884, 322.

[26] The Century Association, *The Century 1847–1947* (New York, 1947), 27.

[27] University Club, *Report 1884–85* (New York, 1885).

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sional and graduate education contrasts strikingly with the educational experience of most of their contemporaries. In 1880 only 2.72 per cent of the Americans between eighteen and twenty-one years of age were enrolled in institutions of higher learning.[28] The median number of years in school for people born in 1865 was eight.[29] The Mugwumps far exceeded both these figures. Of the 188 individuals whose educational background is known, 164 had received some college or professional training, 14 had done high school or academy work and 10 had attended elementary school or were largely self-educated. One hundred and twenty-five had received A.B. or B.S. degrees: 32 from Harvard, 24 from Columbia, 22 from Yale, 11 from Cornell and the rest from other colleges. Fifty-three Mugwumps were graduates of law schools, all but 8 receiving their LL.B.'s from Columbia or Harvard. During their lifetimes the Mugwumps amassed 35 M.A.'s, 11 M.D.'s, 3 D.D.'s, 27 LL.D.'s and 11 Ph.D.'s.

One outgrowth of the Mugwumps' educational background and occupational status was an interest in professional standards and in organizations promoting these standards. A few outstanding examples suffice to illustrate that the Mugwumps were prominent in the development of professional societies. Two presidents of the American Medical Association, Abraham Jacobi (1912–13) and Lewis Sayre (1880–81), were Mugwumps. Benjamin Bristow was the second president (1879–80) of the American Bar Association. Moses Coit Tyler and Herbert Tuttle were organizers of the American Historical Association. Josephus N. Larned was president of the American Library Association from 1893 to 1894. Mugwumps also figured prominently in the founding of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1870. By 1884 fifty-three Mugwumps belonged to the Association; James C. Carter was its president, and five other bolters were on its Executive Committee. It is not difficult to see that such devotion to personal and professional standards was related to the Mugwump demand for the implementation of a civil service merit system and the election of "honest" men.

28 U.S. Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington D.C., 1960), 211.

29 *Ibid.*, 214.

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The Mugwumps were predominately natives of New York and New England. Eighty-two were born in New York State, thirty-three in the New England states, fourteen in other parts of the United States and eighteen in foreign countries.

Both at birth and in 1884, the Mugwumps were much more likely to be city-dwellers than were their fellow Americans. The year 1860 may serve as a reference point for assessing the Mugwumps' urban background. In that year only fifteen per cent of the American people lived in cities having over ten thousand residents; [30] whereas, as Table III indicates, at birth (most Mugwumps were born well before 1860) slightly over half of the Mugwumps lived in cities.

Table III

THE MUGWUMPS' RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENT AT BIRTH

Type of Environment	*Individuals*
City (urban area with more than 10,000 residents)	69
Town (urban area with between 500 and 10,000 residents)	40
Rural (farms or urban areas with less than 500 residents)	16

By 1884 nearly all the Mugwumps lived or worked in the more populous areas of New York—Manhattan, Albany, Brooklyn, Buffalo and Syracuse—the smallest of which was Syracuse with 51,792 inhabitants.[31] Thirty bolters lived in Flushing (population 6,683), but many of these men worked in Manhattan. Most of the nineteen Ithaca Mugwumps were associated with Cornell. (Ithaca's population was 9,105.) Only R. H. Palmer whose farm was near Walden (population 1,254) lived in a rural environment.

It is not surprising that upper middle class men born in New England and New York should have many ties with colonial America. David Allerton (a produce merchant) and Ethan Allen Doty and Charles E. Tracy (lawyers) claimed to have Mayflower ancestors. The Reverend Alfred P. Putnam was descended from Governor John Endicott of Massachusetts Bay Colony. The editor of *Harper's Monthly,* Henry Mills Alden, was a descendant of John Alden. There were also old New York names among the Mugwump ranks for which two lawyers serve as examples. Edmund L. Bay-

30 U.S. Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics,* 9.

31 See Department of the Interior, Census Office, *Compendium of the Tenth Census,* Part I (Washington D.C., 1882) for population statistics. All figures in the paragraph are for 1880.

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lies was descended from the original patroon of Rensselaerswyck, and the ancestor of George W. Verplanck arrived in New Netherland in 1647. Eighteen Mugwumps belonged to the St. Nicholas Society, a club which required each member to have an ancestor who had lived in New York before 1785.[32]

In direct contrast to the colonial roots of most of the bolters, eighteen of the Mugwumps were foreign-born. Germany supplied the most with nine. England, Scotland, Ireland and Canada followed with two each. One man came from Denmark. Although this group was small, some of the most prominent Mugwumps were foreign-born. E. L. Godkin and George Haven Putnam emigrated from England. Six of the Germans had been driven out of Germany for supporting the revolution of 1848. Of these, Carl Schurz, Thomas Nast, Dr. Abraham Jacobi and ex-Governor Edward Salomon have already been mentioned. Of the other two, Sigismund Kaufmann was a prominent lawyer, an influential member of the New York Turnverein and the Republican candidate for Lieutenant Governor of New York in 1870. Hugo Wesendonck was a former member of the German Diet, and upon arriving in America he became a banker. He was a militant free-thinker and a leader in the movement to set up German schools for immigrants from the old country.

While information on the religious indentification of the Mugwumps was not available in abundance, that which is summarized in Table IV reflects the Mugwumps' high social status and New York-New England origins. Almost two-thirds of the Mugwumps belonged to the Episcopalian, Unitarian, or Congregational Churches, denominations which had figured prominently in American religious life during the colonial and early national periods. The Congregational and Episcopal Churches were the old, established denominations of New York and New England, and the Unitarian Church was the intellectual offspring of Congregational New England. By far the largest single church affiliation shown in Table IV is Episcopalian, a denomination which drew the

[32] St. Nicholas Society, *Constitution and List of Members* (New York, 1895), 22.

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bulk of its membership from the upper classes of the community.

Table IV

THE MUGWUMPS' RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

Denomination	*Individuals*
Episcopalian	34
Unitarian	11
Congregational	10
Presbyterian	8
Jewish	5
Methodist	4
Baptist	3
Catholic	2
Miscellaneous	5

Evangelical creeds such as the Methodist and the Baptist which had spread over frontier America, and which, with Roman Catholicism, were the largest denominations in America by the post-Civil War period, were lightly represented in the Mugwump ranks. As shown by Table V, the distribution of Mugwumps in various denominations was almost an inverse proportion to the percentage of their contemporaries in these faiths.[33]

Table V

THE PERCENTAGE OF AMERICANS, NEW YORKERS AND MUGWUMPS IN VARIOUS RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS

Denomination	*Americans*	*New Yorkers*	*Mugwumps*
Roman Catholic	30%	53%	2%
Methodist	22	12	5
Baptist	18	7	4
Presbyterian	6	8	10
Episcopal	3	6	41
Congregational	2	2	12
Jewish	.6	2	6
Unitarian	.3	.2	13

IV

Every aspect of the Mugwump profile—religion, education, wealth, occupation, club membership—indicates that the Mugwump reformers came from a narrow segment of the socio-economic spectrum. I demonstrated earlier that the re-

[33] These figures are for 1890. Bureau of the Census, *Religious Bodies, 1906* (Washington D.C., 1906), I, 25. Eight of the Episcopalians were identified by their membership in the Church Club, an exclusive Episcopalian society. Even without the names found by this "ready-made" device the percentage of Episcopalians among the Mugwumps is double that of the next most representative denomination.

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form tradition with which these men were associated was notable for its moral fervor, élitist tendencies and alienation from regular party politics. It now remains to show some connections between the Mugwumps' socio-economic profile and their interest in reform.

Consider how the environment in which the Mugwumps were raised formed the basis for their view of themselves as an élite of principled men with public responsibilities. The family tradition of the Mugwump men was community leadership. Typical biographical statements about the Mugwumps' fathers were: "leading politician," "diplomat," "president of Wesleyan College," "country storekeeper, farmer, and justice of the peace," "elected reform mayor of New York in 1844," and "a noted publisher." These biographical descriptions imply another characteristic of the Mugwump families, for the statements might be collectively paraphrased, "His father was a man of high principle who taught his son these values." The Mugwump families were pillars of respectable society; they assumed that their sons would carry on this tradition.

The importance of education to the Mugwumps' reform instinct can scarcely be overemphasized. The college education which so many of the Mugwumps sought was far more than preparation to enter the law, business, or medicine. Their college years were also an experience which shaped their attitude toward themselves and their civic role. The young men who listened to George William Curtis discuss the "Public Duty of Educated Men" could not fail to perceive the implication of the speaker's words: that college graduates were an educated élite and that because the maintenance of public standards necessarily lay with such men, they had an obligation to prevent the control of public affairs from falling into the hands of "selfish and ignorant or crafty and venal men."

By virtue of their professional duties the Mugwumps' private pursuits were closely tied to the public life of the community. As professional men and owners of businesses, they were particularly sensitive to any deviation from responsible conduct of public affairs and were likely to react to such deviations by calling for reform. Mugwump clergy-

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men ministered to the spiritual needs of the community and denounced any lapse of public morals. Doctors such as Jacobi and Sayre treated victims of crowded tenements and poor sanitation and agitated for more effective government regulations and services. Journalists informed the public of the misconduct of public affairs. Businessmen protested the evil effects of the irregular business practices and favoritism fostered by political bosses. The lawyers of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York stated that because Blaine "had sold his official power and influence for railroad bonds . . . the rights of every citizen, even the humblest, would be endangered by his election." [34] Such sentiments were not the outgrowth of professional attachments alone, but the Mugwumps' occupational duties did reinforce the civic role previously imposed by their family and educational backgrounds.

The Mugwumps' high economic status contributed to their reform response in a variety of ways. First, although it would be incorrect to characterize them as an élite of wealth alone, wealth must be counted as one of the characteristics which set them apart from their contemporaries and supported their élitist assumptions. Secondly, their economic security enabled them to put off working until they finished college and later provided them with the leisure for political activity. Finally the fact, so evident from their club memberships and *Social Register* listings, that they were an established élite, was conducive to an interest in public affairs. To men who were born into well-to-do families, the acquisition of more money did not always seem an adequate source of personal distinction. Some of the most energetic of these talented men turned to public affairs as a means of self-fulfillment. Henry L. Stimson voiced this sentiment in his memoirs:

> The profession of the law was never thoroughly satisfactory to me, simply because the life of the ordinary New York lawyer is primarily and essentially devoted to the making of money. . . . There has been an ethical side to it [public service] which has been of more interest to me, and I have felt that I could get a good deal closer to the problems of life

[34] Everett P. Wheeler, *Sixty Years of American Life* (New York, 1917), 127.

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> than I ever did before, and felt that the work was a good deal more worth while. And one always feels better when he feels that he is working in a good cause.[35]

The reaction of individual Mugwumps to situations which threatened the public good can be illustrated by a few examples. John Sloane protested the open thievery practiced by the Customs House officials; George Jones refused a one million dollar bribe to end the *Times*' anti-Tweed campaign; Benjamin Bristow would not stop his prosecution of the Whiskey Ring case even though the President's closest associates were implicated by his findings; the president of the Bar Association, James C. Carter, led the Association's campaign against Blaine; Thomas Nast slashed away at politicos such as Tweed and Blaine in his cartoons.

In their various campaigns against "venal politicians" the Mugwumps acted out a civic role to which they were committed by their career pattern. This pattern (or profile) of educational, family and professional associations educated them to a life of conscientious citizenship. They instinctively defended this tradition of public morality against any threat to it. Their reform was not so much the reaction of a displaced élite to their own displacement as it was the response of self-appointed trustees of public morality to the irresponsible ways of the spoilsmen. Their "exile" from public office was in large part self-imposed because they refused to subordinate their principles to the party's interest. The rigidity of this stand irritated many of their contemporaries and often made the Mugwumps seem foolish, pharisaical and vain; yet, this stubborn adherence to principle was also their most notable group characteristic.

If Mugwumpery is viewed from the perspective of its socio-economic origins, the Mugwumps do not seem "improbable reformers" at all. There was no contradition between the fact that they were reformers and the fact that they were a self-conscious élite. The intense awareness of class attachments which limited the Mugwumps' reform program also shaped their belief that men whose education and status made them fit arbiters of civic standards were an élite which

[35] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1948), 17.

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should act as moral stewards for the rest of society. Without the conviction, largely derived from their socio-economic background, that the "best men" should accept civic responsibilities, these essentially conservative men would not have felt the need to attempt "the education of all classes in the community in their duties of citizenship." [36]

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[36] Gilder, 221.

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THE STATUS REVOLUTION AND MASSACHUSETTS PROGRESSIVE LEADERSHIP

IN THE *Age of Reform,* Richard Hofstadter has advanced a provocative thesis about the "status revolution" and the motivation of progressive leaders.[1] His analysis draws heavily upon two significant surveys of progressive leadership, one by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. for 260 Progressive Party leaders throughout the United States and another by George E. Mowry for California.[2] Although there are some regional variations, the conclusions of both surveys are similar. Progressive leaders did not represent the population at large; rather they had some distinct and special characteristics. Thus progressive leaders were likely to be from urban, upper middle class backgrounds. They were generally rather young, native-born Protestants of old Anglo-American stock. Many of them were college graduates. Most of them were either professional men, particularly lawyers, or businessmen who represented neither the very largest nor the very smallest businesses. In New England especially they were likely to be managers of older established firms, not aggressive entrepreneurs. Hofstadter, for one, has used such summaries in presenting his notion of status anxiety as a major force in motivating men towards Progressivism, and his thesis certainly has been influential in recent revaluations of the Progressive Era. In the following analysis of Massachusetts a few reservations are suggested about the usefulness of the concept of the status revolution.

In general the Massachusetts Progressive Party leader resembles the "progressive profile" drawn by Mowry and Chandler. However, neither of these scholars has presented comparable surveys of other political leaders at that time, so

[1] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955), Chap. IV, "The Status Revolution and Progressive Leaders," 131–172.

[2] Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," in Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), VIII, app. III, 1462–1465; George E. Mowry, *The California Progressives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), Chap. IV, 86–104. See also George E. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1958), Chap. 5, 85–105.

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there is no basis for knowing how special the characteristics of progressive leaders were other than the fact that they clearly were not representative of the population at large. In my study of Massachusetts, Progressive Party leadership has been compared with that of the regular Republican and Democratic parties. The result suggests that the Progressive leader, particularly in comparison with his Republican counterpart, had essentially similar class characteristics.

In this analysis, fifty leaders of the Progressive Party in Massachusetts, including important party organizers, state committeemen and candidates for important offices, were compared with Republican and Democratic leaders, for the period around 1912 and 1913, the years of greatest activity for the Bull Moosers.[3] It may be objected that the arbitrary division by party allegiance excludes some progressive Republicans who refused to bolt with Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, thus distorting the picture of the regular Republicans. However, as a matter of comparison note that Chandler's analysis is based upon Progressive Party leaders, not progressives in general. Moreover, in practice there are few, if any, among the thirty-six Republicans whose record by 1912 would clearly place them in a progressive column. In fact the line between conservative and progressive was often far from distinct. For example, Congressman Augustus Peabody Gardner is one Massachusetts Republican whom some might consider a progressive because of his occasional insurgency. But it can be demonstrated, I believe, that Gardner's record was basically conservative.[4] Or a case could even be made for Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the *bête noire* of many reformers, as a man who showed some progressive tendencies.[5] Fortunately the comparison by party affiliation avoids the necessity of making such subjective judgments and provides a clear-cut distinction.

[3] Data have been obtained from standard references such as *Who's Who in America, Who's Who in New England, National Cyclopaedia of American Biography,* and several other similar works, newspapers and a few manuscript collections.

[4] See Richard B. Sherman, "Augustus Peabody Gardner: The Conservative as Insurgent," *Essex Institute Historical Collections,* XCVII (October, 1961), 261–276.

[5] Note comments about Lodge's "intelligent conservatism" by John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge* (New York, 1953), 225–229; see also 284–285.

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The typical Massachusetts Progressive Party leader was fairly young. As of the end of 1912 the average age was 45.2 years, and a sizeable number of important men were in their early thirties. While Progressives came from all parts of the state, a leader was most likely to live in an eastern city. Only five of the fifty were foreign-born (including one born in Paris of American citizens). Of the native-born Americans, twenty-five were from Massachusetts, and nearly all the rest came from New England or the Northeast. British surnames abound, and many Progressive leaders traced their ancestry back to colonial America. Of thirty-five whose religious preference is known, twenty-nine were Protestant and six Catholic. The educational background is known for forty-seven of the group. Of these, thirty (63.8 per cent) attended college or some special training institution beyond secondary school, and sixteen studied at Harvard. Slightly over half of them were professionals, including sixteen lawyers and a few ministers, professors and physicians. Businessmen of various kinds made up nearly all of the rest. Of these none was connected with the very large national corporations; most worked for or owned firms of medium size in which they played a prominent role. Some led family companies, but at least six were "self-made" men, rising from poor backgrounds. But no laborers, skilled or otherwise, and no routine white-collar workers were among the group. The Massachusetts Progressive Party leaders were relatively inexperienced in organized politics. Twenty-six of the fifty had no record of previous political activity at the time they joined the Roosevelt movement in 1912, and very few of the others had more than very limited experience in local or state politics.

Such a summary fits in reasonably well with the picture of the progressive presented by Chandler and Mowry, but it also bears very strong resemblance to the description of the regular Republican leader in Massachusetts. Republican leaders were slightly older than the Progressives, averaging 50.5 years at the end of 1912. All of the thirty-six Republicans studied were born in the United States, and twenty-five came from Massachusetts, a much higher proportion than among the Progressives. Most of them worked in the

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general vicinity of their birthplace, and more than a third came from the Boston area. Even more Republican leaders than Progressives had British surnames, and of those whose ancestry is known, seventeen traced their families back to the colonial era. Every one of the twenty-five for whom a religious preference is known was Protestant, with Episcopalian and Unitarian the most frequently listed denominations. Twenty-eight of the thirty-six (77.8 per cent, a higher figure than that for the Progressives) attended college or some post-secondary school. Of these, fourteen went to Harvard, four to Amherst and three to other Ivy League colleges, while eleven undertook graduate study of some kind. The professional pattern was also similar to that of the Progressives. Although none of the Republicans was drawn from teaching or medicine, the regular Republican leadership claimed twenty lawyers, seven manufacturers, four bankers, five journalists and a scattering of other occupations, including a few duplications where two professions were listed. The most obvious difference between the Progressive and Republican leaders was the degree of political experience. As a slightly older group in actual control of the dominant party in the state, the Republicans had considerably more experience in politics. All of them had been active before 1912, and two-thirds had engaged in state or local politics before 1901. But as for their class origins, the regular Republican leaders of Massachusetts, even more than the Progressives, came from Yankee, Protestant, well-placed backgrounds.

The leadership of the Democratic Party in Massachusetts was drawn from much more diverse backgrounds than that of either the Progressives or the Republicans, and it clearly reflected the nineteenth-century immigrant impact. But even it was remarkably well-placed in many ways. The Democratic leadership was distinctly younger than the Republican, averaging 44.2 years at the end of 1912. Of thirty-three whose birthplaces are known, all but one (from Prince Edward Island) was a native-born American, and twenty-seven came from Massachusetts, a much higher proportion than among the Progressive leaders.[6] The Boston area was

[6] In 1910, 31.5 per cent of the population of Massachusetts was foreign-born, but, as noted, not even the Democrats had a significant number of foreign-born political leaders. See Massachusetts, *Report of the Commission*

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heavily weighted, with fifteen born in the city and eight in the outskirts. Among eighteen Democrats whose parentage is known, nine had at least one parent who was born in Ireland. Of those whose ancestry is not known, many have surnames of obviously Irish origin. However, seven of the Democrats descended from families dating from the colonial period, of whom six were of English and one was of French Huguenot extraction. Of twenty-eight whose religious preference is known, seventeen were Roman Catholic, ten Protestant and one Jewish. The educational level of the Democratic leaders compared very favorably with that of the other two parties. Twenty-six of the thirty-four (76.5 per cent) attended college or some post-secondary school, a higher proportion than among the Progressives, and eighteen went on to graduate study. Of the college group, nine attended Harvard, three Boston College, two Dartmouth and several went to various other colleges. Twenty-one of the group were lawyers, a somewhat higher proportion than among the Republicans and a much higher proportion than among the Progressives. One was a banker, six were businessmen (of whom two were manufacturers, one a merchant and three in real estate), and six were journalists of some sort. Like the Republicans, most of the Democratic leaders had some political experience before 1912, although only twelve of the group were active before 1901, an item that could be explained by the fact that the Democrats were both younger and traditionally less successful in Massachusetts state politics than the Republicans.

This brief survey of the leaders of the Progressive, Republican and Democratic parties in Massachusetts indicates a considerable similarity between the first two, and a high level of educational and occupational attainment in the case of the third. For Massachusetts at least the leaders of *all three* parties were far from being anything like a reflection of the population at large as far as nativity, education and occupation were concerned. Now this picture of Massachusetts leaders raises some questions about the explanation of progressives' motivation in terms of a status revolution. Hofstadter has written:

on Immigration on the Problem of Immigration in Massachusetts (Boston, 1914), 29.

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> Men of this sort, who might be designated broadly as the Mugwump type, were Progressives not because of economic deprivations but primarily because they were victims of an upheaval in status that took place in the United States during the closing decades of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth century. Progressivism, in short, was to a very considerable extent led by men who suffered from the events of their time not through a shrinkage in their means but through the changed pattern in the distribution of deference and power.[7]

Mowry has expressed similar views.[8] These conclusions are drawn in large measure from the fact that the typical progressive leader was a member of an older American, special status group. While there is considerable evidence that many progressives were from such a group, and Massachusetts is no exception, the conclusions about motivation do not necessarily follow from this fact. In the case of Massachusetts at least, it appears that political leadership in general, especially of the regular Republican, was well placed in society. At any rate the Progressive leaders by comparison no longer appear to have such distinct and special characteristics.

The Massachusetts Progressive leadership was actually less well educated than the Republican, and its ethnic composition was more diverse. To some extent the latter fact was a reflection of the deliberate effort of the Bull Moosers to provide candidates and leaders who would best attract the diverse elements of the state's population.[9] All but one of the top six or seven Progressive Party leaders were Harvard men whose social background typified the class described by Hofstadter. Nevertheless one important leader, James P. Magenis, was of Irish Catholic extraction, and the total Progressive picture was certainly more varied than the Republican. The most striking difference between the Progressive Party and the regular Republican leadership was not in class origins, but in degree of political experience. But this fact, after all, merely describes in part the formation of a new

[7] Hofstadter, 135

[8] Mowry, *Era of Theodore Roosevelt*, 87 ff.

[9] Richard B. Sherman, "Charles Sumner Bird and The Progressive Party in Massachusetts," *New England Quarterly*, XXXIII (September, 1960), 328–329.

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party in 1912 and suggests the importance of other elements besides class in awakening political interest at that time.

As most of the leaders of the regular Republicans came from backgrounds very similar to those of the Progressives, why did some men become Progressives, while others did not? If there was a status revolution, how do we explain the difference in reaction to it? Possibly the Massachusetts situation was a special case. Indeed one could well argue that the regular Republican leadership had shown a considerable amount of progressive conservatism in the past in terms of its legislative record.[10] Still, given the conditions of 1912, one would hardly label as progressive such men as Winthrup Murray Crane, Eben S. Draper, John W. Weeks, Samuel W. McCall and many others holding similar views. This survey of the political leadership in Massachusetts does not, of course, prove that Progressive leaders were not concerned about apparent threats to their class status. I believe that some, at least, certainly were. But clearly we must be cautious in drawing conclusions from a class analysis of progressives alone, for in Massachusetts their status was not an independent variable. Much more needs to be learned about the individuals involved and the many factors that motivated such men before a more adequate explanation of progressive leadership can be made.

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10 See Richard M. Abrams, "A Paradox of Progressivism: Massachusetts on the Eve of Insurgency," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXV (September, 1960), 379–399.

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NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL RESTORATION: FRATERNITIES IN POSTWAR GERMANY

THE sharp caesura in recent German history resulting from total defeat and the disruption of a regime and a *Weltanschauung*, provides exceptional opportunity for the study of partial ideological continuities, of the processes of social restoration, and of the relationship between them. The massive and rapid reassertion of conservative nationalism in certain strata of German society is a case in point. This paper offers an analysis of this reassertion through a study of one of its chief agencies, the traditional German university fraternity or Corporation.

The importance of the postwar revival of the German traditional dueling fraternity within the context of a liberal democratic constitutional order derives largely from the fact that in Germany college students have traditionally not only been looked upon, but have looked upon themselves, as the cadre that in time will occupy the leadership positions in the state, in industry and in society. Despite all kinds of reform efforts on the part of the occupying powers and of some forward-looking German educators, the University has by and large remained what it has always been in the recent past, the professional school for the roughly two per cent of German youngsters who by social position, economic wealth or intellectual promise are destined (practically from the very beginning of their school careers) to become part of what in Great Britain would be called the "Establishment."[1] What

[1] For the German postwar student's conception of the role and function of the university and higher education, see Institut für Sozialforschung, "Universität und Gesellschaft (Studentenbefragung)" (Frankfurt, 1956), research report in the archives of the Institute. See also J. Habermas, L. von Friedeburg, C. Oehler, F. Weltz, *Student und Politik* (Neuwied, 1961), 258–259. The earlier study disclosed a remarkable discrepancy between the motives for attending the university (over 40% of the students saw their studies merely as means to the very practical end of making a good living) and the students' refusal to see in their studies merely the necessary professional training (66% insisted that their studies meant more than mere professional training). To Habermas this discrepancy "confirms the conjecture that the respondents hardly take seriously any longer those [studies] which are being carried on at the university as general liberal arts education (Allgemeinbildung)," *ibid.*, 259.

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they think, their values, their political outlook, their insights and their knowledge, will one day determine what the man in the street thinks, how he lives and in what kind of political environment, to a relatively far greater extent than will the ideals and ideas of our far more numerous college graduates determine the shape and quality of American life.

I

There is no question about the extent of the revival of fraternities. Outlawed in 1945 by the Allied Control Council, student Corporations resumed organized activity four years later, and by 1955 could boast 30,000 members in over 800 Corporations, or roughly 25 per cent of all German male students. By 1960 the number of "corporated" students had risen to 49,000 among a German male student body of about 150,000. The Corporations thus account for about one-third of all male students and for almost two-thirds of all organized male students.[2] The future impact in terms of the size of the alumni body is even more impressive. Currently the institutions of higher learning (exclusive of the teachers' seminaries) annually channel some 10,000 graduating fraternity students into the free professions, into high school teaching positions, into the upper echelons of public administration and into the executive hierarchies of commerce and industry. At the present rate, therefore, the old Weimar figures of 200,000–300,000 fraternity alumni in the "Establishment" will soon be left far behind if they have not been passed already. After all, even as early as 1955, the then enrolled 30,000 fraternity members received unstinting financial and moral support from no fewer than 140,000 Corporation alumni.[3]

[2] This percentage gains added significance in the light of the fact that not quite 2% of all students are *politically* organized. See Friedrich Thomas' "'Bruder Studium' meidet die Politik," *Christ und Welt*, No. 14 (March 31, 1960). According to Habermas *et al.*, 289, 5–7% are politically organized. Although Habermas included in his interview schedule a question concerning membership in student Corporations, he does not report on the numbers involved.

[3] As early as 1953 the student Corporations were "again at least as strong as they were at the time of their dissolution. Despite rejection by the academic authorities, regardless of the criticisms of many students and the doubts of the broader public, they have returned in their old form." Ulrich Gembardt, "Gespräch ohne Partner?," *Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung*, 8. Jg., No. 2 (January 26, 1953).

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In numerical extent the restoration of dueling Corporations has been complete. Can the same be said of their political orientation? In the Weimar Republic they were among the bitterest enemies of liberal democracy, and contributed their full share to the Republic's subversion and ultimate downfall. What, then, is the political meaning of their postwar renascence? To apprehend that meaning we must begin with a glance at the accepted ideology of the Corporations, as reflected in their official publications.

The old, conservative bias against the give and take of parliamentary party democracy and the total misunderstanding of the essence of the political process has in all too many fraternities once again led to the nurturing of a so-called "non-political" attitude which invariably merely camouflages an uncritical patriotism and folkish nationalism.[4] Evidence of this mental attitude abounds in the various fraternity publications:

> The *Deutsche Burschenschaft* declines to engage itself politically as an association, but it has always been a political movement . . . We reject the duel although we hold fast to our traditional concept of honor . . .[5]

[4] At times, candor suggests another reason for the "non-political" attitude of the "corporated" students: "The *Burschenschaft* cannot as yet tie itself down politically because there does not as yet exist a party as far to the Right as the *Burschenschaft* wishes it." Quoted in Kurt Hirsch, "Studentenverbindungen und ihre politische Bedeutung," *Textil-Bekleidung,* Organ der Gewerkschaft Textil Bekleidung (Düsseldorf), No. 10 (May 15, 1957), 3. As Habermas *et al.* have not related their findings to the special category of "corporated" students, it is impossible to say to what extent and in what specific way the "non-political" attitudes which we find so characteristic of the "political thought" of the fraternities, is related to Habermas' non-political type which represents 13% of the student body, or rather with the disposition of the "irrationally dissociated" type (see Habermas, 75–98). It is, of course, perfectly clear that the "non-political" pathos affected by the present-day Corporation is a direct offspring of that "unpolitical" stance which the young Thomas Mann celebrated (in his *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*) and which since the days of Nietzsche and Stefan George had reflected the total surrender of the upper bourgeoisie to the pan-Germanist authoritarianism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

[5] *Burschenschaftliche Blätter,* No. 6 (June 1954), quoted in Dieter Grossherr, "Die Korporationen und die Demokratie," *Die Neue Gesellschaft,* 3. Jg., No. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1956), 446. The rejection of dueling was merely tactical, a condition to be endured only as long as the almost unanimous opposition of the rectors persisted. In the case of the *Burschenschaft* the so-called "rejection" of dueling was coupled in its official journal with a sentiment such as this: "Consequently, all attempts to extirpate the duel in European coun-

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> We are non-political only in party questions and in everyday problems . . . We, *Turner-* and *Landsmannschaften* have been thoroughly political at least since 1919 as far as the university, the folk, and the ethnic frontiers are concerned . . .[6]

When the "non-political" stance is abandoned in favor of decisive political commitment, the terms of that engagement can be equally disquieting:

> The *Burschenschaft* movement indeed appears to be petering out. After the dynamics of the years 1815–1848, when the *Burschenschaft* promised to become a regular people's movement, there followed the saturated Wilhelmian period, from which only the Austrian (*ostmärkisch!*) and the Sudeten German *Burschenschaften* were exempted, as they were being kept on their toes by the racial (ethnic) struggle (*Volkstumskampf*). The folkish resurgence (*Aufbruch*) after the First World War appears now again to be followed by formalistic rigidification. We, however, shall know how to prevent that![7]

Similar, and similarly questionable, appeals are also made by the "old grads":

> In the times of crisis which followed the First World War, [the students] were inextricably part of the political events. Let us work to arouse in our present fraternity members a consciousness of their responsibility . . .[8]

The call in the Corporations for folkish-nationalist engagement as part of their fathers' legacy which must remain at the core of their activity, is a constantly recurring theme:

> . . . the *Burschenschaft* has always viewed as its highest goal not only the external drawing together into one state of all

tries, are senseless and vain; because it is the most uninhibited expression of the Western moral sense." *Burschenschaftliche Blätter,* 67. Jg., Nos. 8/9 (Aug./Sept. 1952), 292. On the "traditional concept" of *Burschenschaft* "honor" see Fritz Gruenagel, "Vom Schwund des Ehrbegriffes," *ibid.,* 266–273. According to Gruenagel the "honor of the individual is threatened with being oppressed by the stupidity of the masses," a result of the "infection" of "collectivist thinking" which is a degenerative process originating possibly in Asia! Gruenagel sees the chief disease carrier in the labor union!

[6] *CC-Blätter,* No. 7 (July 1952), quoted in Grossherr, *loc. cit.,* 446.

[7] Erich Kitzing, "Um die Studentin," *Burschenschaftliche Blätter,* 67. Jg., No. 7 (July 1952), 232.

[8] *CC-Blätter,* No. 2 (1952), quoted in Grossherr, *loc. cit.,* 446.

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> men of German blood, but particularly the inner unification of these people in a German *Volksgemeinschaft*. . . .[9]

Aroused by the postwar wave of enthusiasm among German youth for a United Europe, corporation officials have consistently warned against the dangers of a rootless cosmopolitanism. This all the more so as some of the fraternities, quite likely for tactical reasons, have placed themselves on record (in their statement of basic principles) as favoring supra-national organizations. In this connection, Heinz Amberger, the editor of the monthly journal of the *Burschenschaft,* warned that this profession of a generous internationalism must not obscure the chief goal for which the Corporations have "lived, striven, acted, and fought: a free and undivided German fatherland."[10]

> There is not the slightest reason to place the ideal of a "united Europe" as an equivalent ideal beside the ultimate old goal of the *Burschenschaft,* namely the ideal of a free, united German fatherland, let alone to put "Europe" in the first place. By the same token there is no reason to engage the idealism of *Burschenschaft* youth for the goal of a "united Europe," before it knows what that "united Europe" will look like and what role Germany will play within its framework.[11]

For folkish students Germany is never the Federal Republic nor even the state within the borders of the Weimar Republic, but rather the national home of all ethnic Germans. Consequently, so-called *Deutschtum-arbeit* and *Grenzland-arbeit,* that is, activity on behalf of "Germandom," especially at the ethnic or cultural frontiers—such as South Tirol—have again moved into the fore-front of the tasks which most "color-bearing" fraternities consider most important.[12] When the folkish mythology is made to serve an

[9] Kitzing, *loc. cit.*, 232.

[10] "Wir und Europa." *Burschenschaftliche Blätter*, 67. Jg., No. 6, (June 1952), 173. See also "Der 'Westen' und die deutsche Freiheit," *ibid.*, Nos. 8/9 (Aug./Sept. 1952), 291.

[11] *Ibid.*, 175.

[12] The reactivation of folkish concerns was decided in the *Deutsche Burschenschaft* as early as the *Burschentag* of 1952. See *Burschenschaftliche Blätter*, 67. Jg., No. 6 (June 1952), 198, and No. 7 (July 1952), 224, 226 and 236.

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ideal of Europe, an element of missionary arrogance appears which reminds one unpleasantly of past instances when Germans felt they had a message the world could not afford to ignore:

> The fact that Europe today is being ground between the millstones of American civilization and Asiatic [notions of] universal salvation . . . presents a task which can be accomplished only by the German people . . . Not only because it is the center and heart of this continent, [but] because it alone has the [necessary] biologic and spiritual energy to resist (*Widerstandskraft*) . . . Much like the German element in the multi-ethnic realm of the old monarchy, today the entire German people face the infinitely difficult task of encompassing the peoples of Europe, of bracketing them together, and of imparting to their community the breath of life which will permit it to accomplish its occidental mission.[13]

This preoccupation with a rather super-heated kind of patriotism is hardly reassuring when observed as part of the environment which nurtures an appreciable segment of Germany's future leaders. Democratic concern is quite especially warranted when that super-patriotism is paired with a neutral or negative attitude toward the liberal-democratic, parliamentary state, or when popular sovereignty within the framework of the nation-state is rejected in favor of mythical conceptions of a *Reich* with its tribal-folkish subdivisions and an estate order. Unfortunately, much of fraternity thinking reflects the widespread German reluctance to see in liberal democracy more than just another political device, devoid of moral implications, different from, but not necessarily superior to, those forms of political order that have gone before, and distinctly secondary for the achievement of the common life appropriate to the German: "*Even freedom must not be purchased at the cost of our territorial integrity.*" [14] In 1954 the Corps alumnus Fritz Berg, now president of the German version of the National Association of Manufacturers, argued that "in the hours of catastrophe, in

[13] *Burschenschaftliche Blätter,* No. 2 (1955) quoted in Grossherr, *loc. cit.,* 452.

[14] From a speech of Dr. Wirth, the guest speaker at the original Hambach meeting on May 27, 1832, approvingly quoted (with emphasis) in "Der 'Westen' und die deutsche Freiheit," *loc. cit.,* 291.

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the hours of crisis, the squabble over the past and over the form of political order was felt [in the Corporations] to be a matter of absolutely secondary importance, whereas the maintenance of the community was decisive." [15] Similar notes of waspishness and political callousness occur frequently in the journals of the various student Corporations: "Everyone has the right to the free expression of a contrary political opinion, despite the fact that the so-called democracy of today is surely quite as intolerant in this respect as the totalitarian regime used to be." [16] At times this ambiguity gives way to a clear profession of preference for non-democratic forms of government:

> A people runs the least risk of being wrecked if its government has a monarchical or aristocratic form . . . In contrast to the totalitarian state and to parliamentary democracy which daily annuls itself (*aufhebt*) and levels down to the lowest point, [monarchy and aristocracy] still maintain in practice a teleological principle . . .[17]

At other times a nostalgia for "Das Reich" and for an "organically" structured conservative social order in which the pristine tribal or clan groupings could fulfill their appropriate role of rejuvenating the Teutonic social order, breaks through the criticism of postwar conditions.[18]

Considering the history of the "color-bearing" fraternities in the 1920's and early 30's, it is not surprising that their attitude toward the Third Reich is highly ambiguous, despite outright rejection of its enormities:

> Our alumni are men who in part had to suffer very particular persecution by the hostile spirit (*Ungeist*) of 1945 . . . We did not sit in a concentration camp—at any rate, not before 1945. . . . Our alumni, just like we younger ones, have never wanted anything but the happiness of our fatherland . . .[19]

[15] *CC-Blätter*, No. 2, 1953/54, quoted in Grossherr, *loc. cit.*, 446.

[16] *Burschenschaftliche Blätter*, No. 8 (1953), quoted in Hirsch, *loc. cit.* See also Grossherr, *loc. cit.*, 455.

[17] *Burschenschaftliche Blätter*, No. 8 (1953), quoted in Grossherr, *loc. cit.*, 447.

[18] *Burschenschaftliche Blätter*, No. 3 (1955), quoted *ibid.*, and *CC-Blätter*, No. 5 (1954), quoted *ibid.*

[19] Quoted from the *Burschenschaftliche Blätter*, in Hirsch, *loc. cit.*

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> The German people, its academicians, and the . . . *Deutsche Burschenschaft* should not let themselves be railroaded into making confessions of guilt . . .[20]
>
> The indubitable elan of the German revolution and the potency of Central Europe during the six war years become incomprehensible if they are treated as negligible. It should rather be appreciated that it was the answer to a quite generally held European hope, around a power center which appeared to derive its strength from a personality . . . When the identity Europe-Germany appeared complete—in 1942—it turned out that it had been badly wrought . . .[21]
>
> We shall bring our history along with us into our Europe, and unabridged and uncensored, at that! And, further, we don't believe that there is such a thing as an error (*Irrweg*) in history.[22]
>
> He who fought against Hitler's Germany before the Soviet Moloch had been smashed, committed—intentionally or unintentionally—treason against Europe by lowering himself to become a helpmate (*Handlanger*) for the Soviets.[23]

The folkish nationalism, the organicist bias, the élitist bent, the "soldierly" orientation which continued to characterize the ideology of postwar "color-bearing" fraternities, are also reflected in the literature which is being recommended to the students and in the books which are critically reviewed in the fraternity journals. Almost invariably one finds here the works of "Blood and Soil" authors who were adopted by National Socialism as spokesmen for its official *Kulturpolitik,* and who have since 1945 been largely ostracized from the "official" German world of letters.

The ideological orientation of the revived Corporation as reflected in its publications is clear enough. Yet it would be a mistake to exaggerate their impact on the rank and file, or to assume that the "official" fraternity views are necessarily identical with those held by the active membership. The journals are run by "professional" Corporation enthusiasts, and the publications themselves are mostly read and paid for by the more retarded "old grads." Experience with a not

20 *Burschenschaftliche Blätter,* No. 9 (1954), quoted in Grossherr, *loc. cit.,* 447.

21 *Burschenschaftliche Blätter,* No. 1 (1953), quoted *ibid.,* 451.

22 *Burschenschaftliche Blätter,* No. 2 (1955), quoted *ibid.,* 452.

23 *Burschenschaftliche Blätter,* quoted in Hirsch, *loc. cit.*

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entirely dissimilar situation in the United States suggests that there may well be a yawning gap between those who are still living in an eternal yesterday and the great mass of actives who live in the present-day world with its matter-of-factness, its skepticism and its sober realities. Hence, to assess the contribution which the "color-bearing" Corporation makes to the world of postwar German nationalism, we must inquire about the reasons for its startling renascence and about the nature and degree of influence of the "old grads" on the students and their form of common life.

II

The students who returned to the bombed-out lecture halls and the scorched libraries in 1945–46 were too eager to get on with their long-delayed studies, and—when not studying—were too busy cleaning and stacking bricks, rebuilding laboratories or dealing in the black market to be much concerned with what in more settled times was known as the "gay student life." These were serious times, but also exciting years, and German professors still recall nostalgically the joy of teaching the most mature, serious and eager students they ever had, before or since. Such efforts as were then being made by fraternity alumni to revive the Corporations met with little understanding from the student body.

The Allied Control Council had banned all Corporations, and in 1946 the university rectors declared that they would not tolerate any revival of dueling, nor, for that matter, of the public wearing of "colors," let alone of outlandish, operetta-prince uniforms. Three years later, at a rectors' conference in Tübingen, university administrators roundly condemned the revival of the old-style Corporations, banned dueling and the public display of fraternity colors and threatened to revoke the license of any Corporation which violated the regulations. These decisions were confirmed at subsequent conferences, but progressively took on the aspect of pious pleas, increasingly unrealistic in the light of developments after 1949.[24] For, regardless of official displeasure, traditional Corporations began to reappear, organized, financed and supervised by the "old grads." In the mean-

[24] See Erich Weniger, "Das Korporationswesen als soziologisches Problem," *Die Sammlung* (Göttingen), 7. Jg., No. 2 (Feb. 1952), 125–131.

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time, the character of the student body had undergone marked changes.[25] The erstwhile disinterest in old-type fraternities manifested by the mature veterans who attended in the first postwar years, had turned into lively interest on the part of the new student body. The campuses were again populated with the children of those upper and upper middle class families which had somehow salvaged their savings across the catastrophe of 1945, or had succeeded in acquiring new ones in the black market or post currency-reform days.[26] The progressive re-establishment of settled economic conditions and the return to college of younger students who were far more susceptible to the attractions of fraternities than had been their battle-hardened predecessors, were clearly decisive factors in the restoration of "color-bearing" and dueling Corporations.[27]

But there were also other factors of key importance. One was Germany's emerging role as a partner in a Western military alliance. Hitherto the severity with which the Allies, the German Government and the rectors dealt with the matter of dueling fraternities had been largely due to the feeling that Corporations had a brutalizing influence, and that their blatant celebration of military virtues might well rouse the suspicion of Germany's neighbors to a new fever pitch. However, when Germany's contributions to a European army became a matter of public discussion, the greatest roadblock to Allied policy was no longer the "bloodthirsty militarism" of the Germans, but rather their pacifism and neutralism. Consequently, the original attitude of total hostility to "militarist" fraternities was rapidly becoming anachronistic. There

[25] See C. Menck, "Neue Burschenherrlichkeit? Die Westdeutsche Nachkriegs- Universität und ihre Hörer," *Wort und Wahrheit*, IX. Jg., No. 2 (Feb. 1954), 117–125.

[26] At the University of Frankfurt, roughly 80% of the student body come from families of high or middle range officials, free professionals, and the self-employed. Only approximately 5% come from working class families, and 1 to 2% from farm families. Habermas *et al.*, 288.

[27] Defenders of "color-bearing" fraternities have consistently maintained that the postwar Corporations—in contradistinction to their predecessors—are not class institutions. It was claimed that 60% of the membership in 1953 had to hold part-time jobs to eke out inadequate allowances. See, for example, chairman of the alumni of the non-dueling Corporation, Wingolf, Wilhelm Lütkemann's "Wiedergewinnung der Solidarität," *Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung*, 8. Jg., No. 22 (Nov. 1953), 10.

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could be no doubt in anybody's mind where the Corporations have traditionally stood in the matter of "soldierliness" and where they would stand now, officially at least. The change in official attitude away from earlier restrictive anti-Corporation legislation, occasioned by altered circumstances, is unambiguously reflected in a judicial decision upholding a Corporation's contention that the university had no right to forbid the public wearing of fraternity colors. In the 1952 opinion, the judge held:

> In the year 1949 the views regarding student customs . . . were influenced by the invariably severe conception of the occupation authorities. These views had by 1951 undergone a change . . . which becomes most obvious in those areas which are connected with rearmament. . . . Here in particular it is necessary to note that the prohibition of the old traditional rituals of dueling and the carrying of a saber had been dictated by the intention to prevent every militant custom or impression . . .[28]

Clearly, the judge simply assumed that it was, in 1952, no longer either necessary or indeed desirable to "prevent militant customs" or avoid the "impression" of militancy. Consequently, the old restrictions were now felt to be unconstitutional.

A fourth and, possibly, the single most important factor in the revival and continued growth of the fraternity system, and in the progressive hollowing out or total discard of the "democratizing" conditions which public and university authorities had at first so determinedly insisted upon, was the return of Corporation alumni to positions of influence and power in the course of the social restoration which has marked the last ten years of the Bonn Republic.[29] Staunch

[28] "Entscheidung im Bonner Farbenstreit," *Burschenschaftliche Blätter*, 67. Jg., No. 5 (May 1952), 169.

[29] This is not to deny the essential correctness of J. Habermas' observation (on pages 165–66 of *Student und Politik*) that the old, traditional, academic bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia of lawyers, physicians, teachers, professors and high officials, has been after 1945 unable either to maintain itself as a clearly defined social estate or to retain in unmodified form its class (or stratum) consciousness. Its former, proud self-assurance has become mixed with a certain defensive stance in the face of more rapid social mobility and the consequent changes in the functions of the academic professions and the relative loss of status of the academic bourgeoisie. Indeed, Habermas stipulates the existence of a specific, autochthonous social image which reflects these changes and which he calls "the image of the descending academic middle class."

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fraternity men sitting on the State and Federal Benches, entrenched in the State Ministries of Education, and in the Federal Ministries, holding positions of prominence in their communities, or warming chairs on the board of directors of Germany's giant industries, were not likely to countenance passively the Corporation's relegation from the university scene. On the contrary, the "old grads" had years ago committed themselves to a persistent, hard, expensive, and sometimes bitter, struggle for the full recognition of the traditional fraternities. They have won. Even the Association of German Student Groups, "after a decade of opposition, has surrendered to the saber-wielding fraternities. The Association has agreed to approve the dueling groups for Government funds." [30] And, indeed, on that Association's recommendation, the Federal Ministry of the Interior moved in 1961 to subsidize the Corporations, and to begin doing so in the then current fiscal year.[31]

III

The resurrected "color-bearing" fraternities are a monument to the "loyalty" of the alumni. They were not so much the response to a demand of German college youths as to one made by their fathers and grandfathers. Under these conditions there can be no legitimate doubts as to the scope and weight of the "old grads' " influence on fraternity life. Yet without wishing to minimize the seriousness of this kind of social restoration from the point of view of developing liberal democratic consciousness among the leadership cadres of tomorrow's Germany, it must be recognized that the alumni's influence is not *all* pervasive, and that the restoration is by no means *complete.*

To start with, there appears to exist a very appreciable difference between the older and the younger generations as to the essential purposes which they see—or wish to see—fulfilled by the traditional fraternities.[32] The "old grads" offer a variety of reasons for their ardent support of the fraternity

[30] *The New York Times,* May 7, 1961, 24 (col. 1).

[31] "Korporationsverbände werden erstmals aus dem Bundesjugendplan gefördert," *Informationen aus der Studentenschaft,* No. 2 (Feb. 1961), 4–5.

[32] For much of the following, see the investigations of Walter Gong reported in "Couleurstudenten 1961," *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), No. 22 (June 2, 1961), 7, No. 23 (June 8, 1961), 6, and No. 24 (June 16, 1961), 8.

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system. There is the sentimental attachment to the fraternity which, after all, stresses as part of its ideology the character of a "life's bond," and which prompts nostalgic memories of one's own carefree youth. In addition, the wish to see an ancient tradition perpetuated is of course very strong in the overwhelmingly conservative alumni, quite particularly as the tradition in question is designed to strengthen conservatism and patriotism in succeeding generations. Thirdly, there is the rationale which emphasizes the fraternity's important educational role. Discipline, subordination, social polish, manliness, courage, these, say the "old grads," are taught by the Corporations. Moreover, the alumni see in this type of education the single most effective curb to the threatened total depersonalization of the individual by the oppressive forces of a mass-democratic, industrialized society.[33] This argument begins to shade over into another motive which is very likely the most potent and most pervasive, for all of its being the least talked about and rarely even admitted. Bourgeois "national liberalism" must be prevented from "degenerating" into a mass democracy in which power is held by anonymous collectives in the form of labor unions or the mass parties. Only a self-conscious academic élite, aware of its responsibilities in defending German *Kultur* against the brutalization of our times, can prevent the worst, and only the traditional Corporations, in the view of the "old grads," can breed the kind of élite needed.[34]

Whatever the expectations of the alumnus, it is doubtful that all or even most of them are shared by the postwar student who joins a "color-bearing" fraternity. This, at least, would seem to emerge from such investigations as have been published. The difficulty which faces the inquisitive outsider in taking soundings of student motives, is to discover the *real* behind the declared reasons. In an area so sensitive to social pressures and so studded with taboos as the area of

[33] See "Schmisse und Farben," *Junge Stimme,* No. 15 (1960), 5.

[34] In Habermas' investigation of the present-day university student's social perspective, parts of this élite orientation to intellectual pursuits and the class which embodies them appear in two quite specific clusters of attitudes and social perceptions which Habermas denotes respectively as "the social image of spiritual values (*innere Werte*)" and "the social image of an intellectual élite." These were found to be the most widely held conceptions among students.

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corporative student associations, it should not surprise if discretion rather than candor characterizes the reactions of the respondents. Thus, for example, it is generally known that fraternity membership will *in fact* aid the young graduate in obtaining a suitable position. But to admit that this knowledge was an important factor in a student's decision to join a Corporation is still impossible in polite fraternity society.

The investigator encounters very similar taboos when he probes for other possible and more immediate economic motives behind the startling popularity of "color-bearing" fraternities in the postwar universities. Again the *facts* are uncontroverted. The rooms in the comfortable, clubby, well-subsidized lodge rent for half the price of even the most ramshackle garret in town, and the nourishing, ample and well-cooked meals (also subsidized by the alumni body) are only a shade more expensive than the just barely adequate food available at the university's student dining hall. While these facts are well known, no fraternity student will admit that this knowledge had anything to do with his decision to join.[35] On the contrary, any suggestion that this might actually have been the case is viewed as an insult, and is deeply resented. "One does not seek lifelong ties, merely in order to live a little better for a few semesters," is the fraternity student's proud answer.

And, indeed, it would be highly unrealistic and totally misleading if one were to overemphasize these rational, utilitarian motives. Were these exclusively present, the existence and continued growth of the "color-bearing" fraternities on the campuses of Germany's universities would present no serious political problems; they would hardly be dangerous to the development of a liberal-democratic consciousness among Germany's future social and political leaders. In fact, such a danger exists when rational motives play a relatively unimportant role in the rush on the Corporations. Emerging for the first time from the overly protective atmosphere of the German home, with its usually unambiguous—if not always clearly articulated—universe of values, prejudices and social attitudes, the young student searches for

[35] On the early postwar student's financial situation see Rudolf Herlt, "Wer finanziert das Studium?," *Deutsche Universitäts-Zeitung*, 7. Jg., No. 13, (July 1952), 14–16.

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orienting models. For the first time in his life he is exposed to the rough winds of intellectual freedom that blow in the relatively open spaces of the campus, with all their stimulating freshness as well as their sometimes icy blasts of self-doubt and loneliness. It is no wonder that many freshmen respond by running for cover in the ritualistic community of the Corporation. And herein lies the real danger.[36] For, in doing so, the fraternity student has missed the opportunity which presents itself in the form of a four or five year lacuna between the conservative ties, the traditional pieties, and limited vision of a status-conscious family unit, and the later, equally conservative ties, bureaucratic prejudices and social limitations of a still rather status-structured and "estate"-conscious professional or occupational peer group.

It is only from this sociological vantage point that the significance of the "color-bearing" Corporation and the eagerness of the "old grads" to re-establish it in all of its glory, become understandable. Under conditions of increasing social mobility in an industrialized "mass" society, and hence of "democratized" forms of élite recruitment, the "color-bearing" fraternities have become a significant "defensive" weapon in the hands of the largely restored, dominant social classes for controlling the sluice gates through which a rising stream of candidates from the "new" middle class, the lower middle class and the working class threatened to flow into the directing positions of state, school and industry. This "control" is, of course, not merely a matter of selection and exclusion, but, more importantly, one of providing a machinery which vouchsafes that a growing proportion of those who will ultimately be channelled into the key positions of state and society will have passed through the politically nationalist and socially conservative filter of the "color-bearing" Corporations.[37]

[36] This is well brought out in "Die Studentischen Korporationen," *Feinde der Demokratie* (Lower Saxony), III, No. 4 (January 1954).

[37] In this connection a word or two about the changed pattern of fraternity recruitment is important. Contrary to the "rushing" practices in pre-Nazi days, little, if any, recruiting is nowadays done by the members themselves. That lies now almost exclusively in the hands of the "old grads." In many instances the pledge-prospect has actually no choice at all. His father may be an old, faithful Corps alumnus or *Burschenschafter*, and as long as the son can remember, it was simply assumed that he would go to a university and would join his father's fraternity. In many other cases, in which the

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IV

In any discussion of the meaning of Corporations in postwar Germany it is only natural that the emphasis should be put on the remarkable, if disquieting, continuity of nationalist and reactionary social and ideological patterns. Yet it would be a serious distortion of the actual state of affairs if the analysis were to leave the reader with the impression that the "old grads" had succeeded in their aim of total restoration. They have done well, but not that well. Even fraternity students (including those in the most hidebound and reactionary Corporations) must still live and work under the considerably changed conditions of postwar society and the postwar campus. However reluctant, however regretful, however hesitant, alumni and students had to adapt to these changes.[38] Thus, for instance, despite continued ideological insistence in Corporation circles on the importance of the independence of the academic estate as an organically grown part of the larger social organism with its own very special honor (*Standesehre*) and its own appropriate, snobbishly exclusive ways of vindicating it, the traditional "honor-duel" as the single most visible and suspect badge of social superiority has so far not been restored to its old ubiquity. Even the obligatory arranged duels (*Bestimmungsmensur*) which are again in full vogue, however barbarous they appear to the rest of the civilized world, have returned in slightly modified form.[39] Firstly, in most fraternities fewer duels are now

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father is dead, or possibly had not belonged to a Corporation when he was at college, the freshman arrives with a recommendation from some fraternity alumnus (not infrequently a respected high school teacher) who had judged the young man to be appropriate Corporation material and had been able to persuade him of the value of membership.

38 Indeed, among the German student body as a whole, no more than 10% appear to orient themselves by social conceptions which reflect without major *modifications nineteenth and twentieth century ideological positions.* Habermas divides these "autochthonous" ideological models into an "upper class model" (4%), a "lower class model" (1%), and a "model of the descending academic middle class" (5%). See Habermas *et al.,* 160–171. At the same time it would be unrealistic to anticipate that "adjusted" behavior, and even "adjusted" belief systems, would be maintained under radically changed circumstances. Political reliability is not likely to result from more or less opportunistic "adaptation" or "adjustment."

39 For details of the struggle between Corporations and university administration in regard to the prohibition of dueling, and for a defense of dueling,

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required for good standing than had previously been the case. Secondly, they are no longer fought for the primary purpose of having one's cheek sliced to ribbons. The dueling scar used to be a sign of social distinction which was "worn" in business and social contacts, much as the British wear the old school tie, or Americans, a fraternity ring or pin. More students now show little enthusiasm for mutual disfigurement and purposely hit in such a fashion that the wound is inflicted on the scalp, where the scar will not be visible. In short, the social value of the caste sign appears to have diminished.[40]

There are also other indices of change. Much of the old bellicosity and swashbuckling that used to characterize the "color-bearing," dueling student has fallen into disuse. And if it is still true of many of the Corporations that it would be unwise to join them without having taken out an insurance on one's liver as a precautionary measure, it is also true that drinking bouts no longer have a monopoly on the members' attention. Increasingly there is a desire on the part of some of the fraternities at least to engage in discussions with non-corporated students and to participate in some measure in the university's intellectual life.[41] Finally, it is only fair to report the observation of some investigators that contrary

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see the lengthy interview with the chairman of an inter-fraternity committee at the Institute of Technology in Darmstadt, "Von Mensuren hört man nichts," *Der Spiegel,* Aug. 7, 1957, 22–29. Recently university administrators have authorized lecturers at Heidelberg University to exclude from their classrooms students with bandaged facial gashes, if they can clearly prove that the wound had been received in a duel. See "Heidelberg Sets Truce On Dueling," *The New York Times,* Dec. 7, 1961, 34 (col. 3).

40 Amusingly enough there exists a possibility that dueling, that "ultimate test of manhood" which neither Allied prohibition nor the decree of the august university rectors could stop, may be consigned to oblivion by nothing more romantic than a decision of the German health insurance companies that they will not pay for the treatment of dueling gashes. See "German Insurers Bar Duel Claims," *The New York Times,* May 7, 1961, 24 (col. 1).

41 This should of course not be taken to mean that both the political literacy and realism of the "average" fraternity man are very high. In fact both his political interest and sophistication are on the whole dangerously low. To the extent that corporated students tend to exhibit authoritarian political potential, it is very likely that "irrationally dissociated" disposition types, to use Habermas' categories, are represented in "color-bearing" fraternities in considerably greater numbers than in the student body as a whole, where they account for 11%. A characteristic feature of that type is that he will conceal his political antipathies against the prevailing state of affairs behind an elaborate facade of political disinterest and apathy.

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to the sanguine expectations of the more reactionary alumni, the "color-bearing" Corporations have not been uniformly successful in putting their social and political imprint indelibly upon their members. Unfortunately, published data which could confirm that impression or demonstrate its limitations are lacking.

The most sophisticated study on the political and social views of the German university student, J. Habermas *et al.*, *Student und Politik,* did not include in its original research design any consideration of the Corporation problem.[42] Nonetheless, that study's conclusions deserve mention, as they permit certain inferences regarding the sub-group of corporated students. Habermas' conceptual framework consists of a three-dimensional model of political potential. The latter is seen as the resultant of "political disposition," "political tendency," and a quasi-ideological image of society, its structure, power relationships and dominant values (*Gesellschaftsbild*). The correlation of the two attitude clusters of "disposition" and "tendency" provides a measure of political potential under *existing* conditions. However, only the addition of the third dimension, the social image, permits the assessment of the potential under changed and adverse circumstances.

Applying this framework to an investigation of the political potential of students at the University of Frankfurt, Habermas and his colleagues found that the reliable, self-initiated democrats in Germany's college population account for no more than nine per cent, and that at the other end of the scale, sixteen per cent of the respondents represent the "hard core" of the authoritarians. That is, among the quarter of the students who possess a stable, well-founded, political orientation and an action or initiative potential, authoritarians outnumber democrats by a factor of almost two to one. To put it differently, in any future crisis of German democracy, those among the intelligentsia who could be expected to offer determined resistance to anti-democratic de-

42 The research design called for an open-ended, extensive interview of 171 students (which was administered in the summer semester of 1957) and a supplementary questionnaire interview of 550 students (which took place in February and March 1959) for control purposes. See Habermas *et al.*, Annex II, 279–315. A question concerning fraternity membership occurred only in the supplementary interview, and was not discussed in the published research report.

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velopments would find themselves opposed by almost twice as many equally determined "academicians" who support the authoritarian cause. Ninety per cent of the rest of the students fall into three groups of "fellow-travellers," all of which are characterized by an uncertain, vague political potential.

There are two marginally treated problems in the Frankfurt study which permit us to draw more specific inferences with regard to the Corporations. One is the relationship between various "political potential" groups and their social backgrounds. Habermas and his fellow workers found that respondents with authoritarian potential come almost three times more often from upper bourgeois families with an academic tradition than do the students with a distinct democratic potential. If it is safe to conjecture, in the light of the Corporations' recruitment pattern, that the percentage of sons from "academic" upper middle class homes in the "color-bearing" fraternities is significantly higher than among the rest of the student population, then it follows that the number of corporated students with marked authoritarian potential can be expected to be well above the sixteen per cent level.

The disturbing problem implicit in this situation becomes more serious still in the light of the expected career patterns of the various types of university graduates. There are two good reasons for predicting that conservative-authoritarian fraternity alumni will be more likely to fill key positions in state and society than their classmates with high democratic potential. In the first place, despite increased social mobility in postwar Germany, the father's status still determines to a large degree that of his son. As fraternity students come disproportionately from high status backgrounds, it can be anticipated that they will have greater opportunity to achieve influential positions than their lower-born, democratic fellow alumni. Secondly, the reputation of the fraternities as "job agencies" for the more desirable and prestigious positions, is by no means entirely without foundation. Interestingly enough, this objective situation is reflected in the students' subjective assessment of their own career potential. Habermas' study shows that distinctly democratic students expect to achieve high positions less than one-third as often

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as do their authoritarian counterparts.[43] Needless to say, the modest self-estimate on the part of the academicians with high democratic potential may in itself adversely affect their chances for achieving influence, just as the self-assured expectation of the authoritarians may act as a powerful motive for capturing the commanding heights of the public decision-making apparatus.

These inferences from the data of the Frankfurt study underline the symptomatic and absolute importance of the revival of "color-bearing," dueling fraternities for any estimate of Germany's future democratic potential. Unfortunately, no data are extant that would show the relationship between the revival of the Corporations and the restorative trend which characterizes Bonn's social and political milieu on the one hand, and the social, economic and political position of the Corporation alumni on the other hand. However, because of the continued near-monopoly of the universities as channels for the recruitment and distribution of leadership personnel in almost all fields of German life, and in view of the fraternities' remarkable "official" ideological continuity with their nationalist, anti-democratic and anti-liberal past, the revival of dueling Corporations is anything but reassuring. Such comfort as the situation provides derives from the fact that despite great effort, the alumni have not succeeded in reviving the old practices and patterns of thought *in every detail.* But if they have not prevented "adaptive" thought and behavior patterns, that is, adjustments to prevailing political mores (which, clearly, are subject to change with changing conditions), they have succeeded in retarding, or even preventing, in a large number of their members, the development of an unambiguous, inward acceptance of a liberal-democratic social and political order.

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[43] Habermas *et al.*, Table 23, 235.

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN GENERAL ELECTION OF 1961

ON OCTOBER 18, 1961, an entirely European [1] electorate, voting in the fourth South African general election since the end of World War II, returned Dr. Verwoerd and the National Party to power and by implication again endorsed the Government's policy of "apartheid." The Nationalists not only increased their majority in the House of Assembly but also their share of the popular vote. There was thus continued an electoral trend favorable to the National Party which has now been in evidence in six successive general elections since 1938. Although there are reasons for believing that it may be difficult for the National Party to increase the number of votes cast for it in the future, it is nonetheless clear that, in the context of the South African political system, never before has a National Party Premier had a stronger claim to office.

This paper is an examination of this election. The context of the decision to dissolve the House of Assembly, the campaign and the results will be examined in turn. The material presented seems to demonstrate the continued primacy of the issue of race relations in South African politics, the further entrenchment of the National Party, the continued inefficiency of all Opposition groups and considerable stability of political alignments within the South African electorate.

I

A general election was not required by law until 1963, and there can be no doubt that the National Party Government elected in 1958 could have served out the remaining eighteen months of its five-year term of office. At dissolution the Government's majority was forty-three seats in a House of 160

[1] "European" in South Africa is synonymous with "white"; "non-European" is synonymous with "non-white," namely, Africans, Coloreds (mixed blood) and Indians.

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members. One Opposition newspaper claimed that the Prime Minister had advised dissolution of Parliament in 1961 because he did not "trust the future." [2] There were, however, a number of more positive considerations which, from the Government's point of view, made October 1961 an opportune time for it to go to the country.

The Government could reasonably expect to gain some electoral support from the inauguration of the Republic in May 1961. In the general election of 1958 [3] the National Party had received less than a majority of the popular vote, but in the republican referendum of October 1960, contested along party lines, 52.3 per cent of the electorate supported it. Despite the bitter debate before the referendum, anti-republicans accepted the constitutional change without significant protest while it was warmly received by those Afrikaners for whom the creation of a republic had long been an aspiration.

Indeed, the republican referendum, by raising the issue of continued South African membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, had begun a series of events which ultimately led to the country's withdrawal from that body. This development occasioned widespread shock on the part of the European population, but it was widely accepted that Dr. Verwoerd's position on the matter in London had been forced upon him by the truculent attitude towards South Africa taken by the Asian and African Commonwealth members.[4]

The shootings at Sharpeville in March 1960 and the racial disturbances which followed immediately thereafter had deeply upset the country. To many outside South Africa, and some within, these events had seemed to prove the bankruptcy of the policy of apartheid. However, the Government's handling of these incidents returned race relations to their traditional pattern—at least for the moment. Subse-

2 *The Star,* October 17, 1961.

3 For two accounts of the general election of 1958, see R. R. Farguharson, "South Africa 1958" in David Butler *et al., Elections Abroad* (London, 1959), and Edgar H. Brookes, "The Union of South Africa: The General Election of 1958 and After" in Kenneth Kirkwood (ed.), *St. Antony's Papers, Number 10, African Affairs* (Carbondale, Illinois, 1961).

4 The absence of evidence to the contrary is most convincing, but the point was made also by *Die Vaderland,* March 16, 1961.

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quently, the outlawing of the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress [5] and the failure of a non-European strike,[6] timed to coincide with the inauguration of the Republic, seemed to demonstrate that the Government could deal effectively with domestic disorder. The continuing embarrassment to the Government of the "Treason Trial" was ended with the dropping of all charges against the remaining accused in March 1961.[7]

It is probably true that the National Party Government had not succeeded in allaying European anxiety about the future of the white community in South Africa; indeed, the Opposition claimed that apartheid had had the opposite result. However, press reports of atrocities in the Republic of the Congo and in Angola and of growing one-party rule in Ghana were hardly likely to encourage Europeans to tread a path of political integration with the non-Europeans, the polar opposite to apartheid. Moreover, there were signs that the Government was determined to proceed with programs of "positive apartheid," that is, the development of African "homelands" and, perhaps, a larger devolution of power to the African authorities in those areas.[8]

Of greater immediate concern was the economic health of the country. Since the end of World War II South Africa has enjoyed a high level of economic growth based on considerable imports of capital. However, in response to the racial disturbances of 1960 and the expectation of adverse consequences growing out of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, there was, over the eighteen-month period ending in June of 1961, a net capital outflow from South Africa valued at $227,000,000. On June 16, 1961, South Africa's capital reserves fell to $198,800,000.[9]

The Government dealt with the crisis with some vigor. It claimed that it would be able to maintain South Africa's trade relations with Great Britain and the Federation of the

[5] *The New York Times,* April 9, 1960.

[6] *The Star,* May 30, 1961.

[7] *Die Burger,* March 30, 1961.

[8] *Die Transvaler,* June 16, 1961.

[9] *State of the Union Year-Book for South Africa, 1961* (Johannesburg, 1961), 337; *South African Scope,* IV, No. 7 (September 1961), 6.

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Rhodesias and Nyasaland.[10] In July it was announced that the International Monetary Fund had agreed to lend South Africa $74,200,000.[11] Promotion of overseas investment continued,[12] and fairly drastic regulations limiting capital movements out of the country were promulgated.[13] Finally, in August 1961, the Minister of Finance was able to announce that reserves had risen to $236,000,000.[14] At the time of the election, South Africa gave the impression of much greater economic vitality than it had during the anxious days after Sharpeville in mid-1960.

II

The general election of 1958 had eliminated all third parties from the House of Assembly, save for two Liberals sitting on behalf of African electors in the Cape Province, whose seats were abolished in 1959.[15] For the first time in the political history of South Africa the European electorate was represented by only two parties in Cape Town. In 1959, however, the United Party in Parliament had split, eleven of its members subsequently forming the Progressive Party. Later a National Party M.P., Mr. Japie Basson, was excluded from the National Party caucus. Crossing to the Opposition side of the House, Basson subsequently became the sole parliamentary representative of the newly-formed National Union Party. At dissolution in 1961, the seats in the House of Assembly were divided as follows:

10 In 1959 Great Britain and the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland accounted for 86% of South Africa's exports to and 73.5% of her imports from all Commonwealth countries and Ireland. At this time 48.8% of South Africa's total export trade was with all Commonwealth countries and Ireland while these same countries provided South Africa with 45.7% of her total imports. *State of Union Yearbook for South Africa, 1961,* 331–332.

11 *Africa Digest* (August 1961), 22.

12 See, for example, J. R. Holloway, "South Africa Remains a Sound Investment Field," *Optima,* II, No. 3 (September 1961). Dr. Holloway was at the time of writing of his article head of a South African trade mission to Europe.

13 These regulations limited the amount of capital which a citizen can withdraw from South Africa to $2,800.

14 *South African Scope,* IV, No. 7 (September 1961), 6.

15 Prior to 1959 qualified male Africans in the Cape Province were entitled to elect three (European) representatives to the House of Assembly. These seats were filled every five years at a special election.

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National Party	102 seats [16]
United Party	42 seats
Progressive Party	11 seats
National Union Party	1 seat
Independents	4 seats [17]

Two other parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Workers' Party, took part in the general election.

The National Party

Historically, the role of the National Party (N.P.) in South Africa has been to give political expression to the aspirations of the more ethnocentric element within the Afrikaans-speaking population. The origin of the party lies in the protest made by General Hertzog in 1912 on behalf of the "national-minded" [18] segment of the Afrikaner population against the "conciliatory" attitudes of two other Afrikaners, Generals Botha and Smuts, towards the English-speaking population and the British Government.[19] However, the contemporary character of the party is an outgrowth of South African politics from the middle of the 1930's to the first postwar general election in 1948.

Beginning in 1934, when the party was called the Purified National Party, signifying the elimination from the party of "non-nationalists" (including Hertzog himself) who had entered into a coalition (later fusion) with Smuts' South African Party, the National Party embarked upon a drive to unite all Afrikaners in a single and national-minded political organization.[20] Under the leadership of Dr. D. F. Malan, the National Party espoused the creation of a South African republic along "Christian-National," or Afrikaner, lines.

16 Includes the Speaker of the House of Assembly.

17 The four Independent M.P.'s are the (European) representatives of Colored voters in the Cape Province. The dissolution of Parliament and the subsequent general election of 1961 did not affect these seats which are filled at a special election.

18 This is a literal translation of the Afrikaans *nasionaal-gesinde,* a term which refers to a heightened sense of Afrikaner national and/or cultural consciousness.

19 For the program and principles of the National Party in 1914, see D. W. Kruger (ed.), *South African Parties and Policies, 1910–1960* (London, 1960), 68–72.

20 For an exposition of the growth of the National Party to 1945, see Michael Roberts and A. E. G. Trollip, *The South African Opposition, 1939–1945* (Cape Town, 1947).

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Holding that Great Britain's war with Nazi Germany did not involve South Africa, the National Party joined with Prime Minister Hertzog and a minority of the United Party in unsuccessfully opposing the Union's entry into World War II.

To its policy of republicanism the National Party added in the general election of 1948 the concept of apartheid, the separate development of the European and non-European populations in South Africa. The fact that apartheid lacked precise meaning in 1948 did not, apparently, diminish its effectiveness as a political platform. With this concept the party seized the initiative in South African race relations and gained power in 1948.[21]

Since coming to power in coalition with the small Afrikaner Party which it absorbed in 1951, the National Party has governed South Africa. Over these years it has broadened its electoral support while remaining a model of an efficient political organization with an impressive degree of control over the public actions of members, inside Parliament and out.[22] Republicanism and apartheid have remained the two pillars of National Party policy. Both are directed at the two major foes of Afrikaner nationalism: anglicization and African nationalism. But since 1948 apartheid has tended to replace republicanism in importance, except for the brief interlude of the republican referendum of 1960, and today the National Party increasingly represents itself as a party of national, or European, unity, although on its own terms.

The United Party

Since 1948 the principal opposition party in the House of Assembly has been the United Party (U.P.). This party dates from 1934 when Hertzog, then Prime Minister, and Smuts agreed to combine to form a broadly based party of European unity. Cooperation ended in 1939 on the issue of South African participation in World War II, but under the leadership of Smuts the United Party continued to gov-

21 D. W. Kruger, *The Age of the Generals* (Johannesburg, 1961), 226.

22 The National Party's strength in the House of Assembly has grown similarly: from 70 seats in 1948, 94 in 1953, to 103 in 1958. Gwendolen M. Carter, *Politics of Inequality* (2nd ed. rev.; New York, 1959), 449 and 494.

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ern until 1948 despite the defection of Hertzog and approximately one-third of its parliamentary supporters.

The greater amount of the United Party's financial and electoral strength has always come from the English-speaking population, but the Afrikaans-speaking community has provided the United Party with its leaders and crucial electoral support. Approximately fifteen to twenty per cent of all Afrikaners have supported the United Party in recent general elections.[23]

Because the United Party has traditionally attempted to be a party of national unity, its membership has been politically more diverse than that of the National Party, and this diversity has been reflected in a comparative irresoluteness. The party's policies have usually shown compromise and pragmatism in marked contrast to the seemingly ideological character of the National Party programs.

The South African electorate is overwhelmingly conservative. For this reason, the leadership of the United Party has apparently felt that the party could not move to the "left" as a means of returning to power. In consequence, during the years that the party has been in opposition disaffection within the United Party has been felt most keenly on the party's own left.[24] While Smuts was alive intra-party differences were submerged by his towering prestige, but after his death in 1950 his political successors were increasingly unable to resolve the discord within the party. The break-away of twelve liberal-minded United Party M.P.'s in 1959 was the result of a conflict with a long history.

The Progressive Party

The Progressive Party (P.P.) was formed in November 1959. Eleven of the twelve[25] M.P.'s who had recently broken with the United Party immediately joined the Pro-

23 *Ibid.*, 296.

24 Disaffection within the ranks of the United Party has not been limited to its left wing, although it probably has been greatest there. In 1956 three right wing U.P. M.P.'s broke with the party and formed the short-lived Conservative Party, many of whose members were subsequently absorbed by the National Party. See *ibid.*, 141.

25 The twelfth, Professor I. S. Fourie, sat in Parliament as an Independent until joining the Progressive Party in time for the general election of 1961.

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gressive Party and assumed leading positions in its organization. The purpose behind the creation of the party was to direct South Africa away from a policy of "white supremacy," whatever its form, and on to the path of multi-racial cooperation. An immediate consequence of the formation of the party was to make possible a more vigorous debate on apartheid in the House of Assembly.

Until the general election of 1961 there was little evidence upon which to base an estimate of the electoral strength of the Progressive Party,[26] although it was anticipated that its appeal would be largely to urban, English-speaking middle- and upper-income groups.[27] The membership of the party is predominantly English-speaking, although there are a small number of Afrikaners in the party, one of whom, Dr. Jan Steytler, is party leader. The party has received support from Mr. Harry Oppenheimer,[28] an industrialist and one of South Africa's wealthiest men.

The National Union Party

The National Union Party (N.U.P.) was formed in April 1960,[29] although the origin of the party may be said to lie in the exclusion of Mr. Japie Basson from the caucus of the parliamentary members of the National Party in 1959. The reason for Basson's exclusion was his refusal to accept the decision of the leadership of the National Party to remove the three Natives' Representatives from the House of Assembly.

The purpose behind the creation of the National Union Party was to create a political force between the National Party and the United Party and thereby to provide a basis for a political reunion of the two European linguistic groups. In the general election of 1961 the party entered candidates in thirteen constituencies and endeavored especially to attract dissident Afrikaners away from the National Party. The

26 Although in the Hospital (Johannesburg) constituency by-election of May 1961, necessitated by the resignation from Parliament of Dr. Boris Wilson, one of the original eleven Progressive Party M.P.'s, the Progressive candidate received only 37 per cent of the vote in losing to the United Party's candidate. *The Star*, May 4, 1961.

27 Ronald Segal, *Political Africa* (London, 1961), 423.

28 *Rand Daily Mail*, October 18, 1961.

29 Segal, 426.

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party leader of the N.U.P. is former Chief Justice H. A. Fagan.

The Liberal Party

The Liberal Party was formed in 1953 when a small but distinguished group of individuals decided that the National Party and the policy of apartheid could be best opposed outside of the United Party. By South African standards, the Liberal Party is on the far left. It has challenged the Government, and the thinking of the European community generally, on a wide range of matters, but its attention centers on South African race relations.

The Liberal Party is the only South African political party with a substantial multi-racial membership.[30] Its small European membership is overwhelmingly English-speaking and includes many well-known scholars, artists and professional people, although since 1959 some of these have left to join the Progressive Party.[31] The president of the party is Mr. Alan Paton, the South African author.

Until 1959 Liberals sat in Parliament in both the Senate and the House of Assembly as special representatives of the African population. However, the Liberal Party has never enjoyed support from more than a small minority of the European electorate, and with the elimination of the special African representatives from Parliament in 1959, Liberals ceased to be represented in either of its chambers.

The Conservative Workers' Party

The Conservative Workers' Party (C.W.P.) is a creation of the general election of 1961, and it seems likely that it will be short-lived. It was brought into being in order to represent the grievances of European working men on the Witwatersrand, many of whom had been supporters of the National Party and who, in 1961, suffered a high rate of unemployment. It has been a single-issue party of limited purpose, and in 1961 it hoped to bring pressure upon the Government to alleviate depressed economic conditions in particular industries, especially the building and textile trades.

[30] A small number of non-Europeans belong to the Progressive Party.

[31] Segal, 424.

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III

A striking feature of the general election of 1961 was the large number of unopposed candidates. Almost half of the total number of seats, 70 out of 156, were claimed by only one party; had the Progressive Party not been in the field, the number probably would have been larger. The large number of unopposed candidates is indicative of an important fact in contemporary South African political life: the geographical distribution of Government and Opposition supporters, aided by the present delimitation of constituencies, has created bastions of National Party and anti-National Party sentiment with nearly all constituencies falling clearly into one or the other of the two political camps. In the general election of 1958 in only five constituencies was the winning candidate's margin of victory less than six per cent of the popular vote.[32]

Of course, the Opposition had split after the general election of 1958, and this made the outcome of the general election in 1961 in many formerly "safe" United Party constituencies uncertain. But the three principal Opposition parties, the U.P., the N.U.P. and the P.P., moved to prevent divisions among them from benefiting the National Party.

The United Party and the National Union Party formed an election pact: [33] neither would enter a constituency against the other. Furthermore, the Progressive Party unilaterally decided not to enter candidates in constituencies in which the appearance of a third party might cause the National Party to win seats which otherwise it would probably lose.[34] The result of this decision was that the Progressive Party entered candidates in a few safe Nationalist constituencies and in numerous other constituencies which had been very safe for the United Party in 1958. Little increase in the parliamentary strength of the Government or Opposition was, therefore, possible in 1961 without a marked shift in the voting preferences of the electorate.

The broad outline of the electoral struggle became clear with the closing of nominations on the fifteenth of Septem-

[32] See note 3 above.

[33] *The Star*, August 8, 1961.

[34] *Rand Daily Mail*, August 15, 1961.

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ber. The Opposition conceded fifty seats to the National Party. These were seats in the rural constituencies of all the provinces and South-West Africa, excepting Natal; in the Afrikaans-speaking towns of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the Cape Province; and in four Afrikaans-speaking working-class constituencies in Pretoria.

The National Party in turn conceded forty-six constituencies to the Opposition parties, but contests between Opposition parties developed in twenty-six of them, the United Party gaining all of the twenty unopposed seats. These uncontested constituencies were in rural Natal and the Eastern Cape Province, along the urbanized Witwatersrand in the Transvaal and the cities of Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town, where there is a heavy predominance of English-speaking electors.

There were five types of contest in eighty-two of the eighty-six contested seats.[35] In fifty-three constituencies the National Party fought the U.P.-N.U.P. "Pact." Secondly, there were twenty constituencies in which Progressives opposed the Pact. Thirdly, in three seats Progressives opposed Nationalists (in two of these there were also N.U.P. candidates). Fourthly, the Conservative Workers' Party fought the National Party in four working-class constituencies on the Witwatersrand. Finally, there were contests between the Liberals and the United Party in two upper-income urban constituencies.

IV

The campaign highlighted several issues.[36] One was the economic health of the country. Despite the substantial recovery of the South African economy in 1961 and the apparent confidence of Government spokesmen in the economic future of the country, it also appeared that there was a widespread feeling that South Africa must suffer economically

[35] In four constituencies there were independent candidates standing against party candidates. They had no importance for this analysis.

[36] The republican issue was not one of them. Prior to 1948 the central political issue in South Africa for almost four decades was nearly always the question of Afrikaner-English relations, but in the postwar years this subject tended to be replaced by the race issue. The subject re-emerged in the campaign leading up to the republican referendum of 1960, but the bitterness of this contest appears to have had a cathartic impact.

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from its deteriorating position in the world community, its withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the industrial dislocation which will be required if apartheid is to be fully implemented. A second issue was South Africa's political isolation in world affairs. In addition to leaving the Commonwealth, only days before the election, the General Assembly of the United Nations censured the South African Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Eric Louw, for remarks made by him before that body which were deemed "offensive" by certain member states.[37]

But both of these matters were, of course, derivatives of the larger issue, namely, the race policy of the Government. Thus, as had been the case in the three earlier postwar South African general elections, the central question before the South African electorate in 1961 was that of the future of non-Europeans. The vital question in 1961 appears to have been political: Who is going to rule in South Africa, and how is that rule to be made effective? It was on this issue that the parties, the Conservative Workers' Party excepted, took their stands.[38]

The position of the National Party on this question was, of course, one of continuing support for the Government's declared policy of apartheid. Resting upon the premise that the institutions, values and racial identity of the European community in South Africa cannot be maintained unless authority exercised over this community continues to lie exclusively in European hands, apartheid proposes the separate and independent development of both European and non-European groups. The Prime Minister put the matter succinctly:

> Your choice is more sharply defined than at any previous election, namely between a White republic, with non-White neighbors, and a multi-racial fatherland with, first a multi-racial and, later, a Black government.[39]

[37] *The New York Times*, October 12, 1961.

[38] Party positions were not made known to the electorate through the medium of the government-controlled radio (S.A.B.C.) from which election speeches and election reviews were excluded during the campaign. See *The Star*, August 29, 1961. There is no television in South Africa.

[39] *The Star*, October 16, 1961.

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This statement seemed to imply a Government commitment to create "non-white neighbors" outside the borders of the Republic. The Prime Minister hinted clearly enough that apartheid, which since 1948 has emphasized restrictions upon Africans in the so-called "white areas" rather than the economic development of the Bantu reserves and the devolution of powers to their African rulers, might be expensive.[40] And a few days later he added that he might have to take action with which his party and the electorate might not entirely agree.[41]

Nevertheless, the Deputy-Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. Botha, conceded the Opposition's persistent charge that total separation of black and white was not now economically feasible.[42] And the National Party's candidate for Vereeniging, Mr. B. Coetzee, indicated that even when apartheid had been fully implemented, there might remain as many as one and one-half million blacks in the white areas. "If this happens," he said, "we will have to make arrangements for Parliamentary representation for these people, otherwise the rest of the world will never accept us." [43] There was, in fact, considerable candor in National Party statements: the Prime Minister acknowledged "difficult times" ahead; [44] the Deputy Minister of Labour looked to an electoral victory to give a mandate to arm the country morally, economically and politically.[45] The Minister of Defense announced new measures to strengthen the forces,[46] and the Minister of Immigration reported that seven new immigration offices were being opened overseas.[47]

40 "What we are paying, we are paying for our protection and security." (Quoted in *Die Vaderland*, September 11, 1961.)

41 *Die Transvaler*, September 16, 1961. Perhaps the Prime Minister then had in mind the plan which he announced to Parliament in January 1962 whereby it is the intention of the Government to develop "along democratic lines" a political structure in the Transkei to which authority for self-government of the Transkei will be granted by the middle of 1963. For a statement by the South African Government, see *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 24, 1962.

42 *Cape Times*, September 22, 1961.

43 *The Star*, September 6, 1961.

44 *Die Vaderland*, September 11, 1961.

45 *Die Transvaler*, September 4, 1961.

46 *Die Vaderland*, September 1, 1961.

47 *Dagbreek*, September 3, 1961.

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The leader of the United Party, Sir de Villiers Graaf, made the statement, a common one in party literature, that the "leadership" of the country must rest for the foreseeable future in the hands of Europeans.[48] Characteristically, the party claimed not a major departure in policy, but a more "humane" application of existing law, such as the pass laws. There were, however, major differences: the U.P. pledged itself to granting to the Cape Coloreds legal and political equality with Europeans. Moreover, "negotiations" would be begun with the Indian community on its future political status. And to effect an ultimate political accommodation with the African population is suggested a policy of "race federalism." Each racial group was to be given representation in Parliament. Coloreds would be grouped with Europeans; Africans would elect eight white M.P.'s to the House of Assembly and the ultimate admission of Africans to Parliament was tentatively accepted.[49]

On economic and social questions the party clearly reflected its cautious reformism: it claimed that there would be a resurgence of overseas confidence if it were elected; South Africa's "lost friends" would be regained. "Job reservation" should be replaced by "the rate for the job"; Indian and Colored trade unions would be recognized; African unions would be placed under "guardianship" of recognized trade unions, that is, unions controlled by non-Africans. The party pledged itself to amend, not to repeal, laws enforcing social segregation.[50]

The electoral partner of the United Party in 1961, the National Union Party, was in fundamental agreement with the position of the United Party with but two exceptions. The N.U.P. believed that Africans should have three, not eight,

[48] For this statement and a summary of the program of the United Party, see the *Rand Daily Mail*, September 27, 1961.

[49] Mr. Mitchell, leader of the U.P. in Natal, indicated that the party would be prepared to train certain Africans with a view to their ultimately entering Parliament. *Daily News*, September 21, 1961.

[50] A motion committing the party to repeal the Immorality Act and the Prevention of Mixed Marriages Act was submitted to the United Party Congress in August. It was shifted from the "open" to the "secret" agenda and finally not discussed at all. See *Rand Daily Mail*, September 27, 1961. The party was cautious also on the issue of readmission to the Commonwealth; it would be sought only if it appeared to be "in the interests of South Africa." *Ibid.*

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European M.P.'s in Parliament, and that Coloreds should be allowed to vote on a separate roll of their own and not on the common roll with European voters.[51] The leader of the National Union Party, Mr. Fagan, criticized the Government for having no policy for dealing with the urban African community.[52] It was necessary, he said, for the country to work out a system by which there could be representatives of all races in Parliament, although the rule of the white man in South Africa should not be endangered.[53]

The position taken by the Progressive Party during the campaign [54] rested upon a premise of the impossibility of equitably dividing South Africa among the racial groups. It rejected the permanent subordination of the interests of the non-Europeans to the interests of the Europeans as morally inadmissible and, moreover, politically impossible.[55]

But the Progressive Party, unlike the Liberal Party, maintained that the racial traditions of South Africa cannot and should not be overturned immediately and without preparation. Progressive Party policy, therefore, was directed at the achievement of three major goals: the gradual political emancipation of the non-European population, a change in South Africa's political institutions so as to prevent the political domination of any racial group and the more rapid development of the material and human resources of the country. As for the first, the party recommended a common voters' roll franchise open to all individuals meeting rather high educational and/or property qualifications.[56] A "special roll" open to all who are literate but lack the necessary education or property qualifications for the common roll vote would initially elect ten per cent of the membership of Par-

[51] *Rand Daily Mail,* September 27, 1961.

[52] *Cape Argus,* September 18, 1961.

[53] *Daily News,* September 20, 1961.

[54] For a summary of the program of the Progressive Party, see the *Rand Daily Mail,* September 28, 1961.

[55] *Rand Daily Mail,* September 22, 1961.

[56] These qualifications were 1) completion of ten years of schooling; 2) completion of eight years of schooling and an annual income of at least $840 or occupancy of property valued at at least $1400 for two consecutive years; or 3) literacy and an annual income of at least $1400 for two consecutive years.

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liament.[57] The special roll would thus train individuals for the exercise of the common roll franchise without jeopardizing the functioning of the parliamentary system.

Constitutional changes recommended by the Progressive Party were three-fold: 1) the devolution of increased authority to deal with local matters to the provincial governments and the entrenchment of this authority; 2) the creation of a rigid constitution, including a bill of rights, changeable only by a difficult multi-stage procedure ensuring the consent of all racial groups; and 3) the creation of a specially constituted senate with veto power over all save money bills presented to it.

The Progressive Party further proposed to eliminate laws grounded in race discrimination which impede the South African economy: by allowing for the free play of economic forces, South Africa would enter a phase of unprecedented productivity and resultant prosperity would be enjoyed by all racial groups. Moreover, the party also promised to repeal laws which today compel the social segregation of the races.

The program of the Liberal Party, resting upon the premise that discrimination on the basis of race is totally incompatible with the moral and political foundations of the western world, called for the full and immediate integration of all elements of the population into the political, economic and social life of South Africa. This program necessarily involved a demand for the repeal of all legislation discriminating on the basis of race.[58]

The positions taken by the Progressive Party and the Liberal Party in 1961, inasmuch as both looked forward to a racially integrated South Africa, differed fundamentally from the positions taken by the National Party, the United Party and the National Union Party. Each of these parties was committed to the maintenance of European rule in South Africa, although the position of the United Party with re-

[57] Until such time as the number of special roll voters fell below twenty per cent of those on the common roll. Then gradually the special roll M.P.'s would be reduced in number as the proportionate size of the special roll diminished.

[58] See *Cape Times*, August 22, 1961 for a statement by Mr. Wigne, Liberal candidate for Constantia.

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spect to the Colored population was fundamentally different from the position which has been taken by the Government. The Minister of Justice, Mr. Vorster, recognized that the real issue lay in the challenge of the Progressive Party. He said, ". . . it is a dangerous party undermining the foundations of our existence in South Africa." [59]

The campaign lasted eleven weeks from Dr. Verwoerd's announcement of the general election on August 2 to the voting on October 18. Public interest centered not on the selection of a Government but on the battle going on within the ranks of the Opposition. The real question of the election was how well the Progressive Party would do in its twenty contests with the United Party–National Union Party Pact.[60]

V

On October 20 the final returns of the election were known: [61]

	Seats Won	*Total Votes* [a]
National Party	105	370,431 (60)
United Party	49	302,875 (67)
Progressive Party	1	69,042 (24) [b]
National Union Party	1	35,903 (13)
Conservative Workers' Party	0	6,229 (4)
Liberal Party	0	2,461 (2)
Independents	0	10,704 (7)

[a] These are the figures as published in the *Star*, October 21, 1961. According to Muriel Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1961* (1962), 20–21, "it would appear that these figures are not correct, 11,317 votes cast for the National Union and 2,325 for the Conservative Workers' Party being in error credited to the United Party." A correction based on these figures would not affect the analysis below. Figures within parentheses indicate the number of contested seats. Two Independents appeared in one constituency.

[b] In Zululand the Progressive Party candidate withdrew before election day, but his name nevertheless stayed on the ballot and received 104 votes.

The average turnout in contested constituencies was 77.9 per cent of registered voters. In 1958 this figure had been 88.3 per cent and in the referendum of 1960 it had been 90.8 per cent. In only one constituency, Queenstown, did a higher percentage of the electorate vote than had in 1958.

[59] Mr. Vorster said further that a principal reason for the election was to allow for the "annihilation" of the Progressive Party. *Rand Daily Mail*, September 6, 1961.

[60] See above, p. 96.

[61] *Rand Daily Mail*, October 20, 1961.

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It has already been suggested that it was widely held that the result of the election was never in doubt. This attitude may have been a cause of a decline in voting. In the few constituencies in which the outcome was in considerable doubt, the voting turnout in 1961 more nearly approximated the 1958 rate and was generally higher than the 1961 rate elsewhere. Moreover, while it appears that both Afrikaners and English-speaking electors stayed away from the polls in significant numbers in nearly all constituencies, it seems that there was a larger proportionate turnout of Afrikaans- than of English-speaking voters. There exists an unmistakable if rough correlation between the size of the increase in National Party majorities and the decrease in voting turnout, that is, there was a smaller increase in National Party majorities in those constituencies where the turnout, compared to that in 1958, was greatest.[62]

In consequence of the election the National Party's membership in the House of Assembly was increased by three seats: Namib (S.W. Africa), Queenstown and Pretoria Sunnyside.[63] No National Party M.P. was unseated; in fact, *all* increased their 1958 majorities. The first two results were related to changes in political leadership: Namib had been held by Basson who had broken away to form the N.U.P.; Queenstown had been held by Dr. Steytler, leader of the Progressives. The changes of allegiance on the part of these leaders were clearly not reflected in their respective former constituencies.

The Nationalist gains had been predictable. So too were the parliamentary losses incurred by the Progressive Party. But while the Progressives lost ten of their eleven seats and came within 564 votes of losing the eleventh, the party showed a remarkable drawing power in several constituencies which it contested. The highlight of this performance was

62 In Humansdorp the turnout was 2% lower than in 1958 and the N.P. candidate increased his majority by 285 votes; in Bethel-Middelburg turnout was 8.7% lower and the N.P. candidate increased his majority by 1,406 votes; in Langlaagte turnout was 21.7% lower and the N.P. candidate increased his majority by 2,122 votes.

63 In 1959 the voting age was lowered to 18. This affected Sunnyside which contains the Afrikaans medium University of Pretoria. Between the general election of 1958 and the referendum of 1960 the number of registered voters in Pretoria Sunnyside increased by 3,125. The average increase per constituency over the entire country during the same period was 1,519 voters.

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clearly Mrs. Suzman's victory in Houghton. The tactical value of this victory for the Progressive Party is, of course, inestimable. In two other constituencies, Parktown and Pietermaritzburg, the Progressive candidate was only narrowly defeated. In each of five other constituencies Progressive candidates were defeated by less than 1,000 votes.[64]

Progressive candidates faced Pact candidates in twenty constituencies altogether. In these constituencies the total Progressive Party vote was 65,089, the total Pact vote, 105,669. Considering the newness of the party and the radical departure from the traditions of South African politics explicit in the Progressive program, this was a considerable showing. However, it appears that the Progressives cut into the traditional United Party vote most heavily in solidly English-speaking constituencies. Progressive candidates fared markedly less well in areas having a sizeable Afrikaans-speaking electorate, and no party in South Africa can hope to challenge the Government unless it can appeal to Afrikaners as well as English-speaking voters. In the three constituencies where Progressives challenged Nationalist M.P.'s,[65] the total Progressive vote was 3,849 to the National Party's total of 24,244. Progressives fared poorly throughout the Cape Province. They did well in English-speaking Natal and in middle income constituencies in and around Johannesburg, hardly sufficient in itself to have an impact upon South African politics nationally.

As expected, the Conservative Workers' Party and the Liberals demonstrated no significant electoral appeal. National Party M.P.'s easily defeated all four C.W.P. candidates in straight fights, greatly increasing their 1958 majorities in each instance. And the two Liberals obtained only 2,461 votes to the United Party's 13,218 votes in the upper-income and English-speaking constituencies of Hillbrow (Johannesburg) and Constantia (Cape Town).

Thus while the Progressive Party cut significantly into United Party majorities in Natal and along the Witwatersrand, the national political balance in South Africa was de-

[64] Orange Grove, Johannesburg North, Durban Berea, Durban Musgrave, and Pietermaritzburg City.

[65] George, Stellenbosch and Pretoria East. National Union Party candidates were also entered in the first two.

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termined largely by the traditional struggle between the United Party and the National Party for the votes of the moderate Afrikaners. It appears highly probable that in 1961 a larger percentage of Afrikaners voted for the National Party than ever before.[66]

The large number of uncontested seats in the general election of 1961 and the emergence of the Progressive Party in 1959 make a general comparison between the general election of 1958 and 1961 difficult. However, in 1961 U.P.-N.U.P. Pact candidates opposed National Party candidates in fifty constituencies in which the United Party had opposed the National Party in 1958. If it may be assumed that the political role of the Pact parties in the general election of 1961 was analogous to the role of the United Party in the general election of 1958, a limited comparison between the two general elections is possible.

In these fifty constituencies in 1958, 58.9 per cent of the electorate favored the National Party, the remaining 41.1 per cent, the United Party. In 1961 in these same constituencies the National Party received 64.3 per cent, and the Pact parties the remaining 35.7 per cent of the vote. The National Party thus increased its percentage of the total vote by 5.4 percentage points, a swing to the Government and away from the Pact parties in these fifty constituencies of 2.7 per cent of the vote.[67]

Of special interest was the comparative showing of the National Union Party. It will be recalled that National Union Party candidates were entered in thirteen constituencies. Here the avowed purpose of the party was to act as a "bridge" over which dissident Nationalists might move towards the political center. In one of these constituencies the United Party candidate was unopposed in 1958, and in 1961

66 It is also possible, of course, that the National Party is now receiving the votes of a number of English-speaking electors. There is as yet no evidence on this point, however.

67 This statement is based, of course, upon the results of votes actually cast. In view of the afore-mentioned greater abstention of voters in 1961 than in 1958 (equally apparent in the above-mentioned 50 constituencies as in the nation as a whole) and the likelihood that proportionally more U.P. than Government supporters abstained from voting in 1961, the "swing" cited probably exaggerates the actual shift in political sentiment within the entire electorate between 1958 and 1961.

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Progressive Party candidates were entered in two others. In the remaining ten constituencies in 1958, the United Party received 44.6 per cent of the vote. In 1961 the National Union Party candidates received 38.0 per cent of all votes cast, a swing towards the National Party in these constituencies of 3.3 per cent of the votes cast. The National Union Party was less able to stop the drift of voters towards the Government than was the United Party.

The above figures are not, of course, representative of the country as a whole. Fortunately for the political statistician, the republican referendum of 1960 was nationwide, that is, voting took place in every constituency. Moreover, the republican issue was fought along party lines, the National Party favoring the creation of a republic and the United Party and the Progressive Party opposing its creation.[68] If it may be assumed that the vote in favor of the creation of a republic in 1960 accurately represented the support of the Government in the country at large, the referendum of 1960 offers a convenient basis for a projection of the Government's national support in the general elections of 1958 and 1961 if it is further assumed that the political relationship between a minority of constituencies and the nation as a whole in 1960 remained relatively unchanged during this three-year period. If these assumptions are granted, the following ratio is of use:

$$\frac{\text{percentage of voters favoring the creation of a republic in 50 selected constituencies}}{\text{percentage of voters favoring the creation of a republic in the country as a whole}} \text{ equals } \frac{\text{percentage of voters supporting the Government in same 50 constituencies in 1958 (1960)}}{\text{projected percentage of voters supporting the Government in the country as a whole in 1958 (1961)}}$$

Those favoring the creation of a republic were in 1960 52.3 per cent of the entire South African electorate. In the fifty constituencies previously mentioned, 62.9 per cent of the voters favored the creation of a republic. Employing these and earlier figures in the above ratio, it would appear that in the country at large, 49.0 per cent of the electorate would have supported the Government in 1958 whereas the figure

[68] The National Union Party played no significant role during the campaign leading up to the referendum.

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for 1961 would have been 53.5 per cent. Had the National Party contested and been opposed by the principal Opposition parties in all constituencies in both 1958 and 1961, it is probable that a national swing of voters towards the Government of the magnitude of 2.2 per cent since the general election of 1958 would have been recorded in 1961. It should also be noted that these figures would indicate that the National Party Government now enjoys the confidence of a majority of the electorate, 1961 being the first *general election* after World War II when a majority of the "projected" national electorate supported the Government.

VI

The general election of 1961 demonstrated the enduring strength of the National Party. The party not only succeeded in preventing electoral reverses but also continued to attract support towards itself and away from the United Party, as it had been doing at least since 1938. Especially striking is the fact that in thirty-five constituencies the National Party increased pro-republican majorities obtained in the 1960 republican referendum,[69] for it had seemed reasonable to assume that some of those favoring the creation of a republic in 1960 were former United Party supporters who would return to their earlier party affiliation once the constitutional issue was settled.

It seems likely that some English-speaking electors, responding to the Government's plea for "national unity," are now supporting the National Party. Probably of greater significance to the growth of support of the National Party, however, is the movement of Afrikaner moderates towards the Government, and hence away from the United Party. This movement undoubtedly has a number of causes, but foremost among them must be the reinjection [70] of race relations as the issue in South African politics.

[69] In one constituency, Karas, the National Party's majority in 1961 was identical to the pro-republican majority obtained in 1960, but in 24 constituencies N.P. candidates won by fewer or lost by more votes than did the pro-republican cause in 1960. In all 60 constituencies the Government enjoyed a net gain in majorities since the referendum of 13,268 votes. *Sunday Times*, October 22, 1961.

[70] Official race policy was a foremost political issue in the general election of 1929. For an account of this election, see *The Annual Register*, 1929, 137.

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Using Lord Balfour's useful distinction between "fundamentals" (those matters upon which there exists a broad consensus) and "details" (those matters about which people do argue), it may be said of the National Party that its success has been its ability since 1948 to make and keep one of the South African fundamentals the principal political issue. Rather to the surprise of the National Party its appeal to views based upon racial attitudes which are held by the overwhelming majority of European South Africans succeeded in 1948. This success was largely due to the failure of the United Party to perceive the inherent appeal of apartheid and its refusal to identify the United Party with this policy. Since 1948 a distinction between the National Party and the United Party on this issue has been maintained in the minds of most voters, however ambiguous this distinction may be in fact. Moreover, the consensus in the matter of race relations has not weakened. The growth of self-governing and later independent Black African states since 1951 may have stimulated the traditional fears of Europeans of South Africa's African majority. Furthermore, overseas criticism of South Africa's policies may well be causing the electorate to unite behind the Government in defense of the country's "peculiar institution."

While the policy of apartheid has broad appeal within the South African electorate, the appeal of the National Party has, however, proved more limited. With a secure majority in the House of Assembly and firm in the belief that it could, in emergencies, command the loyalties of almost the entire European population, the National Party has remained predominantly an Afrikaner party in both personnel and outlook. For this reason, non-Afrikaners have been effectively precluded from seeking membership. However, the Government's appeal for English-speaking support in the general election of 1961 and the appointment after the election of two English-speaking Cabinet Ministers [71] suggest that South Africa may have arrived at a turning point in European politics.

The nature of the South African political dialogue since 1948 has presented the United Party with peculiar difficulties.

[71] *Africa Digest* (December 1961), 90.

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The United Party has, broadly speaking, adopted two strategies of opposition to the Government with respect to the issue of race relations. One has been to attempt to force the National Party to accept responsibility for the logical conclusion to the policy of racial discrimination, the partitioning of South Africa into wholly Black and White states. The second, and perhaps contradictory, strategy has been for the United Party to protest that apartheid is not a new policy for which the National Party alone is responsible, but the traditional race policy followed by all South African Governments. This effort clearly aims to shift political debate away from fundamentals and onto details.

Neither strategy seems to have been especially successful. The second would appear to be ingenuous "me-tooism," and until recently there has been little evidence of Government determination to push apartheid to its logical conclusion. Since the election, however, the Prime Minister has indicated his plans for self-government for the Transkei in 1963, as has been noted. In time public reaction to this and other such steps could bring about a significant electoral realignment.

The continuing weakness of the United Party is thus its inability to hold its former Afrikaner support. With the tide of anglicisation long past its peak and European population growth decidedly in favor of Afrikaners, this inability, should it continue, will probably keep the United Party from power. However, the party's bastions of urban, English-speaking strength guarantee it existence as a significant Opposition party. But for the National Union Party, sharing as it seemingly does this inability to attract Afrikaner votes, such a weakness means probable extinction.

The limited success of Progressive Party candidates in the general election of 1961 suggests the political inexpedience of attempting a frontal attack upon the existing European consensus regarding South African race relations. But the Progressive Party must achieve a change in opinion on the question of who is to rule before it can succeed in turning South African political debate into one on the "details" of the methods by which an entirely new structure of power may be brought into existence.

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Clearly, the Progressive Party did not hope to achieve power in 1961; its ambitions are for the more distant future. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the alteration in the fundamentals of South African politics requisite to a Progressive Party victory will come about voluntarily. It seems more likely that a change in the traditional pattern of South African race relations such as that now recommended by the Progressive Party could only come about in consequence of formidable internal and external pressures upon the South African political system. At such a time, the gradual changes now recommended by the Progressive Party might well be outdated. In this connection, one should note the dissatisfaction of influential Africans in Northern Rhodesia with recent electoral changes there, some of which bear a striking similarity to current proposals of the Progressive Party.

The general election of 1948 reflected significant change in the sentiment and nature of South African society which had occurred over the preceding decade and cast South African politics in a form which endured through the 1950's and into the 1960's. The emergence of the Progressive Party and the National Union Party in the general election of 1961 varied somewhat the pattern of previous electoral alignments but did not significantly change them. What occurred in 1961 appears rather to be a consolidation of developments since the end of World War II, and, at the moment, the overriding impression is one of considerable stability of alignments in European politics.

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The Later Correspondence of George III. Edited by A. ASPINALL. *Volume I, December 1783 to January 1793.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1962.—xlvi, 688 pp. $19.50.

It is expected that Professor Aspinall's edition of the "later correspondence" of George III will run to five volumes, each of about the size of this first one, which begins at a time of political and constitutional crisis that the editor does not hesitate to call the gravest of a reign not devoid of other crises, both earlier and later. The volume ends with the coming of the war between Britain and France which was to last, with only brief intermissions, from early in 1793 until Waterloo. The earlier correspondence of the ill-fated King, during the first twenty-three years of his very long reign, is the subject of the also ill-fated *Correspondence of King George the Third from 1760 to December 1783,* edited by Sir John Fortescue and published a generation ago by Macmillan in six volumes. It is known that Sir John looked forward to the continuation of his editorial activities with a view to the publication of their results in subsequent volumes, but *dis aliter visum.* The volumes already published encountered a hurricane of adverse criticism, to which, it is well known, Namier made the most influential, and devastating, contribution, and Fortescue was not able to weather it. Aspinall makes clear that (and tells why) he regards the present volume as the first of a new series rather than a continuation of an old, and discredited, one. In his selection of letters he has drawn on a much wider range of manuscript collections and other sources than Fortescue had done, and in the laborious work of annotation he has been far more copious. Those who have occasion to make use of this volume may well be grateful for his carefully prepared Introduction, and those whose main concern is with the history of politics will find what he has to say on this subject of considerable value.

Among the political conditions that he emphasizes is the numerical preponderance in the House of Commons of members who were not committed to any organized political party and voted with or against "the Minister" (for example, William Pitt during his very long ministry from 1783 to 1801) "according to the view they took of their own interests, the effectiveness or otherwise of the speeches, or of the supposed wishes of the Court," and of these the last was not the least. It was as the King's man

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that Pitt himself came in as "the Minister," with majorities in the Commons against him, and when he ceased to be such, on the issue of Catholic Emancipation, he had to go out. He had, in fact, nearly gone out during the King's spell of insanity in 1788–89, when he was deprived of the royal support, and when the Whig leaders, aided and abetted by the Prince of Wales, were planning the formation of a predominantly Whig ministry. What might have been *if* can never, of course, be definitively determined, but Aspinall is not indulging in fantasy when he says: "Had George III not opportunely recovered his sanity . . . the Prince of Wales would have become Prince Regent, Pitt would have been dismissed, and the Prince's Whig friends . . . would have come in with [the Duke of] Portland as nominal Prime Minister and Fox as Leader of the House of Commons."

Although Pitt was interested in various reforms—parliamentary reform for example, and the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, and Catholic Emancipation, and the abolition of the slave trade—political conditions prevented him from accomplishing very much as a reformer. With respect to parliamentary reform, although he was unable to give legislative effect to what he advocated, what he advocated was more "radical" (radical, that is, in the sense in which that word was applied to proposals for parliamentary reform that had been made by writers such as Major John Cartwright, who came to be known as "The Father of Reform") than anything which a British statesman had previously recommended. On March 19, 1785, Pitt submitted to the King a paper captioned "Heads of a Bill or Bills for Amending the Representation" (given in full in Aspinall, pp. 139–141). In his covering letter he expressed the hope that the proposals in this document would "at least appear free from the objections against undefined innovations" and could be proved "strictly consonant to the principles on which our Constitution has in fact been framed, and in truth a strong confirmation of those principles." He also hinted, in discreet language, at resignation if his measure should be defeated in the House of Commons by royal influence. Pitt fully accepted, as did everybody else in Great Britain before the French Revolution, what has often been called "the classical theory" of the English constitution or the theory of "mixed government," of which the essence was a coexistence of the elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, represented respectively by the Crown, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, and the maintenance of a balance among them. A great majority of the so-called "radicals" of Pitt's day were far from being all-around democrats. They did not argue in favor of the de-

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mocratization of the Crown or the House of Lords. What they were contending for was reform in the system, if system it could be called, of representation in the House of Commons, supposedly the democratic branch of the government, with a view to making it more truly representative of the British people. But Pitt failed to carry his Bill, and the British people had to wait until 1832 for the first installment of parliamentary reform.

George III was a hard-working and a very conscientious man, and he had much to think about. Even his worst enemies never accused him of laziness or self-indulgence; this was not the gravamen in the charges made against him in the Declaration of Independence! He was King of Great Britain and King of Ireland, and after the passing of the Act of Union in 1800 King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. As Elector of Hanover he was the ruler of an important state in Germany, and as such directly concerned with Continental European affairs. He was the head of a miscellaneous collection of overseas dependencies in America and the West Indies, Asia, Africa and Australia, although the successful revolt of the thirteen North American colonies, however mortifying to his pride and damaging to his prestige, relieved him of a large part of his colonial responsibilities. And he was the head of a very large family; before the correspondence in this volume begins his Queen had presented him with fifteen children, and he was never inclined to take paternal responsibilities lightly. The family correspondence scattered through the volume would add up to a large part of its contents, and it may be remarked, by the way, that the letters printed therein from the correspondence between him and his eldest son and heir apparent make it no easier than it was before to take a favorable view of the character of the Prince of Wales, the future Prince Regent and King George the Fourth. As a correspondent George III drove himself hard, and until 1805 he employed no private secretary. His meticulosity is evidenced by his practice of dating his letters by minute as well as by hour, day and month (thus: *3 Oct., 7.47 a.m.*).

Professor Aspinall was clearly indicated as the logical person to edit the later correspondence of George III. In a volume published a few years ago (*English Historical Documents, 1783–1832*), which he, in collaboration with a colleague at the University of Reading, edited for Professor David Douglas' multi-volume series, he gave impressive evidence of his mastery of the sources and literature of English history in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The only serious defect in the present volume seems to be the lack of an adequate index. There is an index

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containing some 1440 entries, but almost all of these are mere names—of individuals, places, parliamentary elections and a few other particulars. Subjects are not included. Suppose that one wishes to find out what light the volume throws on a subject that caused the King great anxiety and distress, from first to last, the debts of the Prince of Wales. Under the entry "George, Prince of Wales" he will find a long list of page references but no indication of which of these relate to his debts. Our inquirer must wade through the entire list. The omission of topics in the index of a compilation such as this, which will serve rather as a work of reference than as a book to be read from cover to cover, seems especially regrettable.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

The Papers of James Madison. Edited by WILLIAM T. HUTCHINSON and WILLIAM M. E. RACHAL. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1962.—*Volume I, 1751–1779,* xlii, 344 pp. $10.00; *Volume II, 1780–1781,* xix, 344 pp. $10.00.

In these first two published volumes of the Madison papers, under the joint sponsorship of the University of Chicago and the University of Virginia, the scholar and the general reader at long last will have ready access to the papers of one of America's major statesmen and political theorists. Up to now the collecting and editing of Madison's papers had run into an unusual number of difficulties, and the previously published Gilpin, McGuire, Congressional, and Gaillard Hunt editions were seriously inadequate. Together these four editions provided only about one-sixth of the extant documents by Madison and only an insignificant fraction of the around fifteen thousand extant letters addressed to him. The present collection, now in its beginning, contains not only the letters by Madison but also those addressed to him, even those to public bodies and committees of which he was a member, in the cases where his interests and duties made the communications particularly significant for him.

The papers are accompanied by copious, competent and insightful editorial notes. The editors have been unusually faithful in the transcription of the documents and in their aids to the reader. Ordinarily, words or phrases struck out by the writer are omitted without comment. (This reviewer is unhappy about even this exercise of editorial discretion.) But in other cases the deleted words appear in the footnotes. In a few highly important documents, strike-outs and insertions are presented in a close ap-

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proach to the original documents as is typographically possible. Changes which the editors believe that Madison made in later life, while looking over the papers, are given in the footnotes.

The first volume covers the period of Madison's childhood, youth and young manhood: his stay at the College of New Jersey; his loafing interlude of intellectual gestation in his early twenties; his services to the Orange County Committee of Safety; his participation in the Virginia Convention of 1776; his membership in the Virginia Council of State. Many of the letters of this period deal with the gossip about college friends; the usual eighteenth-century speculation involving Locke, Hume and Montesquieu and large conceptualizing about the Muses and Graces, History and Morality, Volition and Mechanism, Liberty and Necessity; and the accelerating tempo of events leading to the Revolution. Even so sober a youth as Madison could wax enthusiastic about the marksmanship of the Upper Country riflemen (himself included) and the tarring and feathering of the Tories.

The second volume covers Madison's first year as a delegate from Virginia to the Continental Congress at Philadelphia. The correspondence reveals vividly the sense of desperation of "the terrible year" of 1780: the lack of supplies for the armies; the increasing difficulties of recruiting men for the armed forces and the merchant vessels; the disruption of American shipping; the grave need of revenue, the disarray of public finances and the mounting inflation; the retreats in the Carolinas; the Arnold raid on Richmond and growing disaffection in Virginia; the agonizing waiting for aid from Spain and more effective help from France; the growing insistence by France and European commercial houses that the American states establish a central and stable government.

As a member of the Congress, Madison concentrated on public finance; on the Western lands, taking a lead for the cession to the general government of the Western lands held by the landed-states, including Virginia, and for safeguards against "the land-mongers," the big land companies making unauthorized purchases from the Indians; and on John Jay's mission to Spain and the importance of acquiring from Spain the right of free navigation by Americans of the Mississippi River through Spanish Louisiana. The adversities of 1780 brought victory for the cession of the Western lands and retreat from the American insistence on the free navigation of the Mississippi.

The letters of the young Madison are clear, to-the-point and solid factual reporting, and they show occasional evidence of the scope and insights of his somewhat later years. He often in-

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duced more philosophic discussion from his correspondents than he gave in return. His letters are prosaic compared to the graceful and sometimes brilliant ones of William Bradford (who later, for a time, would be President Washington's Attorney-General), and the crisp, sprightly, robust ones of Edmund Pendleton.

These early letters scarcely anticipate the Madison of the *Federalist* essays. However, here and there is the point of view which later would bring him fame as the philosopher of political balance through group pluralism. While only in his twenty-third year, Madison noted the wide range of civil liberties in Pennsylvania and attributed this to the variety of national groups and religions there and the absence of a religious establishment. He contrasted this with the attitudes of the "Zealous adherents of Hierarchy" in his home state (Vol. I, p. 112). "If the Church of England had been the established and general Religion in all the Northern Colonies as it has been among us here and uninterrupted tranquility had prevailed throughout the Continent, it is clear to me that slavery and Subjection might and would have been gradually insinuated among us" (Vol. I, p. 105). Madison's activities at the Virginia Convention of 1776 indicate persuasively that the main honor of giving Virginia religious liberty, liberty of conscience, must go not to Jefferson but to Madison.

WILLIAM G. CARLETON

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

The Predicament of Democratic Man. By EDMOND CAHN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1961.—194 pp. $3.95.
Democratic Theory. By GIOVANNI SARTORI. Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1962.—xi, 479 pp. $8.50.

Despite different methodologies, vantage points and primary concerns, both of these stimulating and thought-provoking books deal with fundamental problems of democratic theory, share a common liberal-democratic outlook and, on some matters, suggest similar approaches to our democratic difficulties. Sartori fears that freedom will be destroyed by the uncritical advancement of the democratic-equalitarian elements in a liberal-democratic society. Cahn's focus is the moral contamination of the individual because of the misdeeds of democratic government. Both men oppose confusion and vagueness in democratic theory and believe that a large part of our difficulty can be cleared up by more careful attention to language. Both analyze candidly the strengths and weaknesses of democratic citizens and their

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government. Both refuse to gloss over the tension between quality and equality in a democracy. Both argue that popular rule must be maintained without sacrificing individual rights. Both maintain that free and creative private associations are indispensable to a liberal-democratic order.

However, despite certain similarities, each author is preoccupied with a different major problem. Cahn seeks to demonstrate that our vicarious moral guilt is not too great to be borne. In a democracy there are incentives which reduce the weight of our responsibilities, augment our power to bear them, and make our lives not merely tolerable but desirable. By distinguishing between collective responsibility and individual responsibility we can dispel the vagueness about moral responsibility and reduce our sense of moral guilt. Moreover, the duties of collective responsibility—which involve preventing, repairing and protesting misdeeds—are not so heavy as to exceed the economic and ethical potential of a democratic community. Our individual responsibility can also be delimited and identified by means of a "Citizen's Self-Search." This search trims "the onus of responsibility to tolerable dimensions and adjusts it fairly to the shoulders of the individual citizen." In addition, "passive equality," "active equality" and "civic quality" strengthen the backbone of the democratic citizen. The first sets a floor under the deprivations and misfortunes of free citizens; the second removes the ceiling from their opportunities and encourages self-fulfillment; the third bolsters the democratic citizen by emphasizing "intelligence and compassion in the exercise of judgment, courage and integrity in the exercise of honor, and self-disciplined allegiance in the exercise of associability."

The central theme of Sartori's book is the defense of liberal democracy, particularly against the muddled thinking of those who might be willing to settle for democracy without liberalism. The constant worry in his logical and historical appraisal is that equality wrongly understood will destroy liberty, that the economic appetite of the demos will move liberal-democracy toward totalitarianism. In developing this theme, Sartori—who is Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence—seeks to arrive at a clear definition of modern democracy, to ascertain the roles of the "governed democracy and the governing democracy," to emphasize the role of democratic leaders and parties, to face up to the problems of planning and power and, above all, to stress the importance of ideas in democratic theory.

What, then, can be said of these two books? Initially, we must welcome Signor Sartori to the tradition of De Tocqueville whose

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concern for the future of democracy, for the consequences of equality and for "democratic despotism" he so strongly shares. It is always healthy to see ourselves through the eyes of a perceptive foreign observer, even though we may not share all of his worries and even though his treatment of the "fundamental issues" may seem somewhat familiar to those in the United States. We may strongly urge editors on the Continent to publish Professor Sartori's book (which is based on the 1958 second Italian edition of his *Democrazia e definizioni,* and which was originally designed for an audience on the fringe of democracy). Then the current European generation may have the benefit of his wide reading, his perceptive appreciation of the vices and virtues of empirical and rational democracies, and his eloquent plea to face the facts of political life without abandoning our civilized commitment to human integrity and the development of individual personality.

If Sartori grapples with De Tocqueville's central queries, Cahn —who is Professor of Law at New York University—struggles successfully with the Grand Inquisitor's disturbing question: Can modern man endure his freedom? Cahn's affirmative answer is convincing. Yet, although he helps to free democratic men from some unnecessary moral burdens, the penetrating questions of the "Citizen's Self-Search" and the "Democratic Official's Self-Search" provide no easy solution to our problems of citizenship and government. Moreover, Cahn's position on judgment, honor and associability constitutes a rather high and exacting standard. Cahn's stress on quality in a democracy is to be welcomed, as well as is his plea for a "consumer perspective," the perspective that requires us to depersonalize the state and to personalize our officials and citizens. Perhaps we will achieve success in adopting this perspective as we develop those qualities of excellence whose absence in the past has served to excuse the brutal modern state. This is the modern state whose own injustices and immoralities have so often been defended on the basis of the need for miracle, mystery and authority.

NEAL RIEMER

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

Questions in Parliament. By D. N. CHESTER and NONA BOWRING. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962.—335 pp. 35 sh.

There are some particular features of the British political system whose general significance everyone acknowledges without knowing much about the details. One such topic is the institu-

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tion of question time in the House of Commons. For members of the House to have the opportunity to question ministers on matters within their departmental jurisdiction is clearly of fundamental importance to the parliamentary system and, in a larger sense, to democracy. But the specific procedures and their actual use and effects have not been thoroughly studied.

This book by the Warden of Nuffield College and Mrs. Bowring fills that gap. On the general topic of question time, it answers all of our questions, plus supplementaries, thereby promising that students of British politics will be glad to have it on their shelves. The authors have done their research thoroughly and have written a definitive account which will not need to be re-examined until new experience has accumulated in another twenty years.

From the historical review of the evolution of the question period, it appears that the practice was "largely a development of the nineteenth century" (p. 12), and that it took place "during a time when the private Member still dominated the proceedings of the House" (p. 16). The reasons for the development are to be found in the growing discipline of the two-party system, the sharper separation between ministers and ordinary members and the increase in the administrative functions of government. These tendencies, as well as the special problem of Ireland and the tactics of the Irish members, produced the need, both before and after the turn of the century, to reorganize the procedures and timetable of the House of Commons. As the backbenchers found themselves increasingly subordinated to the ministry in other aspects of parliamentary business (especially, the initiative in legislation) they sought other ways of enforcing the responsibility of ministers to the House, and the question period afforded an admirable opportunity for public scrutiny of policy and administration.

Naturally, the institution of question time has itself undergone much change and reorganization. It became necessary to distinguish between the questions which would receive a written answer and those which sought an oral reply in the House, and to establish the right of members to follow the original question with a few supplementaries on the same topic. Because of the pressure of time, and because it was more convenient to group together the questions relating to the same department, ministers were called on to face the ordeal in rotation, so that nowadays an individual minister (with such exceptions as the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary) will only reply to questions on certain specified days each month. The length of the question period has been limited in practice to just under an hour, and, despite

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Balfour's objections, it occurs at the opening of the afternoon's sitting—a time which is convenient for members and for the press.

Contrary to what one might expect, the authors show that, despite the enormous increase in the functions of government during the last four decades, there has not been anything like a corresponding increase in the number of questions. For this, there are various explanations. Clearer rules have been established about the topics for which a minister is answerable; the number of starred questions which each member may put on any one day is limited; and other practices (such as direct correspondence between a member and a minister) remove much of the burden from question time.

All in all, the institution is valuable and important. It provides the backbencher with a sphere of important activity, and it subjects virtually all acts of government to continuous publicity. Like all systems, it can be, and has been, abused by bores, dullards and faddists. But the remedy against such abuses is the good sense of the House as a whole. The practice of putting questions to ministers should now be better understood thanks to this informative and authoritative book, one which could well be made "required reading" in many of the world's capitals.

LESLIE LIPSON

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Reason in Society: Five Types of Decisions and Their Social Conditions. By PAUL DIESING. Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1962.—262 pp. $5.75.

This is an important contribution to general social science theory—the most important, in my opinion, to have been made in many years. It should be of particular interest to political scientists.

The usual conception of rationality as economizing strikes Diesing as too severely limiting, and, accordingly, he has constructed a much more comprehensive one. It includes not only technical and economic rationality but three other kinds as well: those appropriate in interpersonal relations, in law and in governmental or control systems. He analyzes each of these five forms of rationality (the first, technical rationality, very skimpily) and then shows what they have in common and how they relate to three standard philosophical conceptions of practical reason.

His method is not simply to describe on *a priori* grounds the logical structure of each kind of rationality, although it is this in part. He looks for "development trends" in culture which by

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their near universality and effectiveness (effectiveness which must arise not by accident but as an expression of the logic of a selective process) are empirical evidence of the existence of an ordering principle, a principle of "rationality." (Technological progress is an example of a developmental trend, and its underlying principle is, of course, technical rationality.) The method therefore involves the analysis of samples of the kinds of effective action that are exhibited in and are characteristic of the developmental trends. In a chapter on each kind of rationality, he discusses (although very briefly) the trend under consideration, the principle of rationality that underlies it, the social circumstances that govern its application and make its application appropriate and the value of that kind of rationality. In his treatment of these matters he makes good use of empirical and theoretical materials from anthropology, psychology, economics, legal theory and political science.

The chapter on political rationality is the best, in my opinion. For Diesing, politics is decision-making, but especially decision-making with respect to the preservation and improvement of "decision structures." Any such structure, he says, must make possible the presentation of a variety of facts, values and action alternatives and also must make possible a resolution which incorporates some of the materials presented; political decisions become necessary whenever there is a deficiency in the decision structure (for example, when the structure is not receptive to an adequate range of facts, is insufficiently self-critical, is indecisive and so forth); the greater the variety of materials presented and the more intricate and subtle the resolution that ensues, the more effective and "rational" the decision. Diesing's analysis in this chapter therefore centers on the nature of decision-making structures, the processes that occur within them, the problems involved in reconciling or compromising and the more or less incompatible needs for variety and for unity.

Because political procedures deal with relations within structures, they are clearly different, Diesing says, from ("nonpolitical") procedures for dealing with substantive—for example, economic or legal—problems which lie outside structures.

> Nonpolitical decisions are reached by considering a problem in its own terms, and by evaluating proposals according to how well they solve the problem . . . Compromise is always irrational; the rational procedure is to determine which proposal is the best, and to accept it. In a political decision, on the other hand, action is never based on the merits of a proposal but always on who makes it and who opposes it. Action should be designed to avoid com-

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> plete identification with any proposal and any point of view, no matter how good or how popular it might be. The best available proposal should never be accepted just because it is best; it should be deferred, objected to, discussed, until major opposition disappears. Compromise is almost always a rational procedure, even when the compromise is between a good and a bad proposal (p. 203).

The making of such compromises as will best maintain and improve the decision structure is for Diesing "the fundamental kind of reason" because the more rational a decision structure is, the more rational are the decisions it produces. The political problem is always basic and prior, and (except perhaps temporarily) nonpolitical questions must always be considered first by their effect on the political structure.

Diesing's analysis is at such a high level of abstraction that all kinds of entities (persons, small groups, formal organizations, governments, societies) are within the framework. The remarkable thing is that this in no way prevents his making numerous non-trivial and empirically verifiable statements about such diverse concrete phenomena as personality, labor arbitration and political party leadership.

The breadth and originality of the conception, and the clarity and fertility with which it is worked out, make this book a striking achievement. To those social scientists who would like to have a normative framework within which to theorize, it offers exciting possibilities. For, as Diesing remarks, political rationality is the only unconditional value (since it makes all other values achievable), and, therefore, if history moves toward a goal, it must be toward that one.

EDWARD C. BANFIELD

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. By KENNETH E. BOULDING. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1962.—ix, 349 pp. $7.00.

To be initiated into the study of conflict, the student or scholar could hardly find a better book. Boulding covers the area in a crystal-clear style, often supporting the argument with illuminating illustrations. Graphs accompany many of the points made, but the text can also be understood without their aid.

The book tackles many aspects of the problem of conflict. It studies conflicts among individuals, groups, organizations and nations; it examines conflict from psychological, economic, socio-

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logical and political viewpoints; it surveys the effects of symbols (or images), of attitudes (such as friendliness and hostility), of arbitrators, mediators and control agencies, as well as those of threats. There is hardly a type or dimension of conflict that is not discussed.

Boulding does more than simply prepare the ground for the study, research and theory of conflict by reviewing what has already been done in the field. He also calls attention to lacunae that ought to be filled. The relationship of power to threats is one such lacuna, the effectiveness of non-violent resistance is another, the dynamics of images that determine how each party in the conflict views its opponents is a third one. Moreover, at several points Boulding pushes beyond the analysis of current thoughts on conflict to the presentation of his own ideas.

Here Boulding's main line of thought is the application of economic topologies of conflict, especially of competition among firms and price warfare, to the study of other conflicts, especially in international relations. He introduces the concept of conditional and unconditional viability, which expresses the ability of one firm to push the other out of existence either by imposing losses or by bringing about a merger. Secondly, he makes much of an analogy between the effect of transportation costs on inter-firm competition and the effect of shrinking of distances between nations due to modern weapons. The lower the cost of transportation of goods or violence, the less likely are the parties in a conflict to have unconditional viability.

Above all, *Conflict and Defense* is concerned with the need to develop a Keynesian theory of international systems. The nature of the economy is such that it is likely to get into upper crises (inflation) or lower crises (deflation) unless a movement in a certain direction is checked and reversed in due time through the activation of automatic and deliberate counter-cyclical mechanisms. The international system needs mechanisms that will counter conflicts while they are "young," before they pass the point of no return. In addition to controlling those conflicts that have occurred, Boulding stresses the need for preventive action to reduce the sources of conflict. There are several other fruitful analyses and insights which would be helpful for the construction of a general theory of conflict, but the structure of the book prevents Boulding from developing them. Whenever the reader's interest is sufficiently aroused so that he expects to penetrate deeply into the heart of a topic, the chapter closes and the discussion turns to the exploration of some other aspect of conflict; when the application of these various concepts and insights to the international

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scene has just begun to be realized, the book reaches its end. We cannot but look forward to a volume in which the author will go on to provide the much sought after model for international regulatory mechanisms.

This wish is intensified as one reads the closing pages of *Conflict and Defense,* in which Boulding lays bare the normative assumptions of his work. The author believes that the present system of international relations is wholly obsolete, that it is apt to lead to a disaster of the largest possible magnitude. But recognition of the need for world peace and world government does not lead the author to expose a neat set of utopias, as so many writers have done before. Boulding is careful to point out that we know where to go but do not know how to get there. Moreover, he dispels any illusions about the ability of the peace movement to exert much influence in these matters. He does see some ground for hope in the increased interest in arms control. He is more tolerant than are most writers of the idea of developing non-violent resistance as a substitute for warfare although he is far from committed to this approach. His most provocative idea is that national disarmament might come out of a coalition of the military establishments of the world over the heads of governments; hence we should advance rather than resist the separation of military and state.

In sum, this is a well-written, well-argued book. No student embarking on the study of conflict should miss it. If upon reading the book one is left asking for more, this is mainly because the book contains the elements of a general theory of conflict, while the title promises that such a theory is actually being presented.

AMITAI ETZIONI

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. (A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research and the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council.) Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.—x, 635 pp. $12.50.

Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. By ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR. Cambridge, The M. I. T. Press, 1962.—xiv, 463 pp. $10.00.

In American Economics the Universities-National Bureau Conference seems to have taken over the function of the venerable *Festschrift* along with most of its vices. In each, the selection of

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papers for inclusion within the same cover is governed mainly by what is available rather than by clear-cut rule; the offerings are of uneven quality; and anything published therein is likely to be lost from view within a few years. (Seven of the thirty contributors to this volume have already insured against this last danger by having arranged to place the same material elsewhere).

Even more than most published proceedings, this volume is a grab bag. It includes case studies that are pure business history, discussions of the methodology of an approach to the study of invention, the uneasy efforts of economists to adapt static price theory to the most non-static of economic phenomena, and several ingenious efforts to measure inventive activity. The outstanding contribution is a paper by Jacob Smookler on "Changes in Industry and the State of Knowledge as Determinants of Industrial Invention." Smookler argues that if "science shapes our lives," and "the rest of culture lags behind changing technology," the converse propositions are equally plausible. Thus, by his analysis, the automobile was an invention "induced" by the emergence of a high per capita income society that valued privacy. If the internal combustion engine had never been discovered, the present day world would not be much different. We would merely be driving around in late model electrics and steam cars. In seventy years the automobile has not "revolutionized" life in any really impoverished country.

Three other papers may be singled out for honorable mention. Kenneth Arrow analyzes the limitation of competition as a stimulus to invention. His thesis that competition is an inadequate stimulus, although persuasive, is essentially a generalization of Adam Smith's point that lighthouses must be built by government since a private entrepreneur would have no way of charging for the beam cast. Simon Kuznets surveys the problems of measurement and, as always, does a first-rate job. D. W. Mackinnon contributes a survey of the personality characteristics of research scientists and independent inventors. (The latter seem to have much in common with Harry Truman.)

To anyone interested in the history of technology this book is excellent bedside reading containing all sorts of curious lore. The reader who seeks a theory of invention will be disappointed. Nor will he be encouraged to hope that further work in the various directions indicated by the contributors will ultimately produce *the* theory. S. C. Gilfillan's thirty-eight "social principles of invention" may exemplify a methodological naivete that brings a blush to the cheek of the young sociologist in search of aca-

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demic respectability. But Gilfillan was (and is) an erudite scholar who sought by his laws to introduce order into chaos. Present research on invention seems better calculated to restore chaos than to improve upon Gilfillan. Could not a miniscule fraction of the expenses incurred in the production of this volume be found to reprint the Gilfillan classics, *Inventing the Ship* and *The Sociology of Invention* (1935)?

In *Strategy and Structure,* Professor Chandler studies business administration as a type of invention with special attention to four successful giants—DuPont, General Motors, Jersey Standard and Sears-Roebuck. Chandler clearly believes that administration *is* important in corporate success but he does not argue his case very well in this book. In each of the four firms considered, the important decisions in the formative years related to product and market, not to the table of organization. The firms prospered because, at the crucial moments, their officials made the right decisions. At Sears, General Wood perceives that the growth of cities makes retail outlets a better bet than the mail order catalogue. At General Motors, Durant grasps the importance of a strong dealer network. The DuPonts wisely decline to plow their World War I profits back into explosives production and instead seek new product lines. In each case, business success produced organizational problems. They do not seem to have been important enough to merit the attention that even Chandler gives them.

Administrative ability of the sort possessed by accountants, tax experts, office managers, and efficiency experts is, after all, a pretty standardized commodity and one produced under competitive conditions. As Chandler notes, his firms solved many of the problems that accompanied growth by a simple expedient. They hired experienced executives away from large organizations, notably government and the railroads. In the large corporation as in the small family firm, the important problem is not organization but leadership. In finding able leaders, the large corporation has undoubted advantages over its rivals—a wider choice of candidates, a greater margin for error in appointments, and, often, more ways of getting rid of a mistake. But in big firms as in small, organization is a substitute for leadership only to the extent that the firm is not forced by falling profits or driven by ambition to take on new functions. The moral of Chandler's research would seem to be that successful firms obtain good administration in the same way that successful men obtain efficient personal service—they buy it.

Administrative history is usually dull and, in this book, the

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author's confessed horror of "empiricism"—by which he seemingly means a straight-forward narrative of events—heightens the monotony. The antidote to empiricism is sought in a liberal use of business administration jargon and frequent repetitive digressions to compare the experiences of the four firms studied. Fortunately, the history of successful enterprises is inherently fascinating and the author frequently drops his guard and lets the story take over. The Cambridge school of business history may do its best to strangle the muse. But surely the spirit of Michelet and Macaulay lives yet in the bosom of the anti-empiricist who can write: "During the chill winter days of February, 1902, the affairs of the venerable E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. were drawing to a crisis."

DONALD DEWEY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

No Transfer: An American Security Principle. By JOHN A. LOGAN, JR. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961.—ix, 430 pp. $6.75.

Spanning the course of American diplomacy from the late 1700's through World War II, this study focuses upon the "most consistently applied, the most unanimously approved, and the most frequently declared foreign policy of the United States." This policy is not, as might be supposed, the Monroe Doctrine. Instead, it is a doctrine which antedated the former by many years—the No-Transfer principle. In its most general expression it meant that "The United States cannot see with indifference the transfer of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere to another non-American power."

Beginning with the British defeat of France in Canada in 1760, the American people depended upon the prohibition against colonial transfers in the New World as "the chief instrument" for their security and for preserving their long-cherished "isolationist" position. Concern over the ambitions of an increasingly powerful France gave way to apprehensions over Spanish and British rivalries on the American continent. Spain was, in the words of John Adams, a nation inclined "to repose." Therefore, the United States sanctioned no substitution of British sovereignty over the rapidly-disintegrating Spanish Empire, a threat Washington connected with British intrigue in fostering "separatist" movements on the western frontier. Secretary of State Jefferson wished to make it clear to Downing Street that "a due balance on our borders is not less desirable to us, than a balance of power

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in Europe has always appeared to them." Insistence upon the No-Transfer edict, Logan contends, was in reality but the first step in a grand American diplomatic design: ultimate displacement of *all* European power from North and South America.

Asserted as early as Washington's Administration, the No-Transfer prohibition colored all relations the United States had thereafter with colonial powers in the New World. It was, for example, extended to cover Cuba early in the nineteenth century. This island, along with erstwhile Spanish possessions in the New World, invited intervention by the Holy Alliance to bolster Spain's waning hegemony. It was in large measure to counter this threat (always more imaginary than real) that Monroe presented his famous message to Congress in 1823. Logan contends, however, that the central precepts of the Monroe Doctrine "were in effect variations on the No-Transfer principle. . . . Historians of the Monroe Doctrine have failed fully to appreciate this." Yet one of the injunctions most widely identified with Monroe —the United States could not "see with indifference" any attempt to "transfer any of the possessions . . . subject to Spain in the American Hemisphere, to any other European Power"—antedated his message to Congress by at least a generation.

The remainder of the book is devoted to case studies involving application of the No-Transfer doctrine: from diplomatic issues arising out of slavery expansion or growing American interests in the Caribbean in the nineteenth century, to formulation of the Platt Amendment for Cuba or Franklin D. Roosevelt's mounting concern for hemispheric security in the twentieth. In all such episodes the No-Transfer injunction served as a basic postulate of national security. The connection between it and the security of the United States emerged strikingly during the Second World War. Wartime policies toward Greenland, Iceland, the Dutch West Indies and strategic Atlantic islands such as the Cape Verdes all had their roots in the realization that hemispheric security would be dealt a grievous blow by the transfer of colonial possessions to hostile European powers.

The No-Transfer principle, as Dr. Logan is at pains to point out, was never conceived or applied in a vacuum. In the beginning it was a logical, not to say inevitable, product of America's power relationship *vis-à-vis* Europe. With its early protagonists, the underlying power realities were clearly acknowledged; and these same realities were always present in American history, however much its later champions tended to believe that *realpolitik* had no place in the New Society.

What is the present-day significance of the No-Transfer doc-

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trine? The author answers that it was always linked (at least implicitly) with a defense strategy built around the concept of an impregnable "Western Hemipshere." Just as that idea has been vitiated by modern military technology, the No-Transfer principle has become merged with the *global* responsibilities of the United States. He finds clear traces of the concept, for example, in such postwar strategies as the policy of containment.

No Transfer is a scholarly, original and well-written analysis of a too-long neglected principle. All students of American foreign policy will be indebted to Dr. Logan for supplying them with a perceptive treatment of the historic foundations of national security.

CECIL V. CRABB, JR.

VASSAR COLLEGE

The New World, 1939/1946: Volume I, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. By RICHARD G. HEWLETT and OSCAR E. ANDERSON, JR. University Park, Penn., The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962.—xv, 766 pp. $5.50.

The New World, the title chosen by the authors, conveys an overtone both of the first chain reaction at Chicago and of a statement in which General Leslie R. Groves pointed to the peacetime uses of atomic energy while saying farewell to the Manhattan Project. The book itself marks with equal clarity a new era in what is known about some of the most profoundly important events of the twentieth century. The book's basic theme is the "inheritance" of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Hence it is not primarily a history of nuclear fission or of the building of the bomb. Yet the authors survey even those themes more extensively and comprehensively than anyone since the first foundations of public understanding were laid by the Smythe Report of 1946. The physicists are all here—Fermi, Bohr, Urey and the rest. Their landmarks—fission, the discovery of plutonium, the achievement of a controlled chain reaction, the explosion of the bomb itself—provide the dramatic framework of the entire story. Yet the broader stage of history is the one on which the authors play, and their decision to take their level of view at the highest possible point in the national machinery of policy make this essentially a book about decisions which are always political in the broadest sense. The reader sees the story unfold most often from the vantage point of the few administrators who could see the birth of the atomic age as a unitary whole. Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant and to a lesser degree

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Arthur Compton and Ernest Lawrence were the scientists who could rise above the compartmentalization of knowledge in the Manhattan project to appreciate the full dimension of the events they molded. General Groves came to have this overall view, and Henry L. Stimson (the most clearly etched figure in the story) was the link with the world of high policy in the grand alliance.

The great length of this book and the detail of many of the passages should not, although unfortunately they probably will, lead people to use it as a reference rather than as a work to read and ponder. The authors are general historians, and they never forget the great themes of politics, administration and diplomacy which run through their period. Thus, the story of the Manhattan Project is not only or even mainly the story of nuclear fission. The authors have given the engineer his due in pointing to the immense technical and industrial problems that had to be solved. The interrelated system of contracts, which geared in industrial giants like DuPont and lesser known key groups such as Kellex Company, get a thorough treatment which reflects both the junior author's experience with the history of refrigeration and an unprecedentedly precise appreciation by both authors of the roots of the scientific-industrial complex. Also, diplomacy gets the kind of treatment one would expect from historians who have made it a specialty. Both the uneasy partnership with Britain during the war and the spirited but frustrating attempt to negotiate the Baruch plan with the Russians represent enclaved monographs of independent importance. Almost half the book deals with wartime planning for control of the atom and with the legislative story of the enactment of the McMahon Act. It is political history of a rare kind—a step-by-step reconstruction of the way in which the United States hammers out a fundamental policy. A few of the characters in the drama, such as General Groves, played key roles before 1945, but most of the actors—James R. Newman, for instance—come on to the stage for the last act alone. By and large they were dependent on the few who emerged from the Manhattan Project for the basic knowledge out of which to build a political structure.

The greatest strength of this book lies in its independence. Although the authors were in the employ of the Atomic Energy Commission, and although they perforce wrote an unclassified history from classified documents, enough of their sources are already in the public domain to lead one to a confidence in the essential integrity of the work as a whole. The restrictions imposed by national security doubtless had to be observed on some

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occasions, but the real gain for free scholarship is that this volume dispels the mystery which has heretofore hung heavy over a crucial era.

A. HUNTER DUPREE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

The Transformation of Austrian Socialism. By KURT L. SHELL. New York, State University of New York, 1962.—305 pp. $10.00.

Among the varieties of European socialism, Austrian Marxism has for a long time held a unique position. The outlook of its leaders as well as the experience of the twenties and thirties have set it apart from the rest of the socialist parties. In view of these antecedents, the question of how Austrian socialism fared in the great postwar transformation of political values and constellations becomes of particular interest. There was little doubt in what direction the Labor Party and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) would orient themselves; that Austrian Socialism would as well become a pragmatically-oriented political grouping which, in addition, would remain a government party uninterruptedly for the entire postwar period, was anything but a foregone conclusion.

Although published in 1962, *The Transformation of Austrian Socialism* is based mainly on material collected, and interviews held, during the early fifties. Professor Shell traces the stages of the transformation, giving the results as well as the reasons for it. Almost half of the book is devoted to a thorough study of the present structure and organization of the party as viewed against the background of both its predecessor in the twenties and early thirties and the radical organizational and political departures attempted by the Revolutionary Socialists during the period of illegality. There are few contemporary accounts which demonstrate so convincingly and so penetratingly the changed rhythm of present-day party life. The change occurred both in the minds of the party leaders, who, in contrast to their brilliant predecessors of the twenties, shun any theoretical involvement and debates on principle, as well as in the minds of the still large-sized battalions of party members. Many of the latter in the middle-aged categories, as the author convincingly demonstrates, joined only after the war for more or less opportunistic reasons. The organization, which in previous times had some characteristics of a community of believers, was transformed into an electioneering apparatus. With a wealth of detail, the author lucidly ex-

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plains the reasons for the dwindling of internal party debate, the absence of meaningful internal party opposition and the sum total of circumstances which brought about the transformation. Shell concludes that leadership action is now limited solely by influences from outside the party ranks, although democratic procedures are still operative within the party. The leadership has become sensitive to the reactions of voters and outside organizations which vary from trade unions which are of "friendly persuasion" to political competitors who seek the favor of the electorate.

The other half of the book discusses in a necessarily more sketchy way the new ideological climate, the meaning of the quasi-permanent association with the state apparatus and the attitude of the party towards a number of key issues, nationalization under the specific Austrian conditions, workers' participation in management, taxation, social insurance and housing policies. In this part, but especially in the concluding chapter entitled "Socialism in the Age of Fulfillment," Shell criticizes present-day Austrian socialist attitudes and performance, using the arguments usually associated with the authors of the *New Fabian Essays* of the early fifties. This, then, raises the question to what extent the British vistas and experiences may be taken as a point of departure for judging the Austrian situation. There is certainly a similarity of popular expectations and claims in regard to government action, which goes together with a marked decline of interest in broader political questions all over industrial Europe. But is that tantamount to saying that democracy as a way of life is as self-evident within the confines of Central and Eastern Europe as it is in Great Britain? This is a large assumption. The policies of the present Austrian socialist leadership, its apparent conservativism, its unwillingness to visualize social problems from the viewpoint of a new balance between equality and personal freedom, and the old party guard's anachronistic hankering after a socialist way of life are not only the products of a psychological schism or lack of intellectual curiosity. They may also be an instinctive mechanism of self-defense. Austria's razor-thin dividing line between the popular vote for the two major parties in a situation where government by majority rule rather than by coalition has never been successfully achieved, puts a premium on caution and on looking at every problem from the viewpoint of electoral or coalition tactics. In other words, reflexes of the style of politics of the twenties and thirties were still part of the experience of the early fifties. Whether the author is right in seeing in these carry-overs nothing but expensive anachronisms, could be better judged if he had made a resurvey

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of the Austrian scene more recently, including a study of the attitudes, manifest and latent, of the other political forces in Austria. Until then, I would be inclined to accept fully the sensitive description of the Austrian Socialist Party organization, but reserve judgment on his evaluation of its style of policy.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy. By ROBERT GILPIN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.—vii, 352 pp. $6.95.

With this book, Robert Gilpin establishes himself as an important scholar in a new and important field of political analysis. Careful research, deft organization of material and considered judgment characterize his study of the efforts of American scientists to influence national defense policy with respect to nuclear weapons and his evaluation of their effectiveness. The result is a substantial contribution both to our understanding of policy-making in this area and of the political behavior of natural scientists.

Gilpin traces the deepening involvement of the "vocal" scientists (whom he equates with "effective" scientific opinion) from the days of the Manhattan Project to the present controversy over appropriate disarmament policy. Against a background of the successive choices political leaders faced in fashioning plans for the use and control of nuclear weapons, he follows the fission of a once cohesive body of opinion into three distinct groups of natural scientists turned political actors. Characterizing these groups by their policy proposals, he identifies them as the control school of thought, the finite and the infinite containment schools, and then analyzes their respective positions in the major defense controversies of recent years. By such a classification, the respective differences of Oppenheimer, Teller, Lawrence, Bethe, Killian, Pauling and others become explicable both in terms of their basic political assumptions and values and their Washington activities.

In dealing with the substance of American policy with respect to nuclear armament and disarmament, Gilpin is of course covering ground already trod by other analysts. But by his focus on the role of the scientific élite and his delineation of the policy objectives as the elimination of nuclear weapons *or* the utilization of these weapons to eliminate war, he is able to provide a clear and consistent treatment of a complex and shifting train of

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events. His analysis of the conference of experts at Geneva in the later years of the Eisenhower Administration is an especially compelling and fascinating summary of the persistent contradictions of American policy.

As for the political behavior of scientists, Gilpin advances one major theme: that the technical and political components of any major defense decision are inescapably interwoven, and that differences in expert advice arise from differences in political assumptions and objectives of the advisers. From this proposition in Gilpin's judgment flows a set of corollaries: that the scientist's role in public affairs cannot be restricted to that of a technician; that scientists by and large have been ill-prepared to understand and participate in political controversy; that when they have participated, as at Geneva, they have committed political errors which experienced diplomats or politicians would have instinctively avoided; and that political leaders have yet to learn how to use scientists effectively in policy deliberations. The upshot is that the potential aid and assistance which the scientist can offer the policy-maker has yet to be effectively tapped. Not until scientific advice is evaluated by the question "Is it wise?" rather than "Is it true?", Gilpin believes, will an effective union between the scientist and the generalist be accomplished. Accordingly, he goes on to recommend the calculated confrontation of scientists of different political persuasions by interspersing them throughout the government, by coupling their efforts with those of the generalist-administrator and by constraining them with an acknowledged code of ethics.

In offering these solutions, Gilpin follows the broad approach outlined by Don Price almost a decade ago when he called on the scientific community to acknowledge the value of traditional political wisdom and to discipline their "restless energy" and "rebellious independence." Thus in this counsel, Gilpin is in good company. But the fact remains that we are only beginning to explore empirically the scientist as political animal and to extract from the wraps of secrecy his contributions to policy. Hence obvious organizational and administrative answers may be both premature and superficial. Their freewheeling and undisciplined manner to the contrary notwithstanding, natural scientists have been the principal innovators in defense and disarmament policy, and to bureaucratize them too thoroughly may cost more than we presently suppose. Why they behave as they do, whether with the small group of vocal scientists we face a phenomenon of profession or only of personality, how their political socialization and recruitment occurs are questions of fact which need answers be-

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fore we can evaluate their performance confidently. These issues lay outside the scope of Gilpin's book and it is to his great credit that he has explicitly raised them and skillfully phrased them. Now, expanded research can and ought to go forward concerning an élite on whose political capabilities the nation's security may well depend.

ROBERT C. WOOD

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Parliamentary Reform, 1933–1960: A Survey of Suggested Reforms. By THE HANSARD SOCIETY FOR PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT. London and Toronto, Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1961.—ix, 193 pp. 25 sh., $6.50.

As the title suggests, this work is a catalogue of reforms of the House of Commons suggested during recent years. The House of Lords is considered briefly in an appendix, as it has been the subject of a recent full treatment published for the Hansard Society.

The nameless researchers of the Hansard Society have tracked down in debates of Parliament, in Parliamentary papers, in scholarly works, in journals and articles, in newspapers and periodicals, every conceivable suggestion made as well as the "good points" and "defects" of each. This does not make for flowing style but does provide a reference work for the specialist in the subject.

The work had originally been scheduled for publication about the time of the report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure in 1959 and so was of considerable value to scholars and M.P.s in Britain. Its use for American scholars is probably more limited, though it is a complete review of the debates and literature on the subject. The reforms discussed include a range of topics from election procedures through devolution, parliamentary procedure, party practices, Parliament-ministerial relationships, and Parliament-public relationships. No suggestion, no matter how minute or picayune, escaped the researchers' attentions. Thus the scope goes from a discussion of the number of minutes permitted Members to come to the floor for a division to basic changes in party discipline and cabinet leadership.

The authors, by limiting themselves to a listing, necessarily assume much. They constantly refer to the "efficiency" of the House of Commons, leaving the reader to ponder how a particular proposal could be argued with equal diligence to be "efficient"

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and "inefficient." "Efficient for what?" is rarely considered. Underlying much of the debate on particulars is a fundamental debate on the entire role of Parliament in the total decision-making process of Britain which could not be discussed within the purposes of the study.

This reviewer found himself wondering as he pursued the endless list of gimmicks recommended just how much the participants in these debates really knew about the relationship of formal institutional structure to the political behavior of the participants in the process. Indeed, he found himself wondering about how much we, as students of politics, really know about these matters. Every argument, pro and con, involves a prediction of just this sort: this procedural alteration will induce such and such a change in the behavior of M.P.s and other actors. The innumerable citations in the work quote from many political scientists (mostly British) who seem to know definitively the answers to these questions. The work itself maintains an icy neutrality on every issue, and on several occasions assumes that there is an "unbiased" answer to these questions. The possible effects on relative interest influence and access are, of course, ignored.

Finally, this book is a further testimony to the interest in the world's oldest deliberative body. Although its role in the political process has changed a great deal through time, it still remains the visible center of the British system, and recommendations concerning it must always be of interest.

JOHN H. MILLETT

UNIVERSITY OF WICHITA

To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy. By FELIX GILBERT. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—vii, 173 pp. $3.75.

A foreign policy of isolation gave us comfort at the beginning of our history; now when it no longer serves, it fills us with nostalgia. But in truth it was never as simple as it has been made to seem: it was tailor-made for a set of eighteenth-century circumstances that, like all historical circumstances, were unique. What these were and how they developed is Felix Gilbert's passionate interest. This little book distills for us what he has learned about the subject, which is as fascinating as it is substantial. His treatise (for that is its nature) is tightly-wound and argued on the basis of the printed sources of our colonial history. And even

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where, occasionally, he has provided us with an intellectual construct that seems to be after-the-fact, he is always provocative.

The book opens with a close analysis of the relationship between the colonies and Europe. Here Gilbert is at work to show how the colonists, owing to their diverse origins, lacked almost until 1776 a coordinated outlook on international relations. But they had not been gazing blankly toward Europe for a century and a half, and imbibing nothing about living in the world beyond the ocean. They had been going to school to the maze and anguish of eighteenth-century British disputes over policy-making.

How the debate in the Mother Country ran and how its arguments found their way across the sea is reported by Gilbert with insight and rare originality. Some readers will already have become acquainted with his exegesis through the pages of *The William and Mary Quarterly* and *World Politics*. Set in the larger background of his comprehension of the matter, however, the picture that emerges is not only full but fresh too.

In reviewing a book as sensitive as this one is to the vagaries of the eighteenth-century outlook, there is no point in attempting to explain its theme briefly. Yet let it be clear: the main thread is the legitimate business of all students of American history.

The new nation, says Gilbert, learned from Britain that the vigorous pursuit of trade makes necessary an isolation from the political embroilments of the Continent. Englishmen had drawn this conclusion after a long era of involvement in continental affairs—involvement, that is, in the "miseries of Hanover," to use Thomas Paine's memorable phrase.

This chain of reasoning in Europe reached across the seas and found its completest expression on this side in Washington's Farewell Address. To be sure, that famous message contained far more than a New World reflection of the pamphlet controversies that had raged in Britain much earlier in the same century. Nevertheless, as Gilbert says of the document: "In its terminology and formulations, the section on foreign policy echoed expressions and thoughts which had dominated the discussion of foreign affairs ever since America had entered the scene of foreign policy in 1776."

The five chapters of Gilbert's book are adorned with the nuances and shadings of one who knows Europe's scene as well as he knows our own. The reader is again and again impressed by the fact that the author, himself not having been reared in isolated America as the overwhelming majority of the present generation of United States historians were, offers us an instructive cor-

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rective for our thinking about the national beginnings. He understands what eighteenth-century Americans understood when they looked toward Europe: the iron grip of the state system pressing upon the New World. He knows it was not crabbedness or intellectual laziness or even an expectation that we might eventually be free of the Old World's hold on our destiny that prompted Hamilton to write: "Our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an ascendant in the system of American affairs."

In persuading us of the Revolutionary view, Gilbert is implying something else too: the Founding Fathers wrote not to prescribe policy for the twentieth century but to clarify their own thinking for their own time and place. In an age of literate public figures their method was sound and satisfactory. Today when research institutes and "task forces" have made outmoded for the national leaders the performing of any such mental exercises, Gilbert shows us what they were like when they were in fashion long ago.

HENRY F. GRAFF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

War and Peace and Germany. By FRED WARNER NEAL. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1962.—166 pp. $3.95.

This hard-hitting slender book by a former State Department official is of major importance. Analyzing developments in Berlin and divided Germany since 1945, and quoting many half-forgotten but highly pertinent facts, it warns that a continuation of present policies can only make things worse. It warns against the myopic tendency, as soon as an acute Berlin crisis subsides, to shift from frenzy to complacency or to prepare even better for a holocaust over the next crisis. For Mr. Neal these eruptions are but symptoms, and he pleads that the true American interest requires removal of the underlying causes.

Professor Neal's main arguments include the following: 1) "In the nature of the problem," German reunification and a normalization of the Berlin situation cannot be obtained on exclusively western terms. 2) United States government circles themselves consider the Berlin situation as a military, economic and political liability, and a constant threat to peace. Yet, United States policy "currently stakes everything on maintaining an unmaintainable status quo in Berlin" (p. 100) because Berlin has become a symbol and a matter of prestige (pp. 5, 6). To commit United States prestige and, possibly, the fate of the world in this manner

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is not in our interest. To paraphrase the author's reasoning, it is true that in Berlin the West has its hands at the Soviet Union's throat: but such a position is advantageous for neither side. 3) West German–East German relations are primarily German concerns, not American. 4) The view that a final settlement would be mainly in the Soviet interest, and therefore amount to "appeasement" or "defeat" is erroneous. To keep matters in abeyance can only intensify the armament race and make the German problem more intractable. 5) By the same token, the Adenauer policy of the "hard line" is equally unrealistic and "cannot, of course, work to any real benefit of West Germany" because its "goals are as imaginary as the policy is ineffective" (p. 104). 6) American policy has been altogether too greatly influenced by West German policy. In any case, the assumption that American and West German interests are always identical, or that West Germany is somehow above criticism, warrants reexamination. Certain trends there are disquieting: for example, the continued official demands for the 1937 boundaries in conjunction with the activities of Bonn's Ministry for All-German Affairs; governmental backing of the propaganda for a "return" of a part of Czechoslovakia; emphasis on Germany's "divine mission" to be a bulwark of the West; and the ever-increasing insistence on obtaining nuclear weapons (pp. 60–81). The post-Adenauer outlook is completely uncertain, and a pro-Soviet orientation cannot be ruled out.

But Neal's main point, to which he constantly returns, is that a Berlin and German settlement is eminently in the American interest because the American position which is now precarious would be strengthened thereby, because this would loosen the Soviet grip on her neighbors, and because a settlement would greatly improve the world situation as a whole. All parties concerned—and especially the East Germans—would have to accept clear-cut obligations. If the will exists, various constructive solutions are possible. These may include the right to freer access from the West to Berlin, addition of neutral countries' troops—conceivably including West German troops—to the West Berlin garrison, expansion of the Free University into a truly all-European university, and so on (pp. 110–121).

In his insistence on the need for a change in approach, Mr. Neal is not alone. Some similar ideas have been expressed for years by such men as Walter Lippmann and James Warburg. Mr. Neal's book brings the discussion virtually up to date. It is written with boldness and a feeling of urgency. It should be pondered, discussed—and, of course, disputed and attacked—with

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the same honesty. But if it were given the silent treatment this would support the author's anxiety about unimaginativeness in the face of peril.

JOHN H. E. FRIED

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

The First Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678–1683. By J. R. JONES. London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1961.—224 pp. $4.80.

This admirable study of the exclusion crisis provides a substantial addition to our understanding of the complex events from the outbreak of the Popish Plot to the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament and the collapse of the Whigs with the flight of Shaftesbury and the Rye House plot. In the first full examination on the subject in a generation, J. R. Jones has provided a new interpretation by concentrating on the role of elections, political organization and parliamentary leadership rather than on the sensational details of the murder of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey, Titus Oates, the Meal Tub and Rye House plots. The author terms the Whigs of this period the first political party in the modern sense, returning in three elections an ever more determined and increasingly inflexible majority. The Whig party of this three year period differs from the factions or groups otherwise more characteristic of the seventeenth-and early eighteenth-century political life by the fact that it cut through social classes and appealed to the nation, including political radical, fanatic, small tradesman and merchant as well as the country gentry who dominated the membership of the House of Commons. Although essentially a Parliamentary party and unable to work effectively without the machinery of elections or the prospect of a Parliament, the party clearly did rally a non-voting public opinion throughout the country and maintained its organization even after the adverse vote in the House of Lords in 1680 insured a fight to the finish between Charles and the majority of the House of Commons. The strength of the Whigs lay in their election strategy, organization and single-minded concentration on exclusion; their weakness rested in their miscalculation of Charles' character and their assumption until the spring of 1681 that continued pressure could force the King and hence the House of Lords to give way to majority opinion and party rule. The Whigs were thus defeated not by the strength of the opposing Tories, outclassed in leadership and helpless at the polls, but by Charles himself whose presence in the House of

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Lords in November 1680, when the exclusion bill was defeated, was a decisive factor, as was his determination to rule without Parliament rather than submit to the intransigent majority in the House of Commons.

Most valuable is the analysis of the motives and behavior of individual members of the Whig party, the lucid distinctions drawn between the various groups that constituted the party and the roles of Halifax, Sunderland and Montagu in their attempts to challenge Shaftesbury's control. Shaftesbury, however, remains shadowy as a person and even as a political leader. The essentially negative aspects of the first Whig party is made clear: the exclusion of James was the only point on which the party could agree and never was there hope of agreement on an alternative candidate. The reform of the Privy Council in 1679 and its failure split the Whigs, while the opposition to Shaftesbury in 1680 forced him into an increasingly intransigent support of Monmouth's candidacy, a position which could not in the long run hope to command respect or unified support. Party theory held that all reforms were worthless without exclusion, hence reform bills presented to satisfy sections of Whig partisans were not pressed until security of life, liberty and property should be achieved by the exclusion of the Catholic heir.

The story is lively and well told. The severe limitation of time, necessary to this interpretation of party, does less than full justice to the continuity with the mounting anti-court majority of the last years of the Cavalier Parliament, the gradual development of Whig political theory or the propaganda and legislative techniques developed during those years.

It is regrettable that there is no bibliography, and unfortunate that the documentation of manuscript and periodical literature is not more complete.

HELEN A. NUTTING

WILSON COLLEGE

Federalism and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries: A Symposium. By U. K. HICKS, et al. New York, Oxford University Press, 1961.—185 pp. $4.00.

The advantages or disadvantages of federalism for underdeveloped areas or the new nations is a topic that is much discussed, but that badly needs clarification. The book under review, the report of a symposium at Oxford, makes a contribution to that desired clarification, although not so much as might be hoped.

Of the four essays contained in the work, the most useful is

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that by J. R. Hicks entitled "The Nature and Basis of Economic Growth," with comments by A. R. Prest. Professor Hicks notes that one major change of the twentieth century is the widely-accepted assumption that economic development is the moral responsibility of the government, if a country is economically backward. With this in mind, he tries to discover if the process of economic development is in fact aided by the creation of federations in underdeveloped areas. The answer, it turns out, depends on a number of other factors in the equation: how underdeveloped the economy really is, the relative size of the poor and the rich regions and thus the costs of social equalization expenditures, the absolute size and resources of the area. And, as Dr. Prest wisely asks, what are the effective alternatives to federalism: unitary states or balkanization? If the latter, what kinds of economic relationships short of federalism can serve the desired economic ends?

As all the economists admit, the critical decisions are political ones. This is presumably the justification, in this treatment of federalism as an economic problem, of opening the symposium with F. G. Carnell's essay on the "Political Implications of Federalism." In his rather diffuse piece, Carnell makes the helpful point that arguments for federalism are usually made on two separate grounds, depending on the size of the units. For small countries the argument is economic, the economies of scale. For large areas the argument is political, the prevention of tyranny. Carnell indicates some of the empirical evidence that tends to throw doubt on the wide applicability of the latter argument. The point was perhaps more effectively treated in Franz Neumann's debunking essay of the virtues of federalism for democracy, in which Neumann concluded "there are no values inherent in federalism as such. . . ."

The essays in this book tend to confirm Neumann's judgment, extending it to the economic realm as well. Indeed the economists seem to be even stronger, tending to see federalism as a nuisance foisted on them for some irrational political motive. Nobly accepting the limited ability of the man of knowledge to alter the follies of rulers, they analyze how best to achieve their ends within its framework. Obviously, federalism is a political compromise. To indicate its significance for economic growth, two essential questions must be answered. Is it the result of putting together previously more sovereign units, or is it the result of disintegration of a previously more integrated unit? Who will exercise more political power as a result of the establishment of a federal structure? If we answer these questions, we can under-

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stand why the very same individuals can have opposing views on federations, proposed or existing, in such diverse areas as Central Africa, Congo, West Africa, the West Indies, and Western Europe. An a priori judgment in favor of or against federalism on economic grounds in all these areas is not possible or credible.

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Politics of Oil, A Study of Private Power and Democratic Directions. By ROBERT ENGLER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1961.—viii, 565 pp. $7.50.

This is not a good book. The author provides neither adequate descriptive propositions about the political activities of the oil industry nor justification of his charge that these actions represent a threat to democracy. What he does demonstrate is that if you implant your conclusions in your methods and assumptions, you can render useless the most painstaking research.

Although a reader has to work inordinately hard to discover what Engler means by democracy, the author eventually suggests a definition which serves his purposes. It first appears that a majority of citizens must actively approve of specific policies. Then it seems as if governmental policies must benefit general as opposed to special interests, even if the former are not yet widely preferred. If these implied criteria are adopted, however, then no modern government can be called a democracy. For if the fact that oil (also farm, labor, cooperative, medical) interests sometimes succeed in controlling governmental policy affecting them means an end to democracy, we can never have democracy until we are all equally interested, active and influential in all substantive areas of policy.

Engler sees it as a perversion of democracy for Congressmen to vote in favor of a bill promoted by oil interests on the ground that their constituents have a great stake in the result. This is not because the Congressmen may have been mistaken in their perception of what their constituents want, but because something Engler calls a broader, more genuine, more inclusive, national interest demands otherwise. Engler knows that no such general public making such demands exists, although he believes that it should. Hence his conclusion that acceding to the demands of a public which he favors, but which does not exist, is more democratic than doing the same for publics which do exist but which he does not like. One should not confuse a dislike for the results of democracy with the absence of it.

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The author's general thesis is that the oil industry is a cohesive and economically powerful group which controls governmental policy on oil and, by repeated insinuation, much else besides. Yet his methods are so faulty that we can have little confidence in his conclusions. Let us enumerate several characteristic devices. (1) Propose self-protecting propositions which cannot be disproved. "When the chips are down, the dissenters generally do go along with the industry leaders. . . ." (p. 64). Any example of disunity may be ignored by saying that the chips were not down then. (2) Speak in such menacing tones of the *intentions* of some oil people that their *behavior* becomes almost an afterthought. After instances where oil men failed to influence elections, say that ". . . these oil barons have preferred to operate in the more sparsely settled states where it may be easier to swing elections." (p. 360). (3) Disregard evidence which contradicts a thesis or, better still, admit it but pay no attention to it. Admit that oil interests lose at times but do not give this finding analytical significance. Acknowledge that no one may be listening to oil propaganda but do not let this interfere with glowing accounts of its impact. (4) Mix some hard facts with gossip, rumor, unsubstantiated allegations, and conclusions by enemies of oil people. (5) Say nothing about what constitutes a relevant sample of cases so that it is difficult to know what a particular one means.

In so far as one can tell from this great mass of scattered data, actors in the oil industry do not use anything like their full resources to affect political decisions; they frequently follow a self-denying ordinance. They usually concentrate on the oil business and not on the business of politics. The ventures of oil people into non-oil areas are infrequent and overwhelmingly unsuccessful (Facts Forum, the Dixiecrats, exhortations to executives to get into politics). Their influence is limited largely to policies such as depletion allowances which directly affect oil, and on which they can agree. But often it does not extend to foreign policy, import quotas, partisan politics and other areas of disagreement. Some of the oil participants are skillful, but others are woefully inept as in the natural gas case. Their influence varies from region to region, time to time, and even policy to policy within the realm of oil legislation. The political influence enjoyed by segments of the oil industry appears to be due, not surprisingly, to the extraordinary importance of oil to many people all over the country, to the wide distribution of benefits to units such as school districts, to wealth, to good fortune in the crucial political positions of Texans such as Rayburn and Johnson, and

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to the indifference of others. One would like to say more, but the book contains no analysis of the conditions under which various oil interests are and are not successful.

Despite the above commentary, the author has obviously done a great deal of work and has brought together in one place much material bearing on the political life of the oil industry. His chapters on public relations and on prewar cartel agreements are informative. But the net result simply demonstrates the thesis that hard work is no substitute for proper methods and relevant theory.

AARON WILDAVSKY

OBERLIN COLLEGE

Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism. By FERENC A. VÁLI. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961.—xi, 590 pp. $9.75.

Prepared under the auspices of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, this volume is a major contribution to Western scholarly literature on the Hungarian revolution of 1956. As a work of synthesis in this age of specialization, Professor Váli's detailed, factual and well-documented book is particularly welcome. Educated in Hungary and England, Mr. Váli was a professor in the law faculty of the University of Budapest. Arrested in 1951, and freed from prison in September, 1956, he was an eyewitness of the October revolution in Budapest. He fled to the West after the Russian armed intervention in November, and is now on the faculty of the University of Massachusetts.

Dealing briefly with the Communist "take over," Professor Váli's detailed narrative covers five phases of postwar Hungarian history under Soviet-Russian domination. The "Stalinist dictatorship" (1949–1953), under the notorious Muscovite foursome of Rákosi-Gerö-Révai-Farkas, carried out the country's sovietization. The "dual leadership" (1953–1955) was an era of conflicting policies which witnessed Imre Nagy's first rise and fall. The third phase was a period of "single leadership" (1955–1956) which briefly restored Rákosi as sole master. This brought not merely Rákosi's Hungarian political career to an inglorious end, but also precipitated the total disintegration of the satellite regime which Rákosi, as the Kremlin's trusted agent, helped to create in Hungary. The fourth phase saw the triumph and tragedy of the 1956 revolution. Finally, the last phase (since 1957) reintegrated Hungary, with coercion and compromises, into the Soviet bloc.

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The product of this "aftermath of a revolution" was the Kádár regime, whose prestige Khrushchev was eager to promote in order to refute the accusations of satellitism. Váli describes the Khrushchev-Kádár relationship as one of "controlled cooperation." In his conclusions, Váli stresses the fragility of the Communist regimes in Soviet-dominated Central and Eastern Europe, and exhorts the West not to ignore, in its political and military planning, this state of instability.

In view of the pitiful Western performance during the Hungarian revolution of 1956, such exhortations are certainly not out of place. But what about the performance of Western historiography in interpreting the Hungarian revolution? In that respect too one could wish for some improvement.

For instance, Professor Váli duly calls attention to the mistaken Western interpretation which regards the Hungarian declaration of neutrality as one of the major causes of the second, and fatal, Soviet intervention. These commentators confuse cause and effect, says Mr. Váli. The repudiation of the Warsaw Treaty was, in fact, a response to the Soviet military moves which threatened to overthrow the Nagy government (p. 365). Other points, calling for Western rethinking, are the role of the United Nations, the relationship between the Hungarian catastrophe and the Suez affair, and the question of American action and the risk of war. All these delicate issues are boldly and realistically treated in Chapters Twenty-four and Twenty-five; they should be studied carefully indeed by authors whose modern European history texts are coming up for new and revised editions.

This reviewer has only one major criticism: Professor Váli's interpretation of the Hungarian struggle as one of "nationalism versus communism" seems too narrow. There is of course a conflict between the Hungarian nation and the Soviet-imposed communist regime. But great social forces are also at work in shaping the new Hungarian society which in Professor Váli's interpretation are neither sufficiently recognized nor clearly enough defined.

STEPHEN BORSODY

CHATHAM COLLEGE

Independent Eastern Europe: A History. By C. A. MACARTNEY and A. W. PALMER. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1962.—vii, 499 pp. $12.00.

It is sixteen years since the last scholarly history of East Central Europe to be written in English—Hugh Seton-Watson's *Eastern*

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Europe Between the Wars 1918–1941—was published. That work was based on the deceptive assumption that the West and the Soviet Union would cooperate in the postwar world to modernize and democratize Eastern Europe. Moreover, it has been out of print for a long time. Hence the eager expectation with which the academic community has awaited the present study by Macartney and Palmer.

Unfortunately, the authors appear to have committed an error of proportion and organization in devoting the entire first third of their book (146 out of 452 pages of text) to the history of their area before and during the First World War and through the Versailles settlements. It is only with their fourth chapter, "The Anatomy of the New Europe," that they get to the heart of their subject and analyze *independent* East Central Europe. The impression made by this too-lengthy introduction is unfortunate. The specialist will be irritated by the shortcuts and oversimplifications which result from an attempt to summarize the vast sweep of the pre-1919 history of this extensive area in three chapters; the non-expert will frequently be at a loss to see the wood for the trees. In this reader's view, too, the authors err again in the remaining two-thirds of the book by devoting a disproportionately large share of their pages to foreign policy (admittedly important, but covered in other books) and too few to domestic political developments (hardly dealt with as yet in a scholarly fashion in English except for Seton-Watson's somewhat obsolete volume).

The book furthermore shows some signs of haste and careless presentation. In the opening chapters there are too few dates among myriads of other minutiae. We are told (p. 6) that Cracow was a free city "for another thirty years" but we are not given any initial or terminal date and thus have no way of calculating when Cracow ceased to be a free city. British rule over the Ionian Islands is also undated (p. 6) while Danev is replaced by Radoslavov (as premier of Bulgaria) "as early as July 16" (p. 34)—the reader being left to guess the year. The transposition of dates between the Gregorian (Western) and Julian (Eastern) calendars is occasionally inaccurate (p. 30, twice). Proper names are introduced with kaleidoscopic abandon, but no identification, thus gratuitously exasperating the uninitiated reader who will not know offhand the identity of Gounaris (p. 50), Miliukov (p. 135), the Regat (p. 83), Hussarek (p. 88), Kemal (p. 135), and so forth. Then there are technical errors: Akkerman is misspelled (p. 8); the founding of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization is erroneously dated as 1895 (it was 1893) and of

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the Supreme Macedo-Adrianopolitan Committee as 1896 (it was 1895) (pp. 19 and 20).

Such mistakes and inelegancies, while irritating, are minor since that they do not distort the reader's understanding of the facts. More serious are errors, still factual rather than interpretive, which do, however, convey a false view of the historical record.

1. We are told that Ottoman rule in the Balkans was "despotic" and "barbaric." That depended on circumstances of time and place. Until the eighteenth century, political and economic conditions in the Ottoman Empire were generally so favorable that the direction of migration was often from Christian Europe into the Ottoman Empire rather than the reverse. Later, during the empire's decadence, conditions admittedly worsened.

2. During the First World War, the authors say, Pilsudski "... kept the Austro-Polish banner flying ..." (p. 43). In fact, Pilsudski rejected the Austro-Polish policy in favor of independent Polish statehood.

3. In Poland, the authors say in another place, Premier Moraczewski (November 1918—January 1919) "... had in his few weeks of office passed a large amount of radical social legislation ..." (p. 183). In fact, the Moraczewski cabinet had enacted a liberal and democratic electoral-suffrage law but had been specifically prohibited by Chief of State Pilsudski from enacting radical social measures.

4. After his *coup d'état* of May 1926, according to the authors, Pilsudski "... refused to stand for office himself ..." (p. 187). This is quite misleading. Pilsudski, in fact, was elected President by a large majority (May 31), a fact which he interpreted as legitimating his *coup*, and then promptly declined to serve, arranging instead for the subsequent election of Moscicki (June 1).

Such errors appear to result from sheer carelessness in research rather than political or national bias. Indeed, the overall level of politico-historical objectivity of this book is high for one dealing with a controversial and feud-ridden part of the world in the treatment of which history often degenerates into propaganda. Particularly impressive are chapters IV, "The Anatomy of the New Europe," and VII, "The Depression and its Consequences."

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Soviet Industrialization, 1928–1952. By NAUM JASNY. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1961.—xviii, 467 pp. $10.00.

Essays on the Soviet Economy. By NAUM JASNY. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—xiv, 297 pp. $6.00.

The Soviet Economy: An Introduction. By ALEC NOVE. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—328 pp. $6.75.

The Soviet Economy: Structure, Principles, Problems. By NICOLAS SPULBER. New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1962.—xi, 311 pp. $5.95.

These four books fall into two categories: those by Spulber and Nove are textbook introductions to the structure and functioning of the Soviet economy; the two by Jasny are concerned with measuring and evaluating the performance of this economy during three decades of planned industrialization.

Nove's and Spulber's books are splendid additions to the textbook material on the Soviet economy. Written on opposite sides of the Atlantic, they still have an almost startling similarity, not only superficially as in their titles but in their fundamental organization as well. Spulber's is subtitled "structure, principles and problems," and Nove's is divided into three parts dealing with "structure, problems, and concepts and ideas." At the same time the two books differ in their approach to the Soviet economy, and they complement each other nicely. Spulber's book is self-consciously analytical and is conceived on a level abstract enough to represent a model applicable to all the economies of the Soviet bloc. Thus, it contains little in the way of institutional or statistical description and is but little interested in the evolution of the Soviet economy during the industrialization period. The discussion of planning, for example, is cast in the concepts of input-output analysis and linear programming, more because that provides a very appropriate set of concepts for understanding the problem of plan construction than because the Russians do their planning that way. The book is further distinguished from much other writing on the Soviet economy by an attempt to phrase this abstract discussion both in the Marxist idiom used by Soviet planners and economists and in the language of modern economists in the West. Nove's book also contains more discussion of Marxist ideas than has been customary in Western books on the Soviet economy. The aim of reconciling these two conceptual apparatuses is attained in some areas (for example, the discussion of social accounting), but is bound to fail in such areas as resource allocation and efficiency. Never-

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theless, I think that this is a step in the right direction. Western students of the Soviet economy probably have made too little effort to master Marxian economics. Disdaining it as inferior to their own theory (as indeed it is), they have done too little to understand how the Soviet economist views the world. Therefore, they are in a poor position to make sense out of Soviet controversies such as those on the law of value, on rent in a socialist society, and on alternative schemes of price formation. Spulber's discussion is too laconic to demonstrate fully the strengths of this position, but at least the relevant Marxian concepts are treated as worthy of discussion.

Nove approaches these problems in a more concrete fashion. His book is far richer in illustrative material and conveys much better the distinctive flavor of Soviet economy. His exposition of planning, for example, is conducted in terms of the behavior of managers, the flow of information, the role of various organizations, and so on, rather than in the context of equations. Nove's treatment is also much more aware of Soviet economic organization as something dynamic. He discusses recent administrative reforms at some length; and the concluding chapter of his book is much concerned with the evolution of the Soviet economy as it faces such novel problems as maturity and increasing complexity in decision making. Both books contain bibliographies. Indeed, the one in Spulber's book is a regular reading list for a full-scale course on the Soviet economy. Both bibliographies list a number of works in French and German, and not merely for decoration. They serve as a useful reminder that this subject is not the Anglo-American specialty that is sometimes assumed in our teaching of it.

Naum Jasny's approach to the Soviet economy is intensely personal, and is marked by passion and idiosyncrasy. He is a crusader against the lies and pretensions that make up the official Soviet image of their economic performance; and it is this crusade rather than an antiseptic professionalism that inspires his work. *Soviet Industrialization* is dedicated to V. G. Groman, "the planner, the fighter, and the great man;" and the *Essays* carry the slogan on the dedication page, "through frankly acknowledged errors to the truth!" This personal involvement also permeates his attitude toward his colleagues in the search for the truth about Soviet economy. He divides his colleagues into pioneers, knaves, and fools in a way that must both infuriate and also bewilder them as they wonder what they have in common with their associates in a particular category. In surveying the period of Soviet industrialization, he rejects the customary

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division into five-year plans and sets up periods of his own—one fancifully labeled the "Stalin has his own way" period. Dogmatic and quantitatively precise assertions are intermingled with almost Soviet-type confessions of error in past assertions. One can never simply accept one of Jasny's interpretations or conclusions, although none may be casually dismissed. Finally, the organization of his work is chaotic and whimsical.

Despite all these faults, Mr. Jasny's books are both useful and stimulating. They are amazing accomplishments for a man who carries on his research without assistance from others. Not only does Mr. Jasny have a tremendous knowledge of the Soviet economy, he is dedicated to the task of revealing the truth about the Soviet economy. Moreover, he has a special gift for asking new questions about, and seeing new relationships in, the evidence that is uncovered by his investigations. For this reason, he is able to overcome one of the greatest difficulties in doing research on the Soviet economy. Unlike many writers, he does not allow his questions and emphases to be unduly shaped by what the Russians say about themselves or by the theoretical apparatus and historical experience that Western economists bring to the subject. His books hold many fresh ideas and thought-provoking suggestions.

ROBERT W. CAMPBELL

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections, 1868–1910. By CORNELIUS O'LEARY. New York, Oxford University Press, 1962.—253 pp. $5.60.

As Dr. O'Leary remarks, historians of British parliamentary reform have emphasized the broadening of the franchise to the neglect of other aspects of the movement. In his book he adds considerably to our information about one of these neglected areas. "What caused the change in the attitude of Parliament to [corrupt electoral] practices?" "How did the politicians manage to get their reformed ideas across to the public?" These questions, the second rather obscurely formulated, are asked on page four, after which one finds eight chapters mainly chronicling parliamentary efforts to reduce corruption. The narrative is based on much careful research which will be of use to scholars, but it does not go very far toward explicitly answering the questions. Most of the author's answers are found in five pages entitled "Conclusions." This unanalytical approach has led him

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to introduce many irrelevant facts and at the same time omit matters germane to his subject. Surprisingly, there is no careful inquiry into the conditions producing electoral corruption.

Dr. O'Leary is undoubtedly correct in stressing the importance of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, which, he maintains, transformed "the whole character of British electioneering within a generation." In answer to the question as to what led politicians after years of cautious and inadequate measures to take such radical action, he observes that in the absence of extensive popular agitation for the reform they were moved both by "a sense of shame" concerning the large amount of bribery and treating revealed after the election of 1880 and by a desire to be rid of the burdensome expense of corruption. The effectiveness of the ethical motive, believed by Dr. O'Leary to be considerable, is very exaggerated. Politicians had condemned corruption on moral grounds for two centuries but had done little about it, partly because they felt it to be a venial sin, partly because they believed it ineradicable, and partly because reform would affect established interests. According to the author, after the middle of the nineteenth century, "the increasing moral consciousness of the later Victorian period" led to bribery being considered no longer simply as a *malum prohibitum* but also as a *malum in se*. Nothing, however, is presented to document this "moral revulsion" that cannot be found in earlier years; on the other hand, there is some evidence that moral blindness about corruption continued among many politicians into the 1880's. It was the opinion of Sir Henry James, who piloted the 1883 Act through the House of Commons, that it had received broad bipartisan support from M.P.'s primarily because of their desire to reduce the staggering costs of elections. Dr. O'Leary gives us no reason to revise this opinion.

How did the politicians get their "reformed ideas" over to the public. The Act of 1883 by setting a limit to election expenditure and subjecting to severe penalties those guilty of corrupt practices was extremely important, but Dr. O'Leary recognizes that it succeeded only because of a number of circumstances including changes in moral standards, the extension of education, the determination of the new national party organizations to operate within the Act, the severity shown by election judges after 1868, the creation of many new uncorrupted voters and the new attitude of the elector toward his vote as a means for influencing public policy. Most of this seems very likely, except that the author again overstresses ethical motivation and makes the unwarranted assumption that an educated electorate is incorrupti-

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ble. One circumstance he neglects is the tremendous growth in the size of constituencies during the last third of the century which tended to make corruption less practicable.

WILLIAM B. GWYN

BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY

The Federal Interest in Higher Education. By HOMER D. BABBIDGE, JR. and ROBERT M. ROSENZWEIG. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962.—viii, 214 pp. $5.95.

The increasing dependence of American higher education upon federal funds has generated much concern among academicians, both those engaged in teaching and those in administration. It has also inspired a number of books, of which this is one. The authors are, however, in an unusually favorable position to survey the problem. Each has matched experience in higher education with experience in the higher education programs of the United States Office of Education. As a result they are able to see both ends of the growing partnership with sympathetic eyes.

Babbidge and Rosenzweig have set themselves five goals: to describe the pattern of federal relations between universities and the federal government, to identify and evaluate the major issues involved, "to provoke—to provoke concern and discussion" (p. *vi*), to suggest the likely shape of future relationships and to employ the materials at hand to convey "a sense of the process of government" (p. *vii*). Their success in meeting these multiple goals makes the book of substantial interest to several audiences. Those interested in the political process will be attracted to it as a case-study in policy-making; college administrators should find useful the diagnosis of the reasons for the weakness of educational associations as lobbyists; any college teacher, whether in the social sciences or elsewhere, may find value in the volume as an illuminating description of the world in which we have come to live. Fortunately, the book is lucid, stimulating and easy to read.

Inevitably, some omissions are apparent in a volume of such brevity. The authors find only a sentence or two to refer to the administrative problems that result from the suspicions of the Office of Education held by many college officials, and they find no time at all to discuss one major source of such suspicions in the traditional role of the Office as a preserve for professional educators with a teachers college orientation. Conspicuous by its absence—perhaps inevitably in a book written by a former and a present staff member—is any picture of the Office of Education as a place of cross-currents and differences of opinion concerning

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its future; in the description provided, the Office appears to be monolithic and single-purposed.

Probably the most serious weakness, however, lies in the discussion of the perplexing problem of federal control. The authors profess to see little merit in the fears expressed by some that increasing federal subsidies will bring increasing federal constraints. Rather curiously, they cite the land-grant colleges at one point to show "there is no evidence whatsoever that federal officials have attempted to influence the substance of any course or discipline" (p. 154), while at another place they devote several pages to the problems posed by "compulsory ROTC" (pp. 58–60). *Hamilton v. Board of Regents of the University of California,* 293 U.S. 245 (1934) would also be in point.

Still more disappointing is the treatment given to the loyalty issue. The authors discuss it in two connections, the security investigations of the early 1950's and the notorious NDEA disclaimer affidavit. The former problem they dismiss on two grounds: the McCarthy period is past; and "as bad as were the acts of the Federal Government, its shame must be shared by virtually every part of the society" (p. 160). Ignored is the very real question whether a future Senator McCarthy—a possibility that must, after all, be considered—would find the federal appropriations process a powerful lever over university administrators.

The argument offered in regard to the NDEA disclaimer affidavit is still more disingenuous. The authors treat the action of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1961 to limit the character of the loyalty restriction as equivalent to governmental action and cite as the moral: ". . . there is vitality enough in our political system to ensure against the imposition of such conditions on those who are vigilant in defense of their freedoms" (pp. 161–62). Although their prophecy of repeal proved accurate, the interpretation seems unduly optimistic.

A more convincing alternative line of argument is also advanced: that if federal money brings "federal control," state money brings "state control," private money brings "private control," and so forth. It is unfortunate that this avenue could not have been traveled farther by the authors; it reflects, however, the fact that the book treats federal-university relations as a partnership of two, almost entirely excluding consideration of the impact of federal funds on the efforts of states to provide higher education for their citizens.

FRANK MUNGER

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

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BOOK NOTES

The republication of *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale,* which is the English translation of Bodin's *Six livres de la république,* done by Richard Knolles in 1606, and now edited by Kenneth Douglas McRae (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962; 214, 794 pp., $22.50) is something of a scholarly event, for it makes available the only complete translation of this work in English and is, indeed, the first complete publication of Bodin's classic in any language since the middle of the seventeenth century. The Knolles text represents a conflation of the French version of the *République* (original edition published in 1576) with the revised translation into Latin done by Bodin himself in 1586. This, indeed, was the main consideration in Mr. McRae's decision to republish it, for in his opinion Bodin's two versions are so discrepant and yet so equal in value that both must be combined for a proper understanding of his thought. But, even apart from this, one might note certain practical considerations in favor of republication. Since the Knolles translation is reasonably sound and surely accurate enough to be conveniently corrected, and since Bodin's strength as a writer does not primarily depend on closely reasoned argument or literary style, there would be little to be gained from the prodigious labor of retranslating such a massive work. Mr. McRae, indeed, has done a very elaborate and impressive job of compensating for the weaknesses in Knolles. Misprints and mistranslations have been exhaustively corrected; almost all omitted materials have been supplied; and, where significant, there are variant readings from the French or Latin text where Knolles did not conflate, as well as variations from French editions which Knolles did not consult. It is unfortunate, however, that the Knolles text has been photographically reproduced since this is not only a strain upon the eyes, but means that archaisms of orthography and language have been handed on unaltered and that corrections of misprints and the like could not be inserted directly in the text. The introduction, finally, is highly useful, scholarly and literate. It includes, among other things, a sketch of Bodin's career which incorporates important recent findings, a brief survey of his political doctrine which properly emphasizes his systematic and synthetic goals, and a bibliography of editions of the *République* which is more complete and informative than the older one in Chauviré. It should also be noted very thankfully that with this volume we

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finally have a reliable index to the text, those appended to the old editions being almost hopelessly chaotic.—JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, Columbia University.

For more than forty-five years a major department of the Central Government of the United Kingdom has had general responsibility for encouraging scientific research and the application of its results. The inherent difficulties of reconciling stable government and administration with such prime generators of change as basic scientific research and advanced technologies give special value to an authoritative description of this department—*The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research* (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York, Oxford University Press, 1962; 200 pp., $4.00) by Sir Harry Melville, F.R.S.—written by its present director and published as No. 9 of the New Whitehall Series prepared under the auspices of the Royal Institute of Public Administration. The DSIR reflects its origins in the World War I experience of fighting the country which had been looked to for scientific and industrial leadership in chemicals and other industries vital to a nation's security. Since its inception in 1915 it has assumed, with the guidance of a council of eminent scientists, four related tasks: encouraging pure scientific research and education in the universities by grants and fellowships; promoting applied research by sharing with industries the costs of their cooperative research associations; establishing its own research laboratories when necessary; and disseminating scientific and technical information. This book thus describes how the Department has administered its responsibilities and been reconciled to budgetary and other restraints. Changes in the administrative design of the DSIR seem more responsive to problems of government and the literal performance of its tasks and programs than to basic changes in the content of science and corresponding reinterpretations of the Department's function. Scientific discoveries and changes in the costs of research have buffeted the Department but there has been little effort to anticipate, let alone guide, the changed place of science in society and the shifting definitions and importance of many categories of scientific exploration and of sectors of industry. Whether any continually effective governmental body can be established to encourage and guide unroutinized scientific activities remains an open question, but it is well to be reminded that the DSIR has had responsibilities of this sort for much longer than its younger and more fragmented counterparts in the United States. If this account of the DSIR does not make it possible to measure the

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Department's past effectiveness in terms of the absolute potential of science for growth and social applications, at least it will be a welcome aid to much needed analytical studies which would compare governmental mechanisms for the support and direction of science with each other and with mechanisms for performing more traditional governmental functions.—CHRISTOPHER WRIGHT, Columbia University.

Boss Cermak of Chicago by Alex Gottfried (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1962; xiii, 459 pp., $6.50), is a book that left this reviewer with mixed emotions. On the positive side, the work gives evidence of much honest effort. The author has compiled a staggering amount of information and has organized it in a reasonably readable fashion. Furthermore, the use of sociological data on the ethnic groups in Chicago provides background material which is helpful in understanding the sources of Cermak's power. Nevertheless, it was a struggle to read the book from cover to cover. Perhaps there are too many data in it. The main stumbling block, however, is that Cermak never "comes through" as an adult personality. The first chapter deals with his childhood and we see him as "a lusty, brawling, drinking, pugnacious, undisciplined youth with a deserved reputation as a 'tough fellow!' He was not much hampered by consideration or sensitivity toward others." (p. 14). Later chapters deal with him as "State Representative" or "Boss of the Council" or Mayor or "Boss of Illinois." We are left with the impression that he continued to be an extremely aggressive person, but he remains a somewhat shadowy figure until the last chapter when an attempt is made to assess his character. Perhaps the last chapter, or at least portions of it, should have appeared earlier in the book. Not surprisingly, the most interesting portion of the book deals with Cermak's death in Florida. The author's description of the attempted assassination of Roosevelt and the "accidental" shooting of Cermak make dramatic reading. The account of Cermak's lingering illness and death is well written and perceptive. It provides more insights into Cermak and the kind of person he was than any other part of the book. Perhaps it is because there are more data available on this part of his personal life than on others. For the political scientist, however, the important issue is whether the book provides useful insights into the political process. It succeeds on this count. It describes in detail the way in which the city boss functions and what the sources of his power are. It should also be useful to sociologists and social psychologists, for it provides interesting material on the inter-

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action of ethnic groups and their leaders, and the relation between personality types and the success of politicians.—JOHN H. FENTON, University of Massachusetts.

"My experiences are not exceptional," writes Zbigniew Stypulkowski in his *Invitation to Moscow* (New York, Walker and Co., 1962; xvi, 360 pp., $5.95). Perhaps to the unfortunate millions living in Central and Eastern Europe who suffered untold horrors and destruction his story is no more tragic than theirs, but certainly more exceptional. A lawyer and member of parliament for the National Democratic Party, Stypulkowski writes in ardent and at times hyperbolic tones in support of the cause he believes just, the re-establishment of an independent Poland. His personal account of suffering and heroism becomes a chronicle for his time beginning with the German invasion of Poland. Fleeing Nazi forces, the author was first imprisoned in the Soviet Union and then handed over to the Germans. By keeping his wits he was able to secure his release. Upon returning to Polish soil Stypulkowski soon became an important figure in the Underground. Particularly harrowing were his experiences during the ill-timed Warsaw rising of 1944 which in sixty-three days of tenacious fighting saw the city reduced to rubble. As fate would have it, however, Stypulkowski's travails did not end with the German occupation. The Soviet Union, determined to discredit the Polish Underground to prevent it from taking part in any postwar government, arrested sixteen of its leaders, the author among them, after having promised them safe conduct to Great Britain—a foreshadowing of what was to happen to Imre Nagy—and charged them with committing crimes of sabotage against the Red Army. A show trial was staged in June 1945 in which Stypulkowski was the only defendant who did not confess despite being subjected to protracted periods of interrogation of three to fifteen hours 141 times in seventy days. A perceptive foreword by Trevor-Roper introduces the volume.—HENRY W. MORTON, Queens College.

The story of the expansion and consolidation of British control in Africa in the Victorian period has been neglected in past years. The emphasis in contemporary literature on Africa has been on the new nationalism. The detailed and careful recounting of the sources of imperial influences on nineteenth-century English government in *Africa and the Victorians,* by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961; xii, 491 pp., $9.00), provides a valuable counter-

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weight to the present tendency toward emphasis on African political development. Even more important than these new insights is the author's thesis that nineteenth-century British expansion in Africa was not motivated so much by commercial or missionary interest as by the overriding concern with the safety of imperial routes to the East: "If papers left by the policy-makers are to be believed, they moved into Africa not to build an African empire but to protect the old Empire in India. What decided when and where they could go forward was their traditional conception of world strategy." Past histories of British policy in Africa have stressed the response of the British government to the demands of the missionaries and the trading companies for protection. The actions which were part of this response resulted in the acquisition of new territories. But the authors of the present volume see this as only a partial and limited explanation. To them, the latent strivings of what was in the mid-twentieth century to be the storm of African nationalism, were already vaguely felt by the statesmen of nineteenth-century England. It was this, rather than considerations of private citizens at home or the situation in Europe, which prompted the Victorian leaders to move in Africa. The authors stress that no single explanation serves to account for nineteenth-century British imperialism, but the new elements they have introduced into the traditional explanations of this phenomenon will be of substantial value in future research.—L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia University.

One rarely encounters a study of a religious freedom issue such as *Render Unto Caesar: The Flag Salute Controversy* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962; 321 pp., $5.50) by David R. Manwaring, that is not only well written but judicious in its selection of material and balanced in its evaluation of evidence. Professor Manwaring has studied the factors involved in the Supreme Court's decisions, first in favor of compulsory flag salute, in *Minersville School District v. Gobitis* (1940), and then against, in *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett* (1943). He presents the reader with a careful analysis of the complex blend of social, theological and legal elements behind the finally successful attempt of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a highly articulate and persistent religious minority group, to have the Court recognize the religious freedom issue involved in the flag salute ceremony in the public schools. Of particular interest to this reviewer were his observations about various aspects of the *Gobitis* case, the vigor and perceptiveness of Judge Maris in the District Court decision of 1938, the theoretical differences between Justices

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Frankfurter and Stone, the wave of anti-Witness feeling and actual persecution between 1940 and 1943 and, lastly, the general public dissatisfaction over the decision. Equally fascinating is his discussion of the significance of the intervening *Jones v. Opelika* (1942) decision, and the generally careless and polemical quality of the American Civil Liberties Union briefs on a fundamental libertarian issue where careful presentation and discretion would have been more helpful and desirable. Both the expert and the layman will find this a fascinating excursion into one of the most exciting and complex debates on religious liberty in recent times.—HAROLD STAHMER, Barnard College.

Leon Goure's, *The Siege of Leningrad* (London, Oxford University Press; Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962, xii, 363 pp., $6.95), a RAND Corporation Research Study, gives the Western reader his first detailed account of what was surely one of the most heroic feats of the Second World War. From August 1941 until January 1944, the citizens of Leningrad were almost completely surrounded by the invading German and Finnish armies. Dependent primarily on those supplies which could be brought in via the ice road built across Lake Ladoga, the population suffered indescribable torment. The city became "a great charnel house." Of its original three-million inhabitants, over one million died from the effects of starvation (their diet consisted mainly of "blockade bread," that is, an admixture of flour, cellulose, sawdust, tree bark and leather scrapings, washed down with a broth of boiled buttons), cold, disease and bombardment. With painstaking attention to details, the author examines the reaction of the Soviet authorities to this situation and how, under the stress of extreme crisis, the populace responded to the various measures taken to save the city. He discusses the factors which help understand how Leningrad survived and explains why the citizens of Leningrad, confronted by actual starvation, at no time revolted, rioted or in any significant way challenged the authority of the government. This book, testifying to the fundamental effectiveness and toughness of the Soviet political system as well as the weaknesses and limitations of its control apparatus, examines with considerable insight the motives which inspired the ordinary Leningrader to remain obedient, to continue to work and to make endless sacrifices under the most appalling conditions. One could only wish that the author had been less concerned with minute details. The endless flow of statistics tends to reduce his otherwise brilliant study into a soulless clinical analysis. The saga of Leningrad's survival deserves more sympathetic treatment.—MORTON SCHWARTZ, University of California, Riverside.

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